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ABSTRACT
In recent years, cities across the United States have
invested considerable amounts of public funds to finance the
construction of stadium facilities.

Supporters of these

projects have utilized, through the use of multiplier
effects, positive direct and indirect economic outcomes, as
well as community building and cultural identification
factors to argue in favor of these public expenditures.

As

sports become part of a culture industry, questions remain
as to whether these sports construction projects are viable
urban development tools.
This study examines the relationship between three
urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour
Square, Lake View and Near West Side) and the stadiums which
rest within their boundaries.

Qualitative and quantitative

data was employed to conduct this research and investigate
the relationship among stadium development, business
interests and community issues.
This study concludes that (1) there is a strong
relationship between the interests of stadium developers and
the actions of public officials, who work to support private
enterprise,

(2) Race matters since minority communities

prove to be more directly affected by these projects,
v

(3)

the media plays an important role as it works to support the
interest of the developers,

(4) social inequality proves to

be the outcome of these projects within the urban
environment, and (5) the stadium as an urban development
tool is capable of not only reorganizing the physical space
but also of transforming local culture.
development can effect urban change.

vi

Thus, stadium
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Goal of this Project
Urban development and its implications toward the
quality of life for those residing within the urban
environment has been shaped by multiple factors.

The

primary emphasis on ecological, political and economic
factors, as ways to understand urban processes, has often
excluded the investigation and impact of various cultural
influences.
Cultural aspects affect the character of the
metropolis.

More specifically, cultural differences, as

represented by the effects of social factors such as income,
education, race, etc., inform the organization of the urban
environment.

Symbolic values, such as dress code and

reliance on the automobile can help differentiate between
experiencing life in New York and experiencing life in Los
Angeles.

These symbolic values have emerged from both

historical and demographic variations (Gottdiener, 1994) and
can assist in the creation of positively identified images
of place (Hummon, 1986).
One of the cultural factors which has shaped and
continues to shape the urban environment has been that of
1

2

professional sports.

Professional sports and the stadiums

which host their teams have utilized cities across America
as places of operation.

These sports enterprises are unique

when compared to other businesses that affect the character
of a metropolitan area.

Though they retain the profit

oriented mode which typifies other businesses, they are
often perceived as a collective representation of a
metropolis while depicting the qualities of its residents.
As a result, professional sports can construct the
metropolitan character.

The presence of a team becomes a

cultural symbol of the city.

These symbolic images of

sports become powerful tools of city identification, capable
of leaving a mark on the urban terrain and its communities.
This project examines the relationship between
three urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour
Square, Near West Side and Lake View) and the stadiums which
rest within their boundaries (New Comiskey Park, United
Center and Wrigley Field).
this research is threefold.

Specifically, the purpose of
The first is to investigate the

development of these sports facilities and their
relationship to the community.
here are:

The issues to be addressed

What role did the local and/or state government

play in the construction of these stadiums?

What

rationale(s) were utilized to support these developments and
what was the site selection process?

How did the local

communities respond to these development plans?

What were

3

the consequences of these developments on these urban
communities?

Who won and who lost?

The second purpose is to compare how these three
communities experienced the stadium development plans.
Issues to be addressed here include: What is the ongoing
relationship between these urban developments and the local
communities?

Are there any similarities and/or differences

in the way the sports developers managed to achieve their
goals?

Are there any similarities and/or differences in the

way the three urban communities responded to the development
plans?

If so, what might account for the similarities

and/or differences?
Finally, the third purpose is to draw on the general
patterns of recent stadium development as representations of
the changing nature of capitalism.

The issues to be

addressed here are: What might be driving the recent
construction of stadium facilities across the United States?
What is the general relationship between this gentrification
of stadiums and the role of government?

How does this

collaboration between sport enterprise and government
support, as exemplified by stadium development, differ from
other cases where government engages in activity aimed at
advancing the interests of free enterprise?

Does the study

of stadium development, help us better understand the
evolving relationship between social institutions and
capitalism within the urban environment?

What role does

4

urban communities play in these processes?
This research will build on the work of sociologists
who have been concerned with urban development and the
various roles of determining the political and economic
directions of the city, including the social implications on
urban life.

Also, political scientists who have been

interested in the government's role in supporting urban
development projects such as stadium construction.

Finally,

sport sociologists who have been concerned with the social
significance of sport and its infiltration and impact on
various social institutions, specifically urban communities.
Cities across the United States invest considerable
amounts of public funds to finance the construction of
stadium facilities.

To rationalize their "need", supporters

of these projects have utilized positive, direct and
indirect economic outcomes and cultural identification
factors.

They have also upheld the status, which these

types of cities are perceived to gain by becoming accepted
into the unique "major league club", as a key element in
making public investment in these projects worthwhile.
Thus, drawing from these general developments, the purpose
of this study is to investigate the relationship among (1)
stadium development,

(2) business interests and (3)

community issues in Chicago.

5

Selection of Communities and Stadiums for Case Studies
The presence of five major league professional
franchises in Chicago (White Sox, Bears, Cubs, Blackhawks
and Bulls) provided four different opportunities to
investigate the relationship between the local communities
and the sport enterprise as expressed through the
construction of stadium facilities

(both the Blackhawks and

Bulls play at the United Center) .

The unique opportunity to

have two of these stadiums, the New Comiskey Park in South
Armour Square and the United Center on the Near West Side,
complete their construction and open within the last few
years, made those stadiums two strong candidates for
inclusion.

In addition, the nature of the local communities

as areas experiencing economic and social distress - a fact
which was utilized as a rationale for building these
facilities at these locations - made for interesting
circumstances to study.
The construction of the United Center on the Near West
Side and of the New Comiskey Park in South Armour Square,
are two recent developments exemplifying the relationship
between the urban environment and professional teams.

In

looking at these two communities, one can note a number of
similarities.

However, the dynamics which brought about the

construction of these sports facilities are quite different.
Both the United Center and the New Comiskey Park have
affected these communities and will continue to shape the

6

landscape of their urban environment in the future.
The location of Soldiers Field (current home of the
Bears), at the lakefront, does not make it an attractive
option to be included as a case study.

This stadium is

isolated from a residential community and fits well within
the museum/landmark campus which exists on that general area
of Lakeshore Drive.

Yet, the professional franchise of the

Bears and its impact on the urban environment, as part of
this intense stadium development, can be examined on the
Near West Side.

It was there when, in the mid to late SO's,

a strong effort took place to build a 75,000 spectator,
open-air stadium for the Bears.

This expansion effort will

be considered when examining the relationship between the
Near West Side and the United Center.
Finally Wrigley Field, on the north side of the city,
is a ballpark of special status.

It continues to attract

fans even though the Cubs have poor seasons on the field.
It is also one of the only three ballparks left which
represent the "old" era of stadiums in America (the other
two being Tiger Stadium and Fenway Park) .

The community in

which Wrigley Field is located has in recent years attracted
a younger crowd.

This case study also offers an insight on

the issue of stadium development. Specifically, the
introduction of lights at Wrigley Field made this ballpark
become the last stadium in the major leagues to have night
games.

7

It is because of these reasons that these three
communities and their stadiums fit well within the scope of
this project and have been chosen as case studies.

At the

same time, these three stadiums will provide an additional
opportunity to compare a stadium of 'historic status', such
as that of Wrigley Field, to the other two stadiums, which
are patterned after a "new shopping mall" form of
development.

Simultaneously, having three very different

communities will also allow for unique comparisons to
emerge.

Methodology
The case study approach is an appropriate way to study
the development of sport stadiums and their
relationship/effect to local communities.

First, the case

study approach provides an opportunity to integrate a
historical perspective to the analysis and investigate the
political, economic and social influences which brought
about the construction of these facilities.

Second, case

studies will allow for variations and similarities to
emerge.

For example, the demographic composition of the

communities involved in these stadium development processes,
their organizational strategies, the role of the local
political leadership, their physical location within the
city, the degree of city and state intervention, the role of
the media, etc., allow for interesting comparisons.

Yet,

8

examined comprehensively, these cases studies will provide
an opportunity to move from the micro to a macro level of
analysis and draw conclusions about the relationship between
stadium development and urban communities in general.
The case studies of these three urban, stadium
communities will be based on:

(1) a review of newspaper

accounts of events related to these stadium developments,
(2) interviews,

(3) inclusion of census data from 1980 and

1990 for these communities, and (4) review of local
documents/publications.

Specifically:

Review of newspaper accounts:

The events which led to the

stadium development examined in these three case studies
received considerable coverage by local and national media.
Much of the coverage concentrated on issues related to site
selection, finance, role of the local and state government,
community response to the development plans, etc.

A history

of the social, political and economic occurrences which led
to the construction of the new Comiskey Park and United
Center, and the installation of lights at Wrigley Field will
prove useful in understanding these stadium development
issues.
Interviews:

Another source of data employed was the

interviews which were conducted with community leaders and
others involved in the stadium issues.

Using a snowball

effect, I identified individuals engaged in the community
response to the stadium development plans.

These
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individuals included local activists, stadium preservation
advocates and even an architect.

For example, in the case

of the new Comiskey Park, the response of the South Armour
Square residents was discussed with community leaders.

A

stadium architect, critical of contemporary "urban ballpark
design" who had proposed an alternative stadium development
plan in that same area was interviewed.

Finally, other

organization leaders like those of the "Save Our Sox" group
which argued that it was the increased profit on the part of
the ownership and not the disintegrating old Comiskey which
drove the demands for a new ballpark were also interviewed.
In the process of these interviews, the tactics of setting
one city against another for the public finance of a new
stadium for the White Sox were revealed.
Similar interviews were conducted for the other case
studies.

In the case of Wrigley Field, the effect of the

lights on the local community was discussed with the owners
of local businesses.

These interactions provided additional

insights to this analysis.

It is important to note here,

that, due to the large number of individuals involved with
these issues, these interviews were utilized as means to
access information which complemented the other methods of
data collection employed in this project.
Census data:

The use of census data was also utilized in

these case studies at two different levels:

(1) at the

community level, and (2) at the census track level.

Even
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though the New Comiskey Park and the United Center were
built after the 1990 census was completed, they were both
constructed next to the previous facilities.

As a result,

the use of census data provided insights on the social and
economic characteristics of the surrounding community.

In

addition to community characteristics, census track data
from around the ballpark in the Wrigley Field/Lake View case
study was employed.

Specifically, 1980 and 1990 census

tract data was utilized to convey population changes and
compare socioeconomic trends in the area surrounding the
ballpark.
Local documents/publications:

The last source of data for

these case studies was the review of local
documents/publications.

'For example, community

organizations involved with these stadium related issues,
produced documents crucial to understanding these urban
developments.

Similarly, various documents published by the

City of Chicago and/or the franchises themselves were
incorporated in the analysis.

Such publications included,

neighborhood assessments, neighborhood improvement and
protection plans, surveys by the sports franchises on
community impact, reports on the teams' value for Chicago,
committee minutes, reports by the city, community
redevelopment plans, etc.
The general questions which will guide this research
project include:
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1.

What is the business climate within which urban centers

across America operate?
2.

Is growth an urban development strategy utilized by

cities?
3.

What is the general relationship between the state and

private investment within urban development?
4.

Are professional sports franchises and stadiums being

viewed to be part of an urban development strategy?
5. What types of rationales are employed by cities to
support these projects?
6. What are the social implications and community effects of
these projects?
7.

What role does the political system, local or state,

play in the stadium development plans of this study?
8.

In the case of neighborhood residents, how were they

impacted by these changes?
9.

How did the community organize to respond to these

development plans?
10.

Has the stadium development impacted

positively/negatively on the local community?
11.

What role has the media played in this process?

12.

Does the case of the United Center on the West Side

of Chicago, the New Comiskey Park in South Armour and the
developments in Wrigley Field, with the addition of lights,
represent the changing role and structure of stadiums within
urban communities?
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13.

Is there a relationship between the socioeconomic

status of the community and the site selection process?
14.

Does such status impact upon the response of the

community and upon the benefits/losses incurred after or
during the construction?

Organization of the Project
The general questions identified above will direct this
analysis to better understand the relationship between
professional sports and urban environments.
divided into four parts.

This project is

The first part, which includes

chapters 1 and 2, provides an introduction to the research,
the methodology employed for conducting the three case
studies, and the identification of two major factors

(role

of state intervention and cultural symbolism in urban
development) which provide the theoretical framework for
this project.
The second part of this analysis includes chapters 3
and 4.

This part investigates the rationales utilized by

cities across America to support the construction of
stadiums.

According to city officials, large public

investments in stadium construction are necessary since
without them professional franchises cannot be retained or
attracted.
Chapter 3 examines the use of the multiplier effect in
input-output analysis.

Public spending in projects like
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stadiums has been rationalize through economic multipliers.
The chapter investigates the multiplier use in various areas
including the defense industry, manufacturing, tourism, the
arts and sports.

The chapter concludes with a critique of

this methodology, outlining its limitations.
Chapter 4 assesses the proposed social benefits
reported to result from the presence of a professional
sports franchise in cities across America.

Drawing from the

functionalist perspective in sports, arguments related to
social cohesion, community building and perceived urban
status are discussed.

This chapter concludes with an

assessment of these social based arguments.
Part three consists of five chapters.

Chapters 5, 6,

7, 8, and 9, concentrate on the three case studies in
Chicago.

These case studies examine the three recent

stadium developments and their effects on Chicago's local
communities.
Chapter 5 provides the political economy of the new
Comiskey Park's construction.

It analyzes the rationales

behind the deteriorating condition of the old Comiskey Park
and the demands for a new facility in South Armour Square,
on the south side of the city.

This chapter also discusses

the strategy utilized by the ownership of the White Sox team
to obtain a new stadium by setting suburban communities, the
City of Chicago and the City of St. Petersburg in Florida
against each other in return for the franchises' presence.
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This chapter concludes with a discussion of the more than
generous financial package which the State of Illinois and
the City of Chicago awarded to retain the White Sox.
Chapter 6 investigates the response of the local
community to this project, community organizing, the role of
the local political leadership, displacement, cultural
implications and redevelopment efforts following the
construction of this facility.

The chapter concludes with

the presentation of an alternative plan which, though it
received no serious consideration, could have had a
different influence on the local community.

Specifically,

according to its architectural designer, this plan could
have produced limited displacement and possibly worked in
such a way as to provide a "real" urban development
opportunity for the area.
Chapter 7 addresses the political economy of Wrigley
Fields' stadium development plans on the north side of the
city.

Specifically, the interest on the part of baseball's

Cubs to install lights on the last ballpark in the Major
League to play only day games, was economically motivated.
When the local community of Lake View responded to these
plans with dissatisfaction and as legal efforts to approve
the installation of lights proved fruitless, the Cubs
threatened to leave for a suburban location and cease
playing at historic Wrigley Field.

This chapter also

investigates the response of the Chicago City Council and
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the politics related to the final approval of the lights
installation, regardless of continued expressions of
community dissatisfaction.
Chapter 8 examines the implications of the stadium
development plans at Wrigley Field and its effect on the
local community of Lake View.

After a discussion of

community efforts and various strategies utilized by
resident organizations, the chapter addresses the response
of the city to the demands of the community.

It becomes

clear that the advancement of a protection and improvement
plan allowed these residents to have a say as to how the
problems of traffic, congestion, and others would be
addressed after the fact of lights installation.

The

chapter concludes with an investigation of how a permit
parking program around the ballpark and the presence of
night games assisted in transforming the surrounding
community into an entertainment district.

Possible long

term implications of the lights for the community are also
discussed.
Chapter 9 examines community response to development
plans by the Chicago Bears in the mid to late 80's to
construct a large, open-air football stadium, and of the
Chicago Bulls and Blackhawks in the 1990's to build a large
sporting indoor arena.

Both of those stadium development

efforts took place on the Near West Side of Chicago.

The

chapter outlines the urban development claims which could
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flow into this economically disadvantaged community by the
presence of these sports facilities.

In addition, the

defeat of the Bears' plans and the eventual construction of
the United Center is discussed.

The implications for this

west side community from these stadium development plans,
including displacement, the role of the local media, the
role of the local and state governments, as well as
reorganization of the west side of the city are also
addressed in this chapter.
The fourth part of this project consists of two
chapters.

Chapter 10, compares the three case studies and

chapter 11 provides conclusions.
Chapter 10 provides a comparative view of the three
case studies conducted in this project.

This chapter

discusses the differences and similarities of the three
urban communities, the differences and similarities in the
government response to the needs/demands of the residents
and stadium developers, issues related to displacement, race
and class, the role of the media and the possible long term
effects of these stadium development plans on these three
urban communities.
Finally, chapter 11 concludes with how cultural factors
such as sporting events and the presence of professional
franchises, through stadium development plans have direct
implications and shape the urban environment.

In that

regard, professional sports becomes a case where through
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their presence, economic interests are advanced.

In the

process, government support is easily generated making this
another example where the political and economic systems
become responsible for determining the nature and
development of the urban environment.

CHAPTER 2
THE STATE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: STADIUMS AND URBAN GROWTH
Introduction
Urban centers across America are increasingly faced
with multiple economic, social and political challenges,
some of which have never before been encountered.

Local

political leadership often steps in and responds to these
issues through the use of innovative approaches such as
facilitating business licensing, establishing economic
development corporations, creating industrial parks,
floating industrial development revenue bonds, land-write
downs, direct loans, employee training programs, etc ...
(Wolman 1979; Bessire, 1981; Huddleston, 1984; Seymour,
1985; Malizia, 1985; Rubin and Rubin, 1987).
In addition, the recent construction of sports
facilities to attract professional sports franchises has
been viewed as another effective urban development strategy.
These partnerships between public and private sectors,
provide examples where public investment in private
development become critical to urban change.
The literature on stadium construction as an urban
development strategy, which includes the effect of these
projects on urban communities, franchise relocation and city
18
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competition, the political economy of sports, its
implications on the urban environment, etc., lacks a solid
theoretical foundation.

The coverage of these and related

issues is primarily conducted by journalists whose reports
appear in local and national newspapers, as well as other
related forms of mass media.

Social scientists have not

engaged in concentrated efforts to investigate the dynamics
of stadium development, leaving the literature in this field
sparse.
Though the relationship of sports to the urban
environment is generally under-researched, political
scientists have recently conducted most of the research in
assessing the relationship between government and sports as
expressed through franchise relocation and stadium
investment issues (Johnson, 1979; 1983; 1986; 1993; Johnson
and Frey, 1985; Euchner, 1993).

Similarly, economists have

addressed the business relationship between sports and
stadiums, including the operational aspects of professional
franchises

(Scully, 1989; Quirk and Fort, 1992; Baim, 1994;

Gorman and Calhoun, 1994).

Although sociologists have

engaged in work in the general area of sport and society
(Boyle, 1963; Edwards, 1973; Nixon, 1976; Figler, 1981;
Snyder and Spreitzer, 1989; Coakley, 1990; Leonard, 1993),
very little attention has been placed on investigating the
role of stadiums and their relationship to local urban
communities within the framework of capitalist operations.
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Due to the limited analysis conducted in this area,
this chapter identifies two major points which provide an
insight into understanding the relationship between stadiums
and urban development.

The first point addresses the

relationship between state intervention and urban
development as framed within a Marxist model of political
economy driven by the growth machine/growth ideology.

State

investment in private projects such as stadiums has been
viewed as resulting in community-wide economic benefits.
Advocates of these projects claim extraordinary economic
benefits through the use of multiplier effects and economic
impact studies.

Similarly, driven by these same rationales,

cities compete with eachother as they attempt to attract or
retain professional franchises at considerable public
expense.

Professional sports teams and stadium construction

then becomes a part of an urban growth strategy.
The second point concentrates on the role of cultural
elements.

In this regard theorists have searched for

answers regarding urban development through an analytical
incorporation of the ways cultural aspects influence and
shape urban centers.

Specifically, stadium construction as

a form of urban development is unique, since, in addition to
the economic arguments of revitalization and redevelopment,
professional sports franchises have also been viewed by
cities as cultural communicators, sources of prestige,
capable of constructing the identity of its citizenry and
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producing sentiments and experiences which result in
community building.

Sports then, like the arts, urban

tourism, landmark sites, theme parks, etc., can be viewed as
part of a culture industry.
This chapter frames the theoretical issues on which the
following chapters, on the use of multipliers and social
rationales for the support of professional franchises and
stadium construction, rely.

Similarly, these theoretical

perspectives will assist in reflecting on the case studies
of this project.

Thus, it is elements of the growth

ideology and the "new" urban sociology, which provide a
comprehensive theoretical framework in understanding urban
development as it relates to stadium construction and
ensuing community impact.

Growth Machine and Growth Ideology
In response to urban ecology, the growth machine and
growth ideology has emerged as a perspective of
understanding and doing urban science.

Urban ecology

theories and analysis, influenced by the biological
sciences, searched to investigate the development of the
"natural areas" in the urban environment (Park 1969; Park,
Burgess and McKenzie, 1925; Hoyt, 1933; Harris and Ullman,
1945; Hawley 1950; 1956; Wingo, 1961; Losch, 1964; Berry and
Kasandra, 1977) .

This approach to studying urban society is

generally incomplete since it fails to include the effect of
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cultural factors in addition to business and government
interests.

Human ecology also fails in its consideration of

the economy since it has a limited view of the competitive
nature and multiple representations of capitalism.

Its

monolithic view, regarding the primacy of the core when
addressing urban development patterns, does not integrate
the ideology of growth.
Molotch (1976), and later Logan and Molotch (1987),
described the city as a "growth machine."

According to this

approach, growth can provide an explanation of the dynamics
of urban development.

The growth machine/growth ideology is

a response to the functionalist perspective which was
utilized to explain the nature and interrelationship of
political powers amongst various urban communities. 1
Cities engage in activities which are directed towards
growth.
1

Molotch (1976: 309-310) writes on this approach of

This functionalist approach emphasizes the
departure from a centralized model of urban power and
political control. Operating through competing interest
groups, citizens have an opportunity to influence
government, thus, making the political system responsive to
organized groups.
Power then rests in multiple centers
rather than single interests (Dahl, 1967; 1989). Based on
these assumptions, it is noted that as cities expand, the
political power will be decentralized and a pluralist model
will emerge. Thus, large heterogeneous urban structures and
the varying political interests, which urban development
produces, are accommodated by pluralist structures of power
(Dahl, 1961; Clark, 1968, Polsby, 1980). Bachrach and
Baratz (1962) have criticized this model and according to
Schattschneider (1960:35): "The flaw in the pluralistic
heaven is that heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent." The elite theory has also surfaced as an
alternative perspective to both these majoritarian and
pluralist models of democracy (Mills, 1956; Dye, 1990).
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seeing the city as a growth machine:
I speculate that the political and economic essence of
virtually any given locality, in the present American
context, is growth.
I further argue that the desire
for growth provides the key operative motivation
toward consensus for members of politically mobilized
local elites, however split they might be on other
issues, and that a common interest in growth is the
overriding communality among important people in a
given locale-at least insofar as they have any
important local goals at all.
Further, this growth
imperative is the most important constraint upon
available options for local initiative in social and
economic reform.
It is thus that I argue that the very
essence of a locality is its operation as a growth
machine.
. .. The city is, for those who count, a growth
machine.
As a result, the drive for growth provides both the
rationale and the need for capital investment.

These

activities are most often advanced by elites who control the
political, economic and cultural aspects of the city.
Consequently, their priorities affect the overall nature of
the urban environment, particularly land use patterns.
It is through this growth driven ideology that
capitalists will have an opportunity to generate conditions
supportive of their goal which simply is to create profit.
For example, as the city expands and grows there is an
additional demand for services which the existing tax-base
cannot support.

This scenario, of cities in demand for

additional income for services, is very common across urban
centers.

In addressing these concerns, local interests will

come together to develop a plan and respond to these
"emerging" needs.

Government will then engage in a plan

which of ten requires monetary subsidies to generate growth
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(See Illustration 1) .
ILLUSTRATION 1
THE LOGIC OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
.--~~~~~~-->

Investment

good business
climate
jobs/taxes

r
spending and consumption/
public improvements
and neighborhood services

1
income/services

Source: Judd, D. (1988). The politics of American cities.
Glenview: Scott, Foresman, p. 376.
As government contributes, through the use of tax
monies to attract capital investment, and as investors
search for places which can provide them with the greatest
profit return in the shortest period of time, certain areas
within the city benefit more than others.

The ability of

capital to easily relocate, especially with the emergence of
the global economy can have an impact upon the life of urban
residents (Sassen, 1991) and the emergence of the "dual
city" could be viewed as a direct outcome of these changes
(Castells and Mollenkopf, 1991).
Capitalists, after assessing and weighing the pros and
cons of an area, will determine its profitability.

The

perceived financial outcomes will form the extent to which
investment occurs.

Capitals' decision, when considering

investing in a socioeconomically devastated area, will have

25

serious implications as to the future condition and
direction of that particular urban community.
Non-investment in an economically devastated area
allows negative existing conditions within those areas to be
reproduced.

On the other hand, a low-priced area that .can

be gentrified and redeveloped will be likely to receive
special attention by business interests.

Such decisions

could have adverse outcomes for the current community since
displacement of its members will be likely to follow.

The

nature of capital investment can then have a direct impact
on the quality of life within the urban environment. 2
Often, urban centers become preoccupied with an
emphasis on growth and expansion as a means of addressing
the social ills and problems they face.

As a study of

Chicago points out (Squires, Bennett, Mccourt and Nyden,
1987:11-12), it is important to examine the real
implications of this approach to urban development:
That Chicago's industrial mix is shifting from heavy
manufacturing to service and high technology industries
is noted, along with the conviction that the city
2

Scott (1980), in his theory of "urban land nexus"
outlines that land development patterns are the result of a
contradictory relationship between the private and public
sphere.
Both capitalist interests and the state work
against each other.
The former, though empowered to make
decisions, cannot carry out its plans without the latter and
the latter, for the sake of general interest, attempts to
direct (through urban planning) the former.
What results,
according to Scott, is uneven urban development.
Though
uneven development is the outcome of the growth
machine/growth ideology, as put forth by Logan and Molotch
(1988), for Scott (1988), uneven development results from
within the process of capitalist production.
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should encourage such developments to take advantage of
emerging growth industries. Yet more fundamental
structural and particularly exploitative dimensions
inherent in the process of uneven development are
either ignored or viewed as issues that can only be
addressed after higher-priority concerns-generating
economic growth-have been resolved.
If it is widely
understood that the city's economic and social problems
will not be resolved simply by the next upturn in
the business cycle, with perhaps a few exceptions
nobody is demanding fundamental changes in the city's
and nation's basic institutional structure either.
The emphasis on solving the problems of Chicago by creating
greater economic growth by providing incentives for private
capital investment has generated a strategic approach which
has not fully responded to the social needs of the city and
its residents.

Because of these urban development

strategies and the effects of uneven development, the
distinction and segregation of groups based upon their
racial, ethnic and class identities has been intensified. 3
The different roles in determining political and
economic directions of the city is the major strength of the
growth ideology.

Regarding the organization of the growth

machine, Logan and Molotch (1987) point to the importance of
government operations as they relate to advancing corporate
interests.
3

Sawers (1984), for example, claims that an
investigation of class needs to be further incorporated in
order to better understand the formation of urban
development, while Gordon (1984) provides a class/labor
based analysis in explaining urban development.
Finally,
biracial tensions which emerged in many urban centers after
the great black migration to the North (Drake and Cayton,
1945; Pettigrew, 1980; Yetman, 1985) have contributed to the
development of a racial/ethnic based identity within the
urban environment (Massey and Denton, 1988a; 1989; 1992).
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The Political Environment:
Private Interests and Public Needs
The relationship between the private enterprise and the
government's impact on local urban policy has provided
interesting views amongst urban theoreticians.

According to

Logan and Molotch (1987:153-154), the private interests are
integrated with local government and become represented
through the growth machine.

Logan and Molotch point out

that the political leadership often becomes one with
business interests, making for a combination of a political
and economic class whose actions are responsible for
explaining the dynamics of urban development. 4

They write:

Intervention in land use in the United States has never
been meant to replace the operation of the property
marketplace, only to smooth out its functioning.
Even
though individual enterprenours may balk at specific
decisions or even denounce the entire planning process
when they lose a particular contest, enterprenours
throughout the twentieth century have come to
appreciate that selective intervention can yield, in
the end, benefits for the growth process...
In this
sense, the necessity for the "relative autonomy of the
State" percolates down to the local level: In order to
keep the property market rising, government must act on
behalf of the market.
Similarly for Gottdiener (1987) , the local government
eventually works to promote the interests of the private
enterprise.
4

Yet for him, the relationship between

Harvey (1976; 1983; 1990) and Mandrel (1975)
advocate that the state has played an important role to
ensure capitalist survival.
For Harvey, it is the political
economy of capitalism which determines the power of the
state, making the state a tool of capital accumulation.
Capital interests evolve to establish the state-capital
articulation and promote capitalist control.
In this
regard, politics and economics become one with eachother.
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government and private interests is different.

Gottdiener

(1994:140), in the sociospatial perspective, views the role
of government as separate and distinct from various economic
interests.

Gottdiener writes:

... the SSP [sociospatial perspective] considers
government intervention and the interests of
politicians in growth as a principle factor in
metropolitan change. Traditional urban ecology and the
newer approaches of urban political economy either
ignore completely the role of government in channelling
growth or treat the state as simply derivative of
economic interests. The SSP considers the state as
relative autonomous, that is, with officials having
interests of their own, and more specifically considers
politics as highly linked to the concerns of property
development (emphasis mine) . 5
Whether local government and business interests fall
within two separate classes, each with distinct interests
and agendas, or whether local government is itself
integrated into a business elite, the outcome of their
operation is similar.

Private interests are advanced

through the presence of a growth machine guided by political
leadership.
growth." 6

Its goal is to promote its "style of economic

Capitalism then has two centers of authority.

The first is represented by the decisions of the economic

5

Gottdiener (1977), addresses the issue of
political control and urban planning. According to
Gottdiener, the interests of business partners find a way
into the process of zoning/rezoning and are supported by the
political system.
6

The need for social control of the inhabitants of
areas which were rapidly deteriorating (mostly in central
city areas), thus signaling possibilities of reoccurring
ghetto riots, has also been cited as a reason behind the
states' finance of these projects (Mollenkopf, 1975).
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system and the second, by the decisions of the political
system (Wilson, 1994).

Both work in accordance with each

other to support the private interests.

Though on the

surface this economic growth is legitimized and rationalized
as a strategy aimed at providing stability and financial
prosperity to distressed urban centers, it often results in
the creation of additional urban stress.
Economic growth in cities has had direct cumulative
affects.

When economic growth is cited as a result of some

strategy put forth by the local government the question of
"Who benefits from this arrangement?" must be addressed.
The usual outcome of this interaction between the public and
private enterprise is that the 'investors', assisted by the
state, emerge as the beneficiaries from these economic
opportunities present within the urban environment
(Carruthers, 1969; Boyer, 1973; Leinsdorf and Etra, 1973;
Lamarche, 1977; Scott, 1980; Harvey, 1973; 1982; Mollenkopf,
1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984).
But what becomes the role of the local government in
this process?

The local government is caught in a dilemma.

On the one hand, it supports private enterprise since it
perceives such action as the only way to address the
multiple social issues facing the city.

On the other hand,

city government must support the interests of the public.
Advocating and supporting, through various policies, the
public interests and needs, comes into sharp conflict with
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the political machine's choice to support individual
business interests.

As a result, the political system is

caught in a cycle; in order to deal with public needs it
must promote private interests which, in turn, create
unequal opportunity structures thus, expanding public needs.
Castells (1978:18-19), discusses the much needed
infrastructure for capital production: 7
. . . the intervention of the state becomes necessary in
order to take charge of sectors and services which are
less profitable but necessary for the functioning of
economic activity.
. .. This intervention of the state
is functional and necessary to the monopolies, even
though it done in opposition to some capitalist
interests.
In effect, it assures the necessary
reproduction of the labour power at a minimum level, it
lessens the cost of direct salaries, while at the same
time easing demands. Besides public investment, as we
know, is an essential form of 'devaluation of social
capital', a major resource for counteracting the
tendency toward the lowering of the profit margin .
. . . the intervention of the state, covers the functional
or economic 'holes', thus making it possible for
private capital to take over (thus the public highway
infrastructure which makes use of the automobile
possible, or urban renewal operations which permit the
actions of private promoters, etc) .
7

Castells' other related work (1977) applies the
Althusserian structuralistic view to the examination of the
urban.
Social structure for Castells is composed of the
economic system, the political system and the ideological
system.
Such investigation of the social structure will
allow for the formulation of a theory of the "urban system."
In this regard, Castells (1977: 460) introduces another form
of consumption which he refers to as "collective
consumption." He defines collective consumption as
" ... being consumption whose economic and social treatment,
while remaining capitalist, takes place not through the
market, but through the state apparatus." So, for example,
the privatization of natural resources before they become
profitable, require the intervention of the state.
In this
regard, a conflict emerges since the two responsibilities
are ideologically and diametrically opposed. O'Connor
(1973) has also discussed this "crisis of the state."
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The state then is charged with a dual responsibility; the
creation of opportunities for capital expansion, and the
maintenance of the quality of life. 8
Growth and expansion has heavily impacted upon the
demands for services in the city.

As the city grows and is

called to provide for its members, it necessitates
additional resources to meet those needs. 9
is faced with multiple challenges.

Thus, the city

Providing public

services for a poor neighborhood, whose residents contribute
very little to the city's tax base, is financially a loss.
As a result, cities look elsewhere for generating the
appropriate income to perform these services.

Promoting

economic growth by supporting business interest has been a
strategy toward urban growth.
Similarly, sports and stadium development has been
8

The removal of old commercial areas and
residential communities for the construction of modernized
administrative facilities are not uncommon to emerge since
various forms of state subsidies are meant to cover land
costs (Fellmuth, 1973; Goodman 1971; Marcuse 1981;
Gottdiener, 1985). Corporate presence then extends beyond
economic competition into the ownership of land and power
over the production of space.
In this regard, the state has
the ability to reproduce social relations.
9

For example, as minority and immigrant population,
which has served as cheap labor force for various business
interests in the city increases, additional funding to meet
the expanded needs of these populations is required.
Health, education and other social services becomes the
responsibility of the government. As public investment in
transportation routes strive to meet the needs of a growing
economy, additional expenditures to maintain these
structures are required.
Finally, as housing decays and the
trapped city population cannot afford to maintain new
structures, public housing is required.
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viewed by cities across the United States as a pro-growth
strategy.

Reports of multi-million dollar economic benefits

resulting from sport related activities generate a climate
of intense competition among cities.

This competition

requires considerable capital investment which often takes
the form of public expenditures.

Capital Investment and Competition: Stadiums, Professional
Franchises and Urban Growth
Cities also engage in activities to attract
professional teams as an urban development strategy aimed at
ensuring or expanding local and regional economic growth.
Capital investment by the government aimed at growth has led
to the construction of sports stadiums.

In 1970 about 70

percent of sports facilities were publicly financed and
owned (Okner, 1974).

In 1988 (Riess, 1989) and in 1991

(Quirk and Fort, 1992), over 80 percent of the facilities
utilized by professional teams across the country were
publicly owned.

Even small municipalities, where minor

league baseball is played, know that if they do not pay for
the expensive upgrades of stadium facilities, other cities
will accommodate such requests (Mahtesian, 1994; S.A.F.E.,
1995a; S.A.F.E., 1995b; Austin Sports Development Authority,
1995).

As a result, cities across the country have engaged

in extensive public investments and intense competitiveness
to retain or attract a professional sports franchise
(Whelan, 1987; Berss, 1992; Hammonds, 1993; Norton, 1993;
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Purdy, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Kramer, 1995a; Neusner, 1995;
Osterland, 1995; Schrotenboer, 1995; Witt, 1995).
The rationale behind the subsidies which professional
teams receive from local and state governments is based on
the perception that such action is a form of capital
investment, similar to other urban redevelopment
projects. 10

Euchner (1993), while investigating the

competition between cities in North America for a
professional team concludes that sports are viewed as part
of a development strategy.

Cities will "make a good

business environment" by extending financial support to
professional franchises hoping to attract one of them to
their town.

This drive towards attracting franchises is

consistent with, and a part of, the notion of the growth
ideology; generating opportunities towards expansion as a
strategy for revitalization and the creation of economic and

10

Squires, et.al, (1987:163-165) in a study of
Chicago provide three modes of redevelopment utilized by the
local government after WWII: (1) infrastructural
development, (2) cooperative ventures with private groups
and (3) essentially private investment. All three modes,
directly or indirectly found the local government supporting
and advancing private interests.
These projects were
viewed to attract outside investment, resulting into job
opportunities, increased income and additional taxes.
This
income will increase spending and consumption by city
residents providing the city with additional money for
public services.
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social wel 1 - b e1ng.

11

This emphasis on urban revitalization and redevelopment
has introduced a spirit of competitiveness amongst cities.
Research has shown that poorer cities are more likely than
economically stable cities to engage in activities which are
aimed at generating economic development.
(1987:55)

Rubin and Rubin

conducted a study analyzing census data in

Illinois comparing the public investments of various types
of cities.

They concluded that:

. . . cities that are poorest - that have the poorest
citizens and the highest unemployment rates - are the
ones that are spending the most money on expensive and
possibly ineffective economic development incentives.
In their attempt to generate economic growth, cities will
find themselves in contested arrangements.
In the area of professional sports, cities compete with
each other to attract an existing franchise or become chosen
by a league to host an expansion team. 12

Regarding stadium

11

Johnson (1993) shows that the economics of minor
league baseball makes the stadium the core of the
relationship between the team and the local community.
Johnson concludes that teams influence local governments to
perceive minor league stadiums as redevelopment
opportunities and strategies toward urban growth.
12
In recent years, cities like Baltimore (football),
St. Louis (football), Jacksonville (football), Charlotte
(basketball), Nashville (football), Oakland (football),
Tampa (baseball), Phoenix (hockey), Denver (baseball),
Dallas (hockey), Orlando (hockey) and others, have been
involved in efforts to attract professional sports teams.
On the other hand, cities across America like Cleveland
(football), Houston (football), Los Angeles (football),
Seattle (football), Tampa (football), Pittsburgh (baseball),
Minneapolis (basketball), Chicago (football) and others have
been involved in efforts to retain professional franchises
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construction Snyder and Spreitzer (1989:278), noted that the
purpose for this type of public funds use is questionable:
The taxpayers subsidize professional sports through
construction bonds, stadia rent below the market value,
taxes foregone on the land, and appropriation of public
services to sports facilities in the form of water and
sewage facilities, mass transit, law enforcement, and
improvement of access roads. This use of public funds
in support of private enterprise raises the critical
question of "cui bono", who benefits?
Similarly, according to Wilson (1994:261):
The real issue with sport franchises is how local
elites are able to get public sanction and subsidy for
the private accumulation of wealth.
Local capitalists
stand to gain much from a city's successful pursuit of
a sport franchise.
As a result, cities will find themselves considering the
extent to which they are, stadium wise, capable of
supporting and competing with other cities.
Thus, at one level, the construction of stadiums is
viewed as an urban development strategy, a part of a growth
ideology, yet, at another level, in order for their
construction to occur, the state has to contribute by (1)
allocating public resources and (2) convincing the public
that the proposed civic expenditures are wisely disbursed.
For the latter to occur, both the state and the private
interests have to join together and become one, since they
share similar objectives.

which threaten to leave.
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Sports Driven Economic Rejuvenation
Cities in the United States have attempted to
rejuvenate downtown economically depressed areas through the
utilization of sports. 13

In recent years, stadium

developments such as those of Coors Field (1995) in Denver,
Colorado, New

Comisk~y

Park (1991) and United Center (1994)

both in Chicago, Illinois, Jacobs Field (1994) in Cleveland,
Ohio and Camden Yards (1992) in Baltimore, Maryland have all
been located in the downtown or near downtown areas.
This approach of "pumping money" into a downtown,
economically depressed area is the driving force behind
these stadium location decisions.

According to Baim

(1994:220):
For a depressed inner city, the unemployment and
incidence of crime is already high. The increase in
employment related to a stadium and sports team will be
more valuable and the increased crime less
objectionable in the downtown area.
Thus, the rational
place to locate the stadium in a city with a depressed
center district would be downtown.
The residents of
the suburbs are willing to commute the extra distance
to keep the stadium "out of their neighborhood," and
the residents of the inner city are aided by the
increased economic growth.
Similar to urban tourism and the advancement of the arts in
urban centers, sports stadiums are viewed as part of an
13

State intervention in the renewal of downtowns has
been viewed as a means of capital accumulation in response
to diminishing profits in those areas (O'Connor, 1973;
Mandel, 1975; Harvey, 1982; Hirsch, 1982).
It has also been
noted that the restructuring of the downtown areas, assisted
by the state, has served various business interests through
real estate actions, providing no direct opportunities to
the urban poor (Anderson, 1964; Friedland, 1980; Mollenkopf,
1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984; Gottdiener, 1985).
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ideology toward urban growth.
Through the use of multipliers, cities employ economic
impact studies on sports to report impressive local and
regional benefits.

These findings are then utilized to

justify the public dollars invested in the construction of
stadium facilities.

However, the long term economic

implications of these projects in cities across America
remain questionable.
The stadium as an urban revitalization tool has been
identified by cities across America.

In Cleveland, Ohio,

the recent partnership (private-public) between the city and
the Gateway Economic Development Corporation, known as the
Gateway Project, to which has been attributed the economic
rebounding of Cleveland by the local government (Barrett and
Green, 1993).
The goal of this project is to attract people to the
downtown area, making it vibrant once again (Kosowatz,
1993) . 14

The city has attempted to generate redevelopment

from this stadium project.

Even though Cleveland Indians'

representatives asked for 10,000 on-site parking spaces, the

14

The owners of the Cleveland Indians (Major League
Baseball) convinced the city to build a new stadium facility
which would generate more jobs and prosperity.
The city
participated in the project by investing about $434 million.
This project, on a 28 acre site on the southern edge of the
downtown area, intends to capitalize on the presence and
activities of a 42,000 seat Jacobs Field, built in 1994 for
$161 (home of the Cleveland Indians) and the neighboring
$118 million, 21,000 seat indoor arena for the Cleveland
Cavaliers of the NBA (Bartimole, 1994).
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city approved only a third.

City officials felt that having

spectators park a distance and walk to the ballpark, will
expose them to the area, and thus, possibly (1) lift
negative beliefs associated with the downtown location and
(2) help revitalize local business.

As a result the

ballpark becomes viewed as a magnet for downtown activity
(Kamin, 1994).
In Baltimore, the 1992 construction of Camden Yards, is
expected to generate economic growth and give rebirth to its
surrounding areas.

It is claimed that this project has

helped revitalize part of the urban core in the city of
Baltimore and serves as a the standard of urban design. 15
According to a survey conducted by Baltimore's Mayor Kurt
Schmoke, $52.8 million of spending by the fans outside the
park make the project a ''financial grand slam"
(Schrotenboer, 1995).
For the Chicago Bears of the National Football League,
Camden Yards is a model stadium.

Assuming that they receive

the requested financial support from the City of Chicago and
the State of Illinois ($200 million) the Bears claim that a
similar type of stadium design would aid the community/site
and be a catalyst for economic development.

In a recent

radio program, Michael Mccaskey, President of the franchise

15

This 48,000-seat baseball facility cost $206
million to complete.
In 1994, Camden Yards was
distinguished by the Urban Land Institute as the best public
project in the country (Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1994).
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noted:
Camden Yards made a valuable contribution to the city
of Baltimore. What makes that ballpark special is not
the design by itself ... it is the way that it's
integrated into the inner-harbor area.
There is that
long warehouse and that has served as a venue for
retailing operations, for food courts, and for other
things that draw people to it on non-game days. And we
would like to do the same thing with the football
stadium.
Just don't focus on the box that's the
football stadium, but let's look at the entire
surrounding area, and let's look at the way to use that
stadium as a stimulus for economic development for a
much wider neighborhood around it. In the same way that
Camden Yards has done it (WBBM RADI0-780AM, 1995) .
In response to McCaskey's requests, the City of Chicago has
offered to renovate Soldier Field at a public expense of
$156 million.

Yet, the Bears continue to promote the

concept of a new, open-air stadium as an urban redevelopment
tool.
In Denver, two years prior to the opening of Coors
Field for the expansion Colorado Rockies of the MLB in
Denver, the stadium was credited with benefiting the hotel
industry.

It was noted that the presence of the sports

facility would have a positive economic outcome and improve
upon the currently thriving business growth of hotels in
that city (Jesitus, 1993).
Since its construction, Coors Field has been described
as a representation of "a thoughtful and successful effort
at urban revitalization"

(Muschamp, 1995) .

Its presence in

Denver's Lower Downtown district complements the gentrified
neighborhoods, galleries, small shops, and the "SoHo" like
atmosphere.

Coors Field becomes an outstanding addition to

40

a newly emerging downtown area, one which replaces the
deteriorated, industrially based, central business center
with a central district geared toward a culture of the arts
and popular entertainment (Judd, 1995; Muschamp, 1995;
Schrotenboer, 1995).
Similar assessments of economic growth, resulting from
the construction of sports stadiums, have been made in San
Francisco (Margolis, 1989), Detroit (White, 1994),
Washington, DC (Pyatt, 1993), Alexandria, Virginia (Howe,
1993), Atlanta (Faw, 1993), and Salt Lake City (Wright and
Jorgensen, 1993) and the Meadowlands, New Jersey (Ibata,
1985), amongst other cities.

The Use of Cultural Factors in Urban Development
In addition to addressing the political economy of
space, an understanding of sports and stadiums within the
urban environment requires the investigation of related
cultural factors.

Numerous culturally based factors have

been utilized to support the construction of sports
facilities.

For example, social cohesion, community

building and other related arguments have been widely
reported when governments and team representatives attempt
to convince the public that expenditures on these projects
are necessary.

At the same time, images of the cultural

relationship between the team and the city are continuously
communicated, thus producing a strong link between the team
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and the urban environment.
The "new" urban sociology has integrated cultural
factors in its investigation regarding patterns and social
implications of urban development.

Though at the core, this

perspective remains Marxist and shares many, if not most of
the characteristics which define other Marxist perspectives,
the addition of these culturally based elements provides for
an understanding of the dynamics of the urban development.
Gottdiener (1994:17), influenced by Gramsci (1971) and
Lefebvres'

(1991) notion of "the production of space",

provides the dimensions of what he refers to as the
"sociospatial perspective."

These dimensions include:

(1)

utilizing a regional perspective of studying the factors
which shape both the urban and suburban space by looking at
the two as interrelated and interconnected, capable of
impacting the fate of each other,

(2) considering both the

implications emerging from the global nature of capitalism,
as well as the national, regional and local settings, which
shape urban development and affect urban life,

(3)

integrating government policies and real estate actions
("supply-side forces" which have a direct impact on
development processes), and (4) analyzing the importance of
cultural factors such as gender, class, social status, age
and race and their impact on the built environment,
specifically as to how these factors shape that environment
and then are shaped by it.

Increasingly, cultural symbols
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are associated with objects, describing urban communities or
elements within these communities. 16
Gottdiener (1994:16) explains the dual relationship
between people and space:
In the past, urbanists have regarded the space of
habitation as only a container of social activities.
But this view is limited. Space not only contains
actions but also acts as a meaningful object to which
we orient our actions. The factor of space constitutes
a part of social relations and is intimately involved
in our daily lives.
It affects the way we feel about
what we do.
In turn, people alter space and construct
new environments to fit their needs better. Hence,
there is a dual relationship between people and space.
On the one hand, human beings act according to social
factors such as gender, class, race, age, and status
within and in reaction to a given space. On the other
hand, people also create and alter spaces for
themselves that express their own needs and desires.
16

David Harvey (1990) utilizes a postmodernist
perspective to analyze architecture and urban design.
In
opposition to modernists, who manipulate space to be shaped
for social purposes, postmodernists view space as something
independent, driven by the aesthetic principles.
Architecture then, as a form of symbolic representation,
becomes a form of communication, a language, which sets the
stage for a dialogue (Barthes, 1975). As Harvey notes
(1990:74), the presence of Trump Tower and of Philip
Johnson's AT&T buildings in New York City, represent two
different eras. The modernism of the former battles the
postmodernism of the latter for control over the city's
skyline.
Cultural representations then become integrated in
urban form.
Others, including Jencks (1984), see postmodern
architecture as the outcome of technological shifts. Soja
(1989), argues for a historical and geographical
materialism, while Bourdieu (1984; 1986) remarks that
consumption can be related to product differentiation in the
urban environment.
'Symbolic capital' for Bourdieu are
goods which serve as representations capable of defining the
owner's taste and distinction.
Finally, for Lyotard
(1984:73), the emergence of a culture of choice is a part of
cultural development: "Eclectism is the degree zero of
contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches
a western, eats McDonald's food for lunch and local cuisine
for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and 'retro' clothes
in Hong Kong."
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Gottdiener (1994:15) also notes:
A variety of images has been used, such as signs of
industry ("the twin cities"), signs of vision ("city of
tomorrow"), and signs of good quality ("the city of
leisure"). Slogans such as these are often linked to
images or objects, such as the skyline or graphic logo
of some kind.
In this way a symbolic identity is
created for a place, which gives the impression that it
is special.
Historically, in the area of sports, there has been a
symbolic connection between a community and a team: "to
watch a club compete was to watch a community perform"
(Wilson, 1994: 234).

Similarly, sports teams became signs

of modernity, postmodernity and progress for the city, while
at the same time have been utilized to advertise the
strength of the local business climate (Goldstein, 1989;
Riess, 1989; Wilson, 1994).
This approach of integrating cultural factors to better
understand the dynamics of urban development, provides a
perspective which analytically can be responsive to the
changing nature of contemporary urban life.

Thus, the arts

and sports can be viewed as aspects of culture which have
been integrated into urban development planning.

The Arts as Part of Urban Growth
Cities have identified the arts to be part of a progrowth, urban strategy.

Support for the arts is seen to

have numerous positive outcomes.

Specifically,

(1)

investment in physical facilities and "good" arts allows
cities to compete with those communities which have
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primarily relied on their natural amenities (i.e., good
weather) to attract potential growth activities;

(2) the

presence of arts activities can bring more visitors to the
downtown area;

(3) those likely to attend performing arts

activities have higher disposable incomes, making them "good
customers" for downtown businesses;

(4) the enticement of

performing arts groups means that many of these companies
will renovate existing structures, thus physically
revitalizing the downtown area;

(5) businesses will be

attracted to the immediate area; and (6) the emergence of a
vital performing arts in a downtown district will have
positive ''spill-over effects" for surrounding business and
residential communities (Whitt, 1987).
Building on earlier studies (Whitt and Mizruchi, 1986;
Whitt, 1987; 1988), Whitt and Lammers (1991) conducted a
study of the relationship between arts and development
organizations.

After investigating the ties of board

members to a group of arts organizations in Louisville,
Kentucky, Whitt and Lammers concluded that the development
of the arts in urban centers is a pro-growth strategy which
includes the involvement of multiple business-elites.

The

implications of these findings are more extensive since they
inform us that culturally perceived activities (theater,
ballet, opera, orchestra, museum) are directly and
indirectly part of larger business interests.
Taking into consideration the previous studies on arts
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and urban development, Whitt and Lammers (1991:388)
concluded that:
... (1) ... growth is central to urban politics;
(2) ... there is a local inner-circle of businessmen who
provides structural bridges among large corporations,
arts organizations, and the leading groups devoted to
urban growth policies; (3) the arts are, at least in
some cities, governed at the top levels by powerful
people (primarily men) who appear to be active
participants in the local growth machine; (4) the major
arts and cultural organizations of downtowns may have
become essential components of urban growth machines,
implying an increasing mutual dependency between
corporations and cultural institutions.
Besides being economic contributors, the arts have also been
perceived to serve as an advertisement for urban centers,
capable of generating prestige and a positive city image
(Whitt, 1988).

Sports as a Culture Industry
The relationship between government and free enterprise
can also be investigated within a broader cultural
framework.

Sports are an example of symbolic expressions of

culture and stadiums are the locales where these cultural
symbols emerge as products to be bought and sold.
Sports have evolved in American society becoming much
more than just a game, and yet, remaining a central aspect
of American culture. 17
17

The sense of civic identity, pride

The ownership of professional sports, for example
has changed.
The corporatization of sports is well outlined
by Quirk and Fort (1992:39) who notes that 22 owners of
professional sports franchises made a list which outlined
the 400 richest individuals in the country.
The list also
included several others who were previous owners of a
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and representation makes cities identify sports stars as
"their" ambassadors.

Sports then have a symbolic value, as

cultural communicators and, from this rising association, a
culture industry develops.

According to Zukin (1995:12):

"Because culture is a system for producing symbols, every
attempt to get people to buy a product becomes a culture
industry."

Thus, sports, like museums, the arts and theme

parks become part of the culture industry.

The demand for

sports creates the stadium, both a social space and a space
of economies and consumption.

Public gatherings at the

stadium promote cultural collectiveness.

As a result, the

production of capital and commodities emerges, and, within
this framework, a culture industry develops.
This emergence of sports as a culture industry is also
consistent with larger economic shifts from an industrial to
a post-industrial economy.

Lash and Urry (1994) explore the

emergence of new economies, the 'economies of signs.'

These

economies are organized around symbols, images and desires.
As a result, culture industries develop.

According to Lash

and Urry (1994:17):
The old Fordist, organized capitalist core was
characterized by a set of producer networks clustered
around a heavy-industrialized hub of the motor,
chemicals, electrical and steel industries ... This old
professional franchise.
Ted Arinson, owner of the Miami
Heat of the NBA, was listed with an estimated wealth of $2.1
billion, as was Laurence Tisch, owner of the New York Giants
of the NFL with $1.5 billion. Media revenue and stadium
related revenues have contributed into making professional
sports 'wise' business investments.
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order has been significantly undermined by two
processes. The first is the disintegration of the old
core with finance, distribution, property, service, and
knowledge and R&D functions each taking their own
autonomy.
The second is the formation of a new core,
one in which 'the post-industrial tail is of the old
order begins effectively to wag the Fordist and
industrial dog' . The new core is clustered around
information, communications and the advanced producer
services, as well as other services, such as
telecommunications, airlines and important parts of
tourism and leisure.
Sports and stadium development can then be viewed to be part
of this emerging capitalist framework.
Lash and Urry (1994), examine the relationship between
cultural objects such as music, movies and paperbacks, and
their process of development into the culture industries of
recording labels, television and publishing.

Regarding

music, Lash and Urry (1994:134) write:
Thus, as the EMI executive said, for the industry to be
really big business the music had to 'become a part of
teenage lifestyle' ... But these objects [music, movies,
paperbacks] are not yet ready for market.
First, they
must become intellectual property. That is firms can
only exploit or make money from cultural objects, when
they have been juridically converted into intellectual
property. Only when firms are able to exclude other
entrepreneurs and consumers from rights to the use of
cultural objects can the culture industries survive.
In the area of sports, the firm is the professional
franchise.

There are two reasons these franchises have been

able to control the 'cultural product' and become its select
distributor.

First, the ownership structure of the

professional leagues has excluded others from control over
their "product."

Second, through exclusive agreements with

media sources, sportswear manufacturers, vendors, etc,
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franchise owners have ensured that, even if new competing
leagues develop, the visibility of their product becomes
quickly limited.

In this regard, sports as a cultural

product can evolve into an industry which includes the
stadium as its place of operation and yet, because of
advanced means of communication and league arrangements can
become non-localized.
This notion of sports as a culture industry provides an
understanding of the dynamics regarding the relationship
between the consumer, the commodity and the firm with
capitalist relations.

It is within this framework that the

city becomes connected to the sports culture industry.
According to Zukin (1995:12):
Culture is intertwined with capital and identity in the
city's production systems.
From that point of view,
cultural institutions establish a competitive advantage
over other cities for attracting new businesses and
corporate elites. But in American and European cities
during the 1970s, culture became more of an instrument
in the entrepreneurial strategies of local governments
and business alliances.
In the shift to a post-war
economy, who could build the biggest modern art museum
suggested the vitality of the financial sector. Who
could turn the waterfront from docklands ruble to parks
and marinas suggested the possibilities for expansion
of the managerial and professional corps.
These culture industries then, which includes sports are
viewed to be stimulates for the urban economy.

The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Stadium Development
Race and ethnicity are also additional factors which
must be integrated in an analysis of urban development and
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urban life as it relates to stadium development.

The strong

association between ethnicity and race with patterns of
residential segregation (Lieberson, 1980; Massey and Denton,
1987; 1988a; 1992) has resulted in distinct socioeconomic
differences amongst the various groups, leaving these groups
without political and economic power capable of effectively
responding to urban renewal projects (Guest and Zuiches,
1971; Molotch, 1972; Harvey, 1976; Schneider and Logan,
1982; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1985; Yinger, 1986; Massey
and Denton, 1988b; Galster, 1990; Massey and Eggers, 1990;
Massey and Fong, 1990; Massey, 1990; Massey and Denton,
1993) .
Regarding stadium construction, urban development and
community impact, issues of race and ethnicity have also
surfaced to play an important role.

For example, the

construction of the new Comiskey Park (1991) in Chicago
displaced a predominantly African-American community.

In

that same city, the construction of the United Center (1994)
was viewed as a catalyst of redevelopment for the
surrounding African-American community in the Near West
Side.

In Miami, the privately constructed Joe Robbie

Stadium (1982) has been positioned in the vicinity of an
African-American community, leaving the residents of this
nearby subdivision to suffer the long lines of traffic and
pollution through their residential streets.
In addition, the position of stadiums in predominantly
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minority, urban communities has been a primary reason for
the owners of the New York Yankees, the Chicago White Sox,
the Washington Redskins and others to search for replacement
facilities in suburban, non-minority communities (Kifner,
1994).

Yet, many of these efforts remain unsuccessful since

suburban, residential communities tend to reject the
presence of these large projects (i.e, Addison, IL rejected
the White Sox from moving to their town), viewing them as
sources of activities, which would negatively affect the
quality of living.
Yet, these concerns don't surface when considering the
construction of sports stadiums in urban communities.

Like

many other publicly supported projects (i.e., highways,
universities, etc), race/ethnicity, in addition to class,
plays a critical role.

Do sports facility development

authorities (the state) and private interests find it much
easier to displace minority residents and make use of the
land for the construction of stadiums?

Also, how do these

authorities deal with the complaints of minority residents
who have to contend with increased traffic, fan rowdiness,
public consumption of alcohol, congestion, noise and air
pollution, in addition to possible vandalism before and
after the games?

Answers to these questions will allow for

an understanding of the extent to which race and ethnicity
prove important factors in the investigation of stadium
development and community impact.
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Urban Social Movements
When urban development and/or urban renewal projects
are advanced through a private/public partnership, as in the
case of stadium developments, communities are likely to be
affected.

Often, these arrangements result in the physical

and cultural transformation of these areas and could even
include community displacement.

At that point, community

organizing as a response to these plans frequently develops
into community-based, resistance movements.
Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) has been concerned with
these urban responses or urban social movements including
the role which they play in understanding urban change.

He

identifies urban social movements in relation to the
capitalist mode of production.

For Castells, urban social

movements integrate the class struggle, production and the
state.

Interested in understanding the relationship between

cities and social change through urban social movements,
Castells (1983:291) writes:
The city is a social product resulting from the
conflicting interests and values. Because of the
institutionalization of socially dominant interests,
major innovations in the city's role, meaning, and
structure tend to be the outcome of grassroots
mobilization and demands. When these mobilizations
result in the transformation of the urban structure, we
call them urban social movements. Yet the process of
urban social change cannot be reduced to the effects
produced on the city of successful social movements.
Thus a theory of urban change must account both for the
spatial and social effects resulting from the action of
dominant interests as well as from the grassroots'
alternatives to this domination.
As Castells notes, urban social change is not only the
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outcome of "successful social movements'', but they also are
due to the "action of dominant groups."

In this regard,

stadium development plans, become an expression of the
dominant interests and could evolve into urban change.
In addition, urban social movements emerge as the
effect of contested meanings of space within the urban
environment.

This notion of meaning is addressed by

Castells (1983: 304-305), who notes.

Specifically:

The dominant class in a given society, having the
institutional power to restructure social forms (and
thus cities) according to its interests and values,
changes the existing meaning . . . . A social movement
develops its own meaning over a given space in
contradiction to the structurally dominant meaning.
And,

Society is a structured, conflictive reality in which
social classes oppose eachother over the basic rules of
social organization according to their own social
interests. Therefore the definition of urban meaning
will be a process of conflict, domination, and
resistance to domination, directly linked to the
dynamics of social struggle and not to the reproductive
spatial expression of a unified culture.
Furthermore,
cities and space being fundamental to the organization
of social life, the conflict over the assignment of
certain goals to certain spatial forms will be one of
the fundamental mechanisms of domination and counterdomination in the social structure (Castells,
1983: 302).
This notion of contested meaning of urban development can be
exemplified in the cases where the state and the stadium
developers' view of urban growth comes into sharp conflict
with that of the community's.

Because of these conflicting

perceptions of urban meaning, and through the "grassroots"
struggles that ensue, an understanding of the process of
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urban change emerges.
At the same time though, these urban social movements
prove to be limited.

Castells discusses the role of these

movements within the larger context of social change.

He

writes (1983:319): "Urban social movements are [not] the new
historical actors creating social change, nor are they
pivotal source of alternative social forms." Similarly
(1983:329):
They are not agents of social change, but symptoms of
resistance to the social domination even if, in their
effort to resist, they do have major effects on cities
and societies.
Finally,

(1983:331)

"Urban movements do address the real

issues of our time, although neither on the scale nor terms
that are adequate to the task."
Yet, Castells allows for a long term contribution of
these urban social movements.

The movements can have an

additive value directed towards social structural change.
Accordingly, Castells (1983:331) notes:
But they [urban social movements] are more than a last,
symbolic stand and desperate cry: they are symptoms of
our contradictions, and therefore capable of
superseding these contradictions. They are the
organizational forms, the live schools, where the new
social movements of our emerging society are taking
place, growing up, learning to breath, out of reach of
the state apparatuses, and outside the closed doors of
repressed family life. They are successful when they
connect all the repressed aspects of the new, emerging
life because this is their specificity: to speak the
new language that nobody yet speaks of in its
multifaceted meaning. When the vocabulary becomes too
restricted (a single focus on rent control, for
instance) the movements lose their appeal and become
yet another interest group in a pluralist society.
When they try to impose their programme, they become a
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counter-society, and collapse under the combined
pressure of multinational capital, a mass media system,
and the bureaucratic state.
In this regard, this analysis will also address the role of
the stadium-based, urban social movements of this study and
search for their contribution to urban change.

Conclusion
An investigation of the relationship between sports and
stadium development within the urban environment has to
integrate in its analysis the utilization of two theoretical
frameworks.

The first is the growth ideology and the second

is the "new" urban sociology.

In this regard, combining

urban political economy and cultural factors allows to view
sports and stadium development as being part of a culture
industry.
The stadium, as noted above, has become the connection
between the city and its professional franchise.

Cities

across the country fear most the loss of a professional
sports franchise due to an inadequate stadium facility.
Thus, they invest considerable public resources to attract
and/or retain professional sports franchises.

This action

is consistent with an ideology of urban growth since the
perception on the part of local and state governments is
that investment in these stadium projects is another way to
create an attractive business climate.

The urban

development component of these investments and other
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related, socially perceived factors take center stage when
cities attempt to rationalize their spending actions.
In the process, private interests and public needs
overlap each other making it difficult to distinguish their
specific objectives.

The investigation of the relationship

between stadium development and urban communities has to
incorporate numerous factors.

These factors include (1) the

business climate within which urban centers across America
operate,

(2) the drive towards growth as an urban

development strategy,

(3) the competition between urban

centers inherent within this framework,

(4) state

intervention and state investment in urban development,

(5)

the role of professional sports franchises as part of an
urban development strategy,

(6) the utilization of economic

and cultural rationales to support these projects, and (7)
the social implications and community effect of these
projects.

Regarding these community effects, an

understanding of the community response and the
reorganization of urban space as a result of these projects
allow for a perspective within which the relationship
between stadium development and urban communities can be
analyzed.
Such a perspective, being critical in nature, also
considers the factors of race, ethnicity, role of the state,
class, cultural images and symbols.

All these factors,

semiotics and otherwise, operate and influence the structure
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of the urban environment and subsequently urban life.

CHAPTER 3
MULTIPLIER EFFECT AND STADIUM DEVELOPMENT

Introduction
This chapter explores the use of the multiplier effect
in input-output regional analysis.

The multiplier method

has been employed by government officials and private firms
to assess the economic benefits resulting from public and/or
private investments.

These "investments" usually take the

form of programs, projects or policies.

Through the use of

multipliers, economic impact studies report impressive local
and regional benefits (sometimes over a billion dollars)
The economic contribution of professional sport
franchises, through the use of multipliers, has also been
utilized to justify the construction of stadium facilities.
However, the long term economic implications of these
projects in cities across America remain questionable.

As

this chapter shows, it is very difficult to accurately
measure the economic effect of these urban projects and even
more difficult· to ensure that the proposed spending occurs
within these local economies.

Some of the problematic

elements surrounding these assessments, which affect the
reported findings, include definitional issues, estimation
processes, numerous questionable assumptions, as well as the
57
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self-serving interests of the "investors" themselves.
After providing an overview of the methodology utilized
in determining multipliers, a discussion of its use through
impact studies is addressed.

Such studies have been

conducted in the defense industry, manufacturing, the arts,
urban tourism, sports, etc.

The chapter continues with a

look at stadiums as urban regeneration tools and provides a
brief outline of the perceived economic benefits resulting
from the presence of professional sports franchises.

The

chapter concludes with a critique of the multiplier use in
economic impact studies and the problems surrounding
arguments made by those promoters who claim that increased
neighborhood development is likely to result from the
construction of stadiums.

The Multiplier Effect
Multiplier analysis emerged in the discipline of
economics as a way to estimate the effects of expenditures
on total income.

The concept of income multipliers was

utilized by Keynes in his theory of employment (1936),
building on his earlier discussions of the effects of
reemployment on total employment (1933:9).

Many others

(Johannsen, 1903; Pigou, 1929; Kahn, 1933) contributed to
the development of the economic multiplier theory, making it
a well established branch of economics.
Since then, such analysis has been utilized to measure
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the long and short term effects of various investments on
economies.

The use of multipliers has been a part of input-

output analysis.

Its purpose has been to assess the

relationships between fiscal contributions and economic
outcomes within a given environment.

Regional Input-Output Analysis
The development of an empirical input-output system to
analyze inter-industry relations was first introduced in the
30's (Leontief, 1936).

From that system, regional input-

output analysis began to further appear in the 50's.

Isard

and Kuenne (1953) for example, introduced an analytical
model aimed at measuring the economic impact resulting from
a major industry's expansion on a region.

Leontief (1953)

also developed a model to assess the impact of national
market industries on local economies.
In later years, the use of adjusted coefficients
allowed for the development of models which were perceived
to be more accurate in evaluating regional input-output
economics.

Such studies included the Moore and Petersen

(1955) study of Utah and the Hirch (1959) study of St.
Louis.
After the 60's the use of interregional models became
common in input-output regional analysis.

According to

Richardson (1972:53), interregional models "enables us not
only to identify but, at the cost of certain rigid

60
assumptions, to measure the interdependence of the economic
structure."

In that regard, such models investigate the

economic relationships between different regions based upon
the introduction of public and/or private expenditures.
Building on the theoretical work of interregional
models conducted by Isard (1951) and Moses (1955), the
applicability of these models has been widely expanded.
Specifically, determining shifts in the location of
industrial activity and employment; preparing regional
impact studies; drafting transportation planning reports;
establishing regional economic development programming and
planning defense spending; assessing the regional economic
effects of military and aerospace spending; and measuring
the effect of increased economic development in wealthy
regions on nearby poorer regions, have all been identified
as areas where interregional models can be utilized
(Polenske, 1969) . 18

How are economic multipliers determined?
Economic development multipliers are determined based
on the distinction that there are two types of economic
sectors operating within a single region.
18

The first sector

Studies have been conducted on the economic links
between separate regions. These interregional analyses
consider similar products as different commodities. The
primary reason for that differentiation is the assumption
that regional economies operate independently (Isard, 1951;
Dalene, 1968; Riefler and Tiebout, 1970; and Isard and
Langford, 1971) .
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is referred to as the primary economy.

This includes all

those employers involved in activities which create products
exported from the local to outside regions.

The second

sector is referred to as the secondary economy, which
produces goods that are sold locally and supports the
activities of the primary economy sector.
Suppose a new factory which produces television sets is
introduced in a specific region.

Since the company will

export its products across other regions, it would be
categorized as part of the primary economic sector.

Other

smaller factories will be introduced into the local economy,
possibly involved in the manufacturing of television tubes,
plastic, knobs, and other smaller parts which the larger
television factory will purchase to assemble its products.
These smaller economic units would be then a part of the
secondary economy sector. 19
19

Stevens and Lahr (1988:89) provides a definition
of a regional economic multiplier as "the total economic
effect that occurs in a region per unit of the direct
economic change that caused the effect." The employment and
income multipliers are the two single multipliers which tend
to receive the attention of policy makers and interest
groups.
The employment multiplier is intended to forecast
the jobs created from an expansion activity within a given
economy. The income multipliers can be either the amount of
money added to the income of the residents in a given
region, as a result of the direct and indirect employment
due to an expansion activity, or the income change as a
result of the direct, indirect and induced employment
(Richardson, 1972:32-33). Other multipliers utilized in
impact studies include value added multipliers, output
multipliers and return on investment multipliers (Miller and
Blair, 1985). Though the measurements of regional economic
multipliers have a long history of development, the
complexities and fluidity of economic forces, especially
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The Use of Economic Impact Studies
Numerous impact studies have been conducted to assess
the economic effects of public and private investment
projects.

These assessments have extended from the economic

effects of the presence of an airline maintenance hub
(Kantor and Savitch, 1993), to the construction of a medical
center (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1972), to local
business patronizing eachother (Thompson, 1989), to stock
shows (Raabe, 1994), and even the defense industry
(Richardson, 1972; Leontief and Hoffenberg, 1961; Gordon,
1966; Billings, 1970; Bolton, 1966; Karaska, 1967; Isard,
1951; Miernyk, et al, 1967).

These investigations have

relied on the application of regional input-output analyses
and multipliers. 20
Though these and other related studies have been widely
utilized by public officials and private investors, serious
within a market economy, have made the development of a "one
formula fits all" approach to output assessment absent
(Richardson, 1985) .
20

Defense and military spending by the government
became a motivating factor for the use of regional inputoutput analysis.
The regional effects of military and
defense government spending has served in the 60's, a growth
period of this form of analysis, as the framework for
assessing the economic effects of these public investments.
In addition, these expenditures became a great opportunity
for social scientists to methodologically "perfect" the use
of input-output regional analysis. As a result, numerous
other studies have been conducted in this area (Karaska,
1966; Peterson and Tiebout, 1964; Benoit and Boulding, 1963;
Isard and Schooler, 1964; Leontief, 1965; Leontief and
Hoffenberg, 1961; Hughes, 1964; Tiebout, 1965; Peterson and
Tiebout, 1964; Isard and Langford, Jr., 1971; Wiedenbaum,
1966) .
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questions persist about their validity and reliability.

In

the following, some of the areas outlined are:
manufacturing, urban renewal and enterprise zone programs,
urban tourism, the arts and sports, where many of these
studies inform public policy decisions and public
perceptions.

Manufacturing and Related Impacts
Manufacturing industries have been assessed to
determine whether these investments contribute to the
economic well-being of local and regional areas.

In New

York and in Philadelphia it was found that the steel
industry had positively effected these economies (Isard and
Kuenne, 1953), and the presence of the aluminum industry in
the northwest region of the United States proved
economically beneficial (Miller, 1957).

Other studies have

assessed the economic effect of factory jobs (Oppenheim and
Swinney, 1992), recycling facilities (Cotliar, 1995), and
steel industry facilities (American Iron and Steel Industry,
1985) .
On the impact of plant closings, Buss and Reduburn
(1987:172-173) reported that the 1977-1978 shutdown of the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Works in Campbell, Ohio has had
wide and long term effects in the region.

This shutdown

eliminated over 5,000 workers employed in steel production.
Buss and Reduburn concluded that:

(1) Two years following
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the closing, 27% of those who lost their jobs were still
unemployed.
identical.

Eight years later that percentage had remained
These findings also communicated long-term

effects on incomes.

(2) Demand for public assistance

programs increased during that decade.

(3) The "secondary

economic effects" continued for years, as "the typical
worker laid off in the closing ... held an average of two jobs
from 1977 to 1985."

As a result, "declining job status",

"lessened job security" and "periodic interruption of
earnings" are other measurable long-term losses, and (4) An
increase in levels of "emotional stress" and "symptoms of
psychiatric disorder" were observed.

Buss and Reduburn

conclude that the effects of plant closings will vary
depending on the size of the economy affected.

Smaller

communities are more likely than larger communities to be
extensively devastated from these shutdowns.
The impact of factory closings is also communicated
through "social cost analyses" and "job impact statements."
These are part of the organizing efforts of labor to
convincingly represent the effects of these shutdowns and/or
relocations on various regions.

These assessments include

the effects of closings on tax revenues, taxes spent on
public programs, indirect effects on other businesses, etc.
(LeRoy, 19 9 2 ) .
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Urban Renewal and Enterprise Zones Impacts
Many government supported programs have been assessed
to determine their effect at the local, regional and
national level.

For urban renewal and enterprise zone

programs, multiplier effects are often utilized to account
for their supposed success.

Redevelopment activities

following land acquisition in urban renewal programs and
business incentives (ie., tax incentives, local political
support) in enterprise zones, are part of the investments
aimed at revitalization and growth.
Many urban renewal projects which concentrated on the
support and creation of manufacturing related economies
have also been assessed.

Through the concept of input-

output analysis, these assessments have been aimed at
determining the cost and benefit ratios of these programs
(Rothenberg, 1967; Weicher, 1972).

According to Lineberry

and Sharkansky (1978:378-379), a multiplier effect is the
outcome of these programs:
The most universally accepted claim for urban renewal,
and probably the most valid one, is that it has
expanded the tax base and improved the economic
vitality of the city. The Urban Renewal Administration
liked to emphasize the "before" and "after" tax effects
of renewal.
For 768 projects on which land acquisition
had been completed by 1971 the estimated increase in
property values was from $464 million to $1.7 billion;
from this increase the cities could reap generous tax
revenues.
In economic terms, each of these projects
also had a potential multiplier effect, stimulating
more jobs and production in service industries ... [and]
both direct and multiplier effects enhance municipal
revenues and stimulate economic growth.
Regardless of the proposed benefits outlined above, concerns
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have been expressed about the success of these urban renewal
programs.

Anderson (1964), who conducted a study of the

effects of renewal programs at Boston's West End, indicated
that caution should be employed when assessing these
projects.

Anderson was critical of the extent to which the

proposed tax benefits and land values for the city had
increased.
Another program, the enterprise zone concept-first
introduced in the U.S. in 1979-has received considerable
support from governments across the United States.

It has

been reported that in 22 states, between 1982 and 1988,
these state or operational enterprise zones increased from
135 to 510 (Gunn, 1993).

This capitalist approach to

addressing the socioeconomic ills of urban America has been
perceived by politicians and the media to be economically
effective in meeting its prescribed goals.
According to Herman (1985), 60,000 jobs were created
and over $2 billion of investments resulted.

These

assessment reports have continually increased to exceed
660,000 new jobs and over $40.6 billion in investments (U.S.
HUD, 1992).

Yet, considerable problems exist with the

evaluation process and assumptions made on the impact of
these enterprise zone programs (Clarke, 1986; Skoro, 1988;
Grady, 1989; James, 1991; Gunn, 1993).
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The Impact of Urban Tourism
Urban tourism has been traditionally associated with
historic, capital, old industrial, and resort cities.
Theoretically, urban tourism has been viewed as being part
of an urban life cycle concept.

As cities go through

evolutionary stages of development and change; urbanization,
suburbanization, disurbanization and reurbanization, it has
been claimed that the industry of urban tourism complements
the last of those stages as efforts toward central core
revitalization occur (Jan Van Der Borg, 1991).
Increasingly, tourism activities are perceived to have
positive economic effects for cities across America and
Europe.

Urban tourism is visibly replacing the

manufacturing character of some cities.

In Baltimore, for

example, tourism activities in Harbor Place have replaced
the once dominant manufacturing industries.

As a result,

the tourism industry has been credited with the
revitalization of downtown Baltimore (Levine, 1987)

21

Overall, urban tourism has been viewed as a vehicle for
downtown revitalization (Judd and Collins, 1979; Buckley and
Witt, 1985; 1989; Vetter, 1985; Morton, 1985; Edgell, 1988;
Page and Fidgeon, 1989; Law, 1991a; 1991b; 1992;
Cullingworth, 1993).

Even though one of the critiques of

the urban tourism industry is that it creates low-paying,
21

Berkowitz, (1987) has criticized these assessments
in Baltimore noting the continuous urban social problems in
the "targeted areas."

68
seasonal jobs, for some (Law, 1992: 604) this industry can
be viewed as a proper match to the types of inner-city
labor:
Whilst many of the [urban tourism industry] jobs are
low-skilled, this could be in its favour when it is
located in or near the inner city with its labour
reserves of the unskilled.
Though this statement searches to provide labor fit for this
industry, one has to be seriously concerned about the
assumptions made here; that in fact low-paying, low-skilled
and seasonal jobs are somehow acceptable for this segment of
the urban population.
The evaluation of urban tourism for cities and the role
of these activities in urban regeneration, has become more
and more a concern of public policy makers.

Impact studies

have been conducted, through the use of multipliers and
national ratios, to determine the economic effect of these
investments (Henderson, 1975; Vaughan, 1979; 1986; 1991;
Hughes, 1982; Beekhuis, 1988; Myerscough, 1988; Jeffrey,
1989; 1990).

According to Law (1992:607), there are three

types of impacts which these project assessment studies
attempt to determine:
Project impact studies attempt to calculate the number
of jobs created directly at the facility or event
(primary impact), the number of jobs created indirectly
because of the expenditure of visitors (secondary
impact), and the number of induced jobs as a result of
the extra income in the local economy. The latter two
topics require extensive survey work so that national
ratios are frequently used to avoid this. Assessments
are also made in terms of the profitability of the
project, impact on the environment, perception of
residents, displacement effects, use of facilities by
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local residents and, where grants are given, cost per
job and additionality.
Theme parks, casinos and convention activities are also
viewed to have considerable economic effect on generating
tourism dollars for cities (Lawson, 1982; Abbey, 1987; Hall
1987; Whyte, 1988; Smith 1989; Cambell, 1995; Worthington,
1995; Sabo, 1995).

The 1995 International Manufacturing

Technology convention at McCormick Place was assessed to
have contributed $165.8 million to the city, according to
the Chicago Convention Bureau (Smith, 1995) .

A recent

Associated Press report (1996), noted that attracting
military veteran reunion activities,

has become a

local/regional economic development strategy for many cities
across the U.S.

Thus, it has been estimated by the

Montgomery, Alabama, Area Chamber of Commerce that veteran
reunions have a "$10 million annual impact on Montgomery's
economy."

The Impact of the Arts
The presence of the arts has also been viewed as a
strategy toward urban development since their economic
effects are perceived to be considerable (Zukin, 1982;
McNulty, 1985; Tighe, 1985; Whitt, 1987; Myerscough, 1988;
Whitt and Share, 1988).

Cities have attempted to restore

and revitalize downtown areas through the use of cultural
anchors such as museums, art centers, libraries, theaters
and other related cultural events (Logan and Molotch, 1987;
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Bianchini, et al., 1988; Bianchini, 1991).

Orum (1995:134-

136), for example, discussed how efforts to revive the
vitality of Milwaukee included the War Memorial Museum.
Attracting people to downtown Minneapolis-St. Paul is driven
by the Minneapolis Symphony, which holds regular free
outdoors and indoors concerts for the local residents (Orum,
1995:183).

Other cities, including Tampa (Mormino, 1983),

Dallas (Tomkins, 1983), New Orleans (Hill, 1984), Knoxville
and Atlanta (Schmidt, 1984), Salt Lake City (Wright and
Jorgensen, 1993) utilize similar techniques to revitalize
their downtowns. 22
Multiplier effects have been utilized to show the
economic impact of the arts on a state's economy.

In

Illinois, a study conducted by Laventhol and Horwath (1988)
for the Illinois Arts Alliance Foundation utilized a 2.65
multiplier for museum-related organizations and 2.36
multiplier for non-museum related organizations.

The study

concluded that the indirect spending generated by the arts
was $337 million for the state.

Economic Impacts Through the Use of Multipliers in Sports
Multiplier analysis has also been used to measure the

22

The role which the arts play in urban development
can be seen in Chicago. The announcement of new productions
by Walt Disney at the Chicago Theater and theatrical
performances at the renovated Oriental Theater, are expected
to create considerable positive economic effects in the
North Loop area (Allen, 1996) .
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economic effects of these investments/projects on
metropolitan areas.

Economic impact studies of sporting

facilities and sport franchises use a formal economic model
based on location quotients to calculate direct and indirect
impacts (Isserman, 1977).

Yet, the figures employed in the

determination of these economic effects are arbitrary.

The

multiplier effect figures utilized across the United States
has varied widely from 3.2 to 1.2 points.

Such difference

points not only to the lack of uniformity when attempting to
assess the financial outcome of these projects, but it also
indicates the political influences of these determinations.
The findings of these evaluations can have serious political
implications since government support of stadium development
projects must be rationalized.

Politicians favoring the

advancement of these expenditures must ensure that their
decision is valid.

It is through research then that the

public can be informed of its proposed benefits.

As a

result, the use of multiplier figures has fluctuated
tremendously, revealing in the process the politics of
research.
For example, the 3.2 figure mentioned above was
employed in a study conducted by the Chicago Cubs (Melaniphy
and Associates, 1986), while a 3.0 figure was utilized in a
study conducted on the impact of a Class A baseball stadium
in South Bend, Indiana (Peck, 1985) .

A Minnesota study

conducted by a State Task Force utilized a 2.6 multiplier
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(Minnesota Major League Baseball Task Force, 1985), and a
similar analysis by the City of Denver employed a 2.3
multiplier (Midwest Research Institute, 1983).

Other

multipliers have ranged from 1.7, used to assess the
contributions of professional sports on Philadelphia
(George, 1989), and a similar 1.7 figure and a 2.0 figure to
calculate the economic impact of the White Sox on the City
of Chicago and the State of Illinois respectively
(Department of Economic Development, 1986) .

Finally, the

economic effect of the Pirates of Major League Baseball in
Pittsburgh was determined through a 1.2 multiplier for goods
and services and a 1.6 multiplier for wages and salaries
(Greater Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, 1980).
There have been three forms of assessment which have
been taken into consideration when accounting for the
effects of a professional sports franchise on local and
regional economies.

Those are the direct, indirect and

intangible effects.
Direct and indirect economic benefits include revenue
created not only in the form of ticket sales, parking, and
franchise employee salaries, but also in employee taxes,
ticket and parking taxes, food and souvenirs at the game,
stays at hotels, entertainment after the game, etc.

As a

result, the combination of spending at the stadium or the
arena and the revenue generated in service industries
because of the sports events, makes up the direct and
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indirect economic benefits.

These benefits have been viewed

to stimulate the local economy by generating additional
funds for the municipalities and promote economic growth
(Euchner, 1993; Leonard 1993).
An economic study in Austin, Texas, for example,
advocated that the presence of a new stadium in the city for
a new AAA baseball team would provide substantial direct and
indirect economic benefits to the area.

According to the

study, three different multipliers were utilized to assess
the overall economic contribution.

One for "total output"

which represents the total direct, indirect and induced
spending effects surrounding the project.

Another for

"total earnings" which represents wages and salaries as well
as earnings of proprietorships, partnerships, corporations
and other entities.

Finally, the third multiplier was used

for "employment" which represents the number of jobs
generated by the project.

The study concluded that over 450

jobs would be created and a total of over $37 million would
be contributed as a result of the presence of a new minor
league franchise in the city. 23

The total construction

costs were also estimated at $18 million (Coopers and
Lybrand, 1995) .
Similarly, a 1985 report by Edward B. Shils noted that
23

Economic impact studies in the area of sports
report number of jobs without indicating the types of jobs
and the average wages. Such reports tend to be misleading
since without data on wages, the real employment
implications are left to individual interpretation.
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the total indirect economic impact of the professional teams
on the city of Philadelphia during 1983 was $343 million and
on the Philadelphia SMSA (made up of five counties in
Philadelphia and four in New Jersey) was over $574 million.
Shils reached these figures by first determining the direct
revenue and then adding,

(1) spending on ticket and

television/radio payments and concessions,

(2) spending on

food, entertainment, public and private (i.e. taxi and
shuttles) transportation as well as lodging and (3) revenue
paid by advertisers to television/radio stations during
broadcasting.

He concluded that these three sources of

revenue generated $202 million.

To identify the overall

economic impact on the city of Philadelphia, he utilized a
1.7 multiplier effect which estimates the indirect economic
impact coming out of direct spending.

The overall economic

impact on the city then becomes $343 million.

Shils used a

multiplier effect of 2.6 to calculate the $574 million
figure for the SMSA of Philadelphia (George, 1989) . 24
24

Direct and indirect economic benefits in sports
are widely communicated across America. Such assessments
have included the economic effects of a professional
basketball team in New Orleans (Finney, 1994), the annual
contribution of the Bears (WBBM-TV2, 1995) and of the White
Sox (Laventhol and Horwarth, 1985) on Chicago's economy, as
well as the impact of the professional leagues on U.S.
cities (CNN Headline News, 1994) . Other reports have
included the economic effects of the Indiana Sports
Corporation on Indianapolis (Macnow, 1989), the economic
impact of the 1993-1994 MLB player strike on Chicago
(Carlino, 1994), the financial contributions of the McDome
project on Chicago (Mccarron, 1990) and the economic impact
of the Louisiana Superdome and the 1990 Super Bowl on New
Orleans (Ragas, et.al, 1987; New Orleans, 1995).
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Intangible effects, the economic benefits which result
from the attention which cities receive as a result of its
professional sports team are also assessed.

Specifically,

it is believed that nationally and/or regionally broadcasted
games, in addition to team coverage, provides citizens
across the country with an opportunity to become exposed not
only to that team but also the city's attractions.

The

presence of the city's name in the score box of local
newspapers across the country can be sources of economic
growth.

In this regard, sports teams become an influential

source of advertizement for urban centers.
For the city of Chicago, these intangible economic
benefits can prove substantial.

According to a report by

the Department of Economic Development,

(1986:5-6):

... these 'intangibles' make a very real contribution to
the economy of Chicago, for any exposure of the team to
outsiders--whether potential tourists or businessmen-also indirectly promotes the city of Chicago.
. .. the
Department estimated that a Chicago baseball franchise
produces about three million dollars worth of
intangible benefits in an average year, and that a team
in a peak year could generate up to eleven million
dollars.
Throughout these calculations, the Department
was conservative as possible. Just how conservative
becomes clear when we compare these calculated
intangibles with other estimates of the impact of
sports publicity. Local advertizing executives
hypothesize, for example, that the championship-winning
1985-1986 Chicago Bears football team produced
publicity for Chicago equivalent to a $30 to $40
million promotion campaign.
Even smaller cities like Aurora, Illinois, view a
professional sports team as a source of exposure.

According

to Paul Borek, executive director of the Aurora Economic
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Development Commission (Dardick, 1995): "You can't possibly
put a price tag on the exposure and recognition that a
national sports franchise would bring to a community.
Aurora would be good for the stadium and the stadium would
be good for Aurora."
The problems with accurately estimating the economic
benefits for local and/or regional economies, because of the
activities of a professional sports franchise and a new
stadium are numerous.

Private interests concerned with

prof it and public officials in pursuit of growth have
utilized these findings to push their separate but
converging agendas, making these investments realities.
Yet, serious concerns exist about the estimates and
predictions on which the multipliers and impact studies rely
as they identify the economic effects of a given project in
local/regional economies.

These concerns exist in both the

calculation assumptions made by the firms and the individual
business interests of those involved in conducting these
studies.

A Critique of Regional Economic Multipliers
Various aspects of the regional economic multiplier
have been criticized since the introduction of this
analysis.

Some criticisms concentrated on the bias of its

matrix (Dietzenbacher, 1995), problems with the use of
constant coefficients (Conway, 1980), effects of errors on
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the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue
(Dietzenbacher, 1990), its applicability to small and
underdeveloped communities (Mulligan and Gibson, 1986;
Rephann and Isserman, 1994), its accuracy (Jensen, 1980),
etc.
There are numerous problems with the use of multipliers
in assessing the total regional impacts of proposed or
existing projects, policies or programs.
be the outcome of (1) definition,

These problems can

(2) estimation,

(3)

assumption, and/or (4) vested interest.

Problems with Definition
The issue of definition is important because the
information presented as a result of regional input-output
analysis can differ based on concept description(s).

Most

of these definitional problems tend to be about employment
and income.

Specifically, regarding employment, the

relationship between "jobs'' and "full-time equivalent" or
FTE, is one which tends to obfuscate the employment
projections that are often communicated in regional inputoutput analysis (Stevens and Lahr, 1988:90-91).
The employment multiplier estimations are made based on
jobs not FTE's.

The reason for that is because the data

utilized for the multiplier determination derives from
sources such as the U.S. Department of Commerce or the
Bureau of Economic Analyses.

These sources present data
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figured out in number of workers or number of jobs, not
FTE's.
This could be problematic, especially when employment
multiplier estimation is conducted for different
occupational sectors.

For example, certain sectors (i.e.

mining, heavy manufacturing) tend to have a low ratio of
workers to FTE, whereas other sectors (i.e. retailing,
service) tend to have a high ratio of workers to FTE.

In

addition to the occupational sector, the area of the
country, as well as the season could play an important role
in communicating serious inconsistencies in multiplier
estimations (Stevens and Lahr, 1988).
As a result of these inconsistencies, the employment
multiplier estimation for two projects would be presented in
jobs and not FTE's.

From that, the presented employment

effect would be both misleading and inaccurate.

Thus, for

example, a $100 million public investment in renovating the
stadium of a professional sports franchise might be hailed
as a project retaining or generating many more jobs than the
number of jobs which the same amount of money would produce
if invested in the steel industry.

The difference here

would be that the jobs in the steel industry are more likely
to be FTE's and year round, whereas the professional
franchise would employ seasonal and part-time workers.
Another definitional concern is the income multiplier
estimation, specifically the induced multiplier effect.

The
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value of output multiplier is employed widely to assess the
economic impact.

This total economic value of output,

resulting from the exogenous change, tends to be quite
impressive.

Yet, a careful evaluation of its definition

should pose serious concerns for its accuracy.
Specifically, the total exogenous value might not be
regionally grounded.

For example, products consumed in the

regional economy as a result of a given economic activity
might not themselves be produced in part or in whole by that
same economy.

According to Stevens and Lahr (1988:91):

The difficulty here comes about because the induced
multiplier effect ... should depend on the marginal
propensity to consume regional goods out of regionallygenerated incomes. This marginal propensity is much
more difficult to estimate for a region than for U.S.
as a whole.
In fact, most regional income multipliers
are really average propensities to consume out of a
restricted definition of income . . . . Output, or sales,
is almost always misleading because of the doublecounting inherent in this measure.
The output per
employee of a region could be very high, for example,
if its only industry consisted of assembling highpriced computers out of costly components imported from
outside the region.
As a result of these definitional problems with determining
induced effects, misleading figures would be likely to
emerge.

A value added multiplier might be a better approach

to isolating these economic effects.

However, the outcome

of that approach would be very likely to produce def lated
impact values from those currently reported.
Other definitional problems have arisen with the
explanation of the concept under investigation.

For

example, studies about the effect of tourism have identified
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the tourist in different ways.

A tourist has been defined

as the visitor who has, at a minimum, stayed overnight at
the place of attraction.

On the other hand, other studies

considered those visiting for one day only to also be
tourists.

If the latter is the case then, it is possible

that spending at the attraction is merely displaced from
within the same economy.

As a result, the definition of the

regional economy itself is very likely to vary, producing
incompatible outcomes (Johnson and Thomas, 1990) .

Problems with Estimation
In addition to the employment and income effects
surrounding the multiplier definitional problems, there have
also been problems related to the process of estimating
these economic multipliers.

The major concern in estimation

has been the accuracy of measuring the product consumption
following a given program, project or policy.

The indirect

and induced economic benefits are often, by far, most
financially impressive.

The multiplier estimation concerns

are more likely to affect these types of benefits.
In the case that products are imported from the
outside, the acclaimed benefits in the production,
employment, income, etc, as a result of a given program is
seriously questionable.

The consistent estimation of the

"leakage", resulting from regional purchases produced
outside the region has been a problematic aspect of

81

multiplier assessment.
Let's say, for example, that a public investment of
$100 million to expand the seats of a stadium in a given
city from 50,000 to 75,000 spectators is hailed to generate
additional dollars, resulting from the increased consumption
of foodstuffs sold during the games.
account for the direct spending.

That would obviously

The indirect and induced

benefits would include the additional foodstuff production
to be sold at the stadium.

Such increased production might

be acclaimed to create additional jobs for the factories
involved in the supply of these products, additional income
spent by these newly employed workers, etc.
Therefore, one would conclude that the more local
production as a percentage of the total production exists,
the stronger that local economy would be.

As a result,

changes in export activities (assuming that 25,000
additional spectators come from outside the regional economy
to view the game) would have positive economic effects on
the local production activities and thus, the regional/local
economy.

Since the local employment depends on its

relationship to the total employment, the question then is:
How can we determine what part of the regional economy is
serving the local economy and what part serves the export
economy?

If the answer to this question is that the local

economy serves exclusively the export activities, then the
multiplier effect would be considerable, making the
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investment in the expanded stadium worthwhile.

Otherwise

the proclaimed indirect and induced benefits should be
questioned.

Problems with Assumptions
Various assumptions are also being made during the
assessment process as to the effect of private and public
investments on regional economies.

These assumptions tend

to be responsible for creating the extraordinary amounts
which are typically reported.

Consider the case of stadium

construction and its effects on local economies.

According

to Euchner (1993:71):
The biggest problem with the multiplier argument is its
assumption that the spending that occurs at the stadium
would not occur elsewhere in the local economy without
a sports team - in other words, the dollars spent at a
game would not otherwise be part of the urban economy.
This conclusion is valid since within large urban
centers there are multiple attractions, many of which
compete for the consumers' money.

Thus, if people do not

spend their money at the stadium watching a professional
sporting event, they will spend it at the local zoo or
museum.

On the other hand, what would the economic impact

be on smaller towns which might provide limited attractions
to its residents?

This argument has been made (Reich,

1989) to show the economic impact of professional franchises
for smaller towns:

"But such an easy transfer of dollars

[within large cities due to the multiple attractions]

is
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less likely in a small community, with only a few
attractions ... ''

(Reich, 1989:48).

by Reich is inaccurate.

The position taken here

Having many or few attractions in a

city, does not necessarily mean that the consumption
patterns of its residents will increase.

More specifically,

the consumption volume will continue to be the same.

People

in the smaller towns will spend their money purchasing other
goods or making investments, and by doing so they are
impacting the local economy as if they were spending their
money at the local stadium.
A recent economic impact study conducted in Austin,
Texas (Cooper and Lybrand, 1995:14), outlined the
possibility of "displacement" money being spent regardless
of the presence and activities related to a professional
sports team and of a stadium.
economic benefits.

However, it rationalized the

Specifically, the study assumed that (1)

there are increased taxes imposed on spending inside the
stadium and,

(2) stadium related spending is a "significant

entertainment opportunity", greater than any of the others
being available to its residents.

This study noted:

It should be noted that the operations of a new sports
and entertainment project, the phenomena of
"displacement" will take place to some degree.
Specifically, this refers to the fact that some portion
of the spending generated by the new project may take
place on some other entertainment activity if the new
facility is not built. For example, an individual,
attending a concert or the Firebirds game at the
Stadium may instead go to a movie without the
development of the stadium. As a result, the spending
by the attendee may not be entirely new to the local
area. While this displacement of spending will take
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place to some degree, it is important to note that [l]
spending which results in place of the stadium related
spending, should the project not be completed, may be
on goods and services taxed at lower rates, and [2]
without the significant entertainment opportunities
associated with the Stadium, less overall spending in
the County may result.
This emphasis on consumption patterns, often outlined
by these studies, serves as the primary means of providing
an economic rationale, and explaining the overall impact of
stadiums and professional teams in various communities.
Since consumption is related to production within a
capitalist system, rather than assessing consumption
patterns, it would be more beneficial to research the impact
on production within the local economy.

What kind of jobs

and how many jobs are produced by the presence of a
professional team?

An answer to this question would allow

for an accurate gaging of the economic impact of
professional teams and the rationalization for building
stadiums to attract them.

Regarding this question, there is

no evidence that the creation of jobs is an outcome of the
presence of sports franchises.

It has been argued (Baade

and Dye, 1990) that because of the subsidies extended to
franchises by the local government, low-paying jobs are
being created.

These types of jobs do not have the economic

effect claimed by politicians and team owners.
Another assumption that has been utilized widely across
the country, when conducting impact studies, has been the
"Taj Mahal Syndrome"

(Hunter, 1989) .

According to Hunter,
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it is believed that the larger the project to be conducted
the greater its economic impact will be.

Hunter showed that

a multiplier analysis of a bridge construction would
generate twice as much in community income as that produced
from repairing the existing bridge.

As a result of that

observation, Hunter (1989:1008) concluded:
The use of the new multiplier in the comparison between
old bridge repair and new bridge repair construction
makes the bias of the analysis clear. By increasing
public expenditures, even greater increases in
community income can be effected through the
multiplier's ripple effect. Why then stop with just a
new bridge? Why not build an even larger bridge, or
perhaps several bridges? Why not build new highways
connected to the new bridge? Certainly if one bridge
can generate far more community income than additional
community cost, several bridges connected by new
highways will bring even more income.
Can this
analysis be correct?
The approach that a larger, more capital-intensive project
would bring about greater economic benefits than a smaller,
less expensive one is an assumption which multiplier
analysis supports.

Similarly the assumption that the return

of a larger project will always outweigh the public
investment is incorrect.
opposite to logic.

In reality, such thinking stands

If spending more meant increased

economic growth, then, local governments across America
would spend themselves into affluence.
Another assumption found when analyzing multiplier
effects is that which views the use of local services for a
given public project as fiscally better for the local
economy than a scenario where out-of-region services were to
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be utilized.

It is possible that, the completion of a

public project conducted by purchasing in-state only
materials and utilizing exclusively local labor, to prove a
financial loss.

The multiplier predictions of such a

project would then be inaccurate, making the proclaimed
economic development outcomes questionable.

Consider that,

in its efforts to stay within the state, the project
materials and the labor utilized might prove to be more
expensive than that which could have been purchased from out
of region locations (Hunter, 1989).

Under this scenario, it

is possible that in an effort to create economic growth, the
public project is likely to run over its projected budget
and become more expensive to complete.
the cost to the taxpayers?
a costlier project.

What would then be

Taxpayers will have to subsidize

Does advocated economic expansion then

result into hidden financial costs?

As the above scenario

shows, local spending does not always guarantee positive,
short-term or long-term economic effects.
Finally, the issue of opportunity cost is not taken
into consideration when multiplier effects are reported.
According to Hunter (1989:1010):
Estimates of the income and employment multipliers for
private firms are misleading for the same reason that
they are misleading when applied to public works
projects: they neglect to factor in opportunity cost.
What are the alternative uses for the business'
productive resources: labor, plant and equipment? If
the business were to go bankrupt or for some other
reason to cease operation, would its workers find other
employment? Would the buildings be used for other
productive purposes? Could the equipment be sold to
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other productive capacities?
In the case where these transfers are likely to transpire,
and in most cases they do, then, based on incorrect
assumptions, the multiplier effect proves misleading.

In

this case then, the multiplier business effects reported are
not unique to the specific business since such economic
benefits are likely to also occur without its presence.

Problems with Vested Interests
Another issue which should be taken into consideration
when reviewing the results of an impact study is that of
vested interests.

Who benefits from the over-inflated

figures reported by these studies?
studies?

Also, who conducts these

Answers to these questions should provide an

insight into the inherent biases which might exist even
prior to the analysis of any data.

According to Hefner

(1995), because of the multiplier effect, economic impact
studies, such as those conducted to forecast the effect of
the 1996 Olympics on Atlanta and Georgia, can be
manipulated.
Multiplier analyses have been utilized for both private
and public projects.

Yet, what remains consistent in both

circumstances is that almost all of these impact studies are
either attempting to (1) rationalize new spending,

(2)

maintain current spending, or (3) increase spending.
Regarding public projects, large contracts end up going
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to private interests, thus, showcasing large benefits
through the use of multipliers only rationalizes the direct
support of private capital by public funds.

On the other

hand, regarding private investments, multipliers effects
have been utilized by businesses to draw additional economic
benefits from local, state and/or federal governments.

For

example, owners of professional franchises will utilize the
"ripple- effect" argument to receive public financial
support for the construction/update of their playing
facilities.

Continued funding for the arts might be

rationalized when, as expressed by various impact studies,
one takes into consideration the possibilities for fiscal
urban regeneration.

Tax benefits for business might also be

justified when considering the local economic effects of
their activities.
Finally, the fact that many private firms are employed
to conduct these analyses also points to the inherent bias
in this process.

The results of these analyses will serve a

specific purpose and in a situation where the methods of
input-output investigation are extremely fluid, the "right"
results can be easily compiled.

Also, the lack of knowledge

on the part of the public to critique the specifics of these
impact studies makes them indisputable.

Sports, Stadiums and Economic Development
Though incentives provided by cities are often expected
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to generate local economic development, it has been shown
that, in the majority of the situations, this is not the
case (Willis, 1985; Wren, 1987; Okuno and Yagi, 1990;
Storey, 1990; Boviard, 1992; Folley, 1992; Wassmer, 1990;
1994).

The economic impact studies in sports most often

tend to exaggerate the benefits making these reports
misleading and unnecessary.
In recent years, the economic effects of sports
facilities on local/regional economies has been questioned
(Baade and Dye, 1988b; Nicklaus, 1991; Howe, 1993;
Colclough, Daellenback and Sherony, 1994; Dauten, 1995)
Robert Baade and Richard Dye (1990) attempted to assess the
influence of professional sports and stadiums on the economy
of a metropolitan area.

Utilizing census data from nine

different metropolitan areas (Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit,
Kansas City, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, San Diego, Seattle and
Tampa Bay) , and methodologically employing a regression
analysis, Baade and Dye concluded that the effects of
stadiums and professional teams on area development were not
as positive as those advocated by the local government and
the professional teams themselves.

The often recommended,

multiplier assumption proved a doubtful factor in urban
development.

New or renovated stadiums do not increase

personal income and, according to Baade and Dye, they could
even have a negative impact on local development.

Baade

(1987:15), in an earlier report published by the Heartland
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Policy Institute in Chicago, utilized the results of this
analysis to conclude that:
The construction or renovation of a stadium, or the
presence of a professional sports franchise, might well
have a positive effect on the economy in the stadium's
immediate neighborhood. But at what cost to the rest
of the city or to the region as a whole? Perhaps a new
restaurant will open up in the vicinity of a new sports
stadium; it is however, just as likely that an
established restaurant fifteen blocks away will close
its doors as a result.
Is this what stadium proponents
consider economic growth?

And,
The results of this third regression confirm the thesis
that stadiums and professional sports induce a
reduction in SMSA income as a percent of regional
income.
In five of the nine cities, stadiums and
professional sports had a significant negative impact;
in the remaining four cities, the stadium and
professional sports variables, failed to exert a
significant impact, positive or negative, on city
incomes.
In no instance did a positive, significant
correlation surface among stadiums, professional
sports, and city income as a fraction of regional
income.
The changing internal construction of sporting
facilities, local/state laws and the positioning of stadiums
close to expressways, all must be taken into consideration
when attempting to assess the economic impact of sports
facilities on local economies.

In addition, the

beneficiaries of labor contracts from the construction of
these sports facilities have not come from local
communities.

The rise of the suburban economy and the

decentralization of the industry in the 40's and 50's has
taken away many of the labor opportunities once held by the
central cities (Ashton, 1984).

As a result, many contracts
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given for the construction of sports facilities have gone to
companies which operate from surrounding suburbs and most
often out of the state.

The Malling of Stadiums: Capturing the Consumer
The changing character of sport complexes should be
taken into consideration when assessing the multiplier
effects of stadiums on local communities.

Newly constructed

sporting facilities have become more geared towards consumer
spending on products which are sometimes completely
unrelated to the sporting event itself.

For example, the

United Center in Chicago, Illinois, conveys an impression
similar to that of visiting the local mall or walking
through an airport concourse being full of small shops on
either side of the walkway.

According to architecture

critic Blair Kamin (1995) :
The hypercommercialized arena [United Center] is part
theme park, part shopping mall, part circus, part movie
theater, part hotel lobby, part airline terminal, part
Niketown-everything, in short, but a match for the
Madhouse on Madison Street ... Maybe Benny the Bull
[mascot of the Chicago Bulls] should wear mouse ears
instead of horns.
This ''malling" of stadiums encourages spending within its
structure, thus discouraging opportunity for the local
community to benefit from the presence of the crowds coming
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to the games. 25
The $308 million SkyDome in Toronto, Canada, is another
example of a sports facility which captures the spending of
the fans in multiple ways.

In addition to being the home of

the Blue Jays of the American League, the Skydome is also an
entertainment center.

According to David Garrick, vice

president of Marketing for the Stadium Corporation of
Ontario, the downtown Skydome can provide an evening worth
of entertainment.

He noted (Buursma, 1988):

It's [Skydome] a city within a city.
People will be
able to leave work at 4:30 p.m., play a game of squash,
shower, have dinner, go to a baseball game, then go to
a nightclub after the game if they want, all without
ever leaving the complex.
Finally, the fact that new stadiums are being built
close to expressways making them easily accessible to the
public, and/or in communities which suffer economically, can
have negative affects for the neighboring communities.

By

the easy expressway access to the stadium, fans will never
become exposed to the restaurants or other various
entertainment attractions and small businesses available
within the local community.

In addition, because of the

harsh social and/or economic conditions experienced within

25

Other factors have also contributed to limiting
the economic growth of surrounding neighborhoods, resulting
from the presence of a stadium. For example, a local
Chicago Park District law prohibits fans from bringing
foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages into Chicago's Soldiers
Field. Similarly, an Illinois state law passed in 1988,
gave the White Sox exclusive rights to sell food and liquor
within and around their South Side stadium.
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these local communities, those who attend home games will
choose not to even purchase gasoline from the local station.
Many will do their spending either at their home communities
or within the stadium itself.

In Search of an Economic Impact
At the heart of every multiplier analysis is the
assumption that the amount of money invested on a given
project will be smaller than the amount predicted to be
generated by that same project.

As a result, state

subsidies have often exceeded the impact expectations.
Mitsubishi/Chrysler were provided with over $85 million in
the form of incentives to operate in Illinois.

In return

the state expected to capitalize on the corporation's
considerable subcontracting business within Illinois.

Yet,

as it turned out, the forecasted 8,000 new jobs and the
additional $300 million a year in personal income never
materialized.

Only 16 percent of the subcontracts went to

Illinois firms.

As a result, in this case, the multiplier

inflated the outcome of the state subsidy (Hunter, 1989).
Similarly, the amount of dollars generated for the city
by having a professional team of ten proves to be less than
the amount invested by the city to support that team's
operations.

A study of Baltimore's support for the MLB

Orioles and the NFL Colts from 1977 to 1983 by Arthur
Johnson (1986), provided some interesting findings.

The
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study showed that for 1977, 1978 and 1982 the city
expenditures on these professional franchises, outweighed
the city revenues by $2,628, $442,530 and $774,043
respectively.

The net city revenue for 1979, 1980, 1981 and

1983 was $798,653, $393,685, $91,191 and $801,096.

Also,

these public subsidies do not translate into increased
access to the games for the public.

Thus, the savings which

the owners enjoy are not passed down to the consumers of
their product.

Coakley (1989a) reports that even though the

residents of the state of Louisiana subsidize the New
Orleans Superdome deficits by $3 to $5 million a year, most
of these residents cannot afford to pay for a guided tour of
this massive structure.

Similarly, in Michigan, taxpayers

have subsidized the Pontiac Silverdome between 1976 and 1987
to the amount of $11 million (Baade and Bast, 1987).

Such

findings definitely question the extent to which the
presence of professional franchises adequately represent the
proposed economic success for the city.
If it is the case, that there is no economic benefit
for the community, then why do cities continue to compete
and be willing to invest such extraordinary amounts of money
to host a team?

To answer this question it is important to

note how the beneficiaries of these activities (stadium
construction) strategize to convince cities of their (city)
"perceived benefits."
Baade and Dye (1988a:38) describe the process and the
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various stages through which proposals for the utilization
of public resources to support sports franchises advance.
The different types of benefits are not economically
grounded.

Rather, proposed economic development through the

use of multipliers and impact studies, serves
political/persuasive needs:
At the first level, there is disagreement on the meaty,
earthly matters relating to direct municipal revenue
projections on stadium income statements.
If these
projections fail to support stadium plans, the
discussion usually ascends to a second stage, where the
stadium advocates recruit indirect benefits or
multiplier effects in boosting their stadium proposals.
Failure here generally ignites a third booster-phase,
in which the city economy is said to be propelled
upward by the ability of stadiums and their big-league
sports franchises to attract other business to their
environs.
Failure to convince skeptics at this level
produces deep space debate on the stadiums' intangible
benefits.
In deep space, any weight can be assigned to
these benefits, and stadium advocates have assigned a
weight sufficient to support their case on "rational"
grounds.
As a result, public officials become convinced that spending
public money will result in economic growth and
redevelopment opportunities, especially for the inner-city.
Baim (1994) conducted two studies aimed at better
understanding the relationship between local/state
governments and public subsidies provided to professional
sports franchises.

His objectives (1994:217) included:

(1)

determining the existence of these public subsidies, and (2)
identifying the extent of the size of these subsidies.

Baim

analyzed financial data on fifteen stadiums of the NFL and
MLB and he reached the following conclusions:

(1) municipal
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investments almost always involve taxpayer support,
size of these subsidies vary,
those subsidies,

(2) the

(3) the fans receive none of

(4) the presence of external benefits which

are utilized to retain/attract a professional franchise are
not universal.
Findings such as those above strongly suggest that the
economic benefits are not as extensive as the ones
predicted.

Stadium construction and economic development,

at the local or regional level, are not an automatic given,
and the economic outcomes of this relationship is either
negative or not equivalent to those publicized (Okner, 1974;
Johnson and Frey, 1985; Harvey, 1990; Baade and Dye, 1990;
Bale, 1993; Euchner, 1993; Hiestand, 1993; Baim, 1994;
Wilson, 1994).

Conclusion
Multiplier effects have been employed in economic
impact studies to show the fiscal contribution of a given
investment.

Though this type of analysis has been conducted

for the last few decades, serious questions should be raised
regarding the accuracy of reports which have employed
multipliers and outline extraordinary economic benefits to a
local and/or regional economy.
Multipliers have been utilized to forecast the economic
effect of manufacturing, urban tourism and the arts, urban
renewal and state enterprize zone programs, sports and
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stadiums, amongst others.

Yet, due to multiple assumptions,

estimation and definitional problems, many of these studies
are deceptive and incorrect.

As a result, the

interpretation of reported findings often does not
adequately describe the actual economic impact of the
assessed project or proposed investment.
In the area of professional sports, the financial
subsidies offered by the cities are aimed by the local and
state government at generating direct, indirect and
intangible economic benefits.

Though these claims are made

by local officials, team owners, the media, and commissioned
impact studies, research shows that there is no empirical
link between public investments in stadium construction and
urban development.
Estimating the positive economic effects of having a
professional sports franchise in a city is clearly
subjective.

Reliance on multipliers and impact studies in

sports and stadium development has resulted in the
rationalization of public support for private enterprise.

CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPORTS: ARE THEY REAL?
Introduction
This chapter provides an insight into the way public
officials, professional team representatives, supporters of
sports franchises and the mass media, utilize social factors
and cultural representations to convince the public that the
presence of a sports team is vital for a city.

In addition,

the quality of the city is measured by the presence of a
professional franchise.

To that extent, such reasoning has

been employed to justify the public support for stadium
development.

Arguments that a professional franchise

represents and symbolizes the city in which it plays, have
become increasingly common.

Similarly, it is believed that

the team reflects on the city itself and a successful team
on the field, the ice or the hardwood floor, is a sign of a
first class city.

Additionally, it has been noted that a

professional franchise is essential for a community since it
serves as a generator of social cohesion and community
building.
These arguments have been based on the social roles
which sports play in society.

Drawing from within this

framework, these claims concentrate on processes of order
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and stability.

Thus, structure, function and equilibrium

are the critical factors on which these arguments rely.

The

presence of a professional team in a city, has been claimed
to provide positive role models to the youth and even to
decrease crime. 26
After providing a brief overview of the social function
which sports play in society, the issue of status and
representation will be addressed.

Supporters of

professional sports franchises across America have
identified increased city status as a direct result of these
teams' activities.

I will also outline other arguments,

namely those related to community building and social
cohesion.

The chapter concludes with some drawbacks, when

attempting to understand sports and professional franchises
in society by exclusively relying on their social
contributions.

The Social Function of Sports
Society has been viewed as an organism which has a
structure and, as a system, is composed of interrelated
parts (Parsons, 1951).

Some of these parts, or social

institutions, include the family, education, religion, the
political system and the economic system.

26

In addition, each

The testing of a correlation between sports teams
and crime showed that there is no overall, statistically
significant relationship between the two variables (Baim,
1994:186-188).
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of the parts of the social system have manifest and latent
functions (Merton, 1968) .

Accordingly, like many other

social institutions, sports serve various functions for
society.

Thus, sports contribute to the smooth functioning

of the social system. 27
In its most direct way, one of the functions of sports
in society is to provide opportunities and encourage its
citizens to engage in physical exercise and thus, develop a
healthy population.

Sports can also serve as a way for

citizens to exert aggression in a manner which is nonthreatening to the social system.

In that regard, sports

become a "safety valve" for society (Proctor and Eckard,
1976; Marsh, 1978).

Similarly, sports can be utilized to

manage tensions, promote stability and ensure that society
continues to function within its existing status quo
(Riordan, 1977; Pickering, 1978; Riordan, 1981; Whannell,
1983; Allison, 1986; Hoberman, 1986; Redmond, 1986; Hulme,
1990).
Sports can also bring people together.

It generates a

sense of collective identity and even represents the values
of the society itself.

So, for example, teamwork,

perseverance, success, competition, discipline, all become
27

Coakley (1982; 1989b), in his examination of the
social functions of sports, utilized a four "system needs"
approach (Parsons and Smelser, 1965). According to Coakley
(1989b:26-28), the four areas include: (1) sports as a
pattern of maintenance and tension management, (2) sports as
a means of integration, (3) sports as a means of goal
attainment, and (4) sports as a means of adaptation.
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communicated through sports.

According to Eitzen (1989:44):

"· .. American sport, like American society, is authoritarian,
bureaucratic, and product oriented. " 28

In this regard,

there is a strong interrelationship between sports and the
social system.
Another function of sports in contemporary society has
been that, like education, the family, the peer group,
religion, etc, sports serves as an agent of socialization.
Within the organized setting of sports, young children learn
to value order, structure, patience, commitment, authority,
stability and realize the notion of hierarchy (Ball, 1976;
Watson, 1977; Kohn, 1980; Fine, 1987; Eitzen, 1989;
Underwood, 1989) .

In the process, these children become

prepared to enter society with the attitudes and
understandings which the larger culture values.

So, for

example, the acceptance of the calls made at the game by the
official, signifies the power and powerlessness of its
participants (players and officials) .

These judgements by

the officials also occur within a highly structured
environment.

Such an environment is usually composed of

records/statistics, disciplinary actions against the
individual which often affect the team, credentialism, etc.
Within the larger society, similar elements can be found as
28

Sports have also been viewed as a reflection of
society.
Curry and Jiobu (1984:17), note that the events
and issues (i.e., sexism, racism, drugs, corruption,
violence, crime, etc) which take place in society can also
be found in the social institution of sports.

102

one observes the operation of the legal system and the
enforcement of laws.
Drawing from this perspective of sports, arguments of
status, cohesion and community building have been utilized
to rationalize the need for the presence of a professional
sports team in cities across America.

Thus, the high social

value of these franchises becomes another reason for cities
across America to find themselves competing against
eachother for an opportunity to receive the national
attention promised by the leagues and their teams.

Sports

teams have also been viewed as representing the city to the
rest of the nation.

These factors have been employed to

def end the use of public funds expended on renovating
existing sports facilities or building new stadiums.

A Professional Franchise as an Urban Status Symbol
It is believed that having a professional team in a
given city places that city on the national "map."
Amplifying the prestige of the community and improving the
morale of the citizens have also been cited as some of the
factors for the willingness of cities to rent their
facilities inexpensively to professional teams (Okner,
1974).

These and other related factors have in recent years

supported decisions for considerable public expenditures in
stadium construction.
Recently, St. Louis, Missouri offered an excellent
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financial package to attract a professional football team
back to that city.

The city identified the presence of a

football team as a way of regaining its national image.
According to former Missouri Senator Thomas Engleton
(Kramer, 1995b), the presence of the Rams in St. Louis is
nothing short of a blessing, making every effort and dollar
spent rewarding.

He noted:

Whether one agrees with it or not, some people measure
the caliber of a city in terms of having a professional
baseball team and a professional football team. When
St. Louis lost football, it became a second-class city.
With football back, St. Louis is once again a first
class city.
Having a professional team then denotes an increased
image for the city and makes that city enter into a unique
club of cities which can be called ''major league cities."
Hoffman and Greenberg (1989:154), reported the comments of
an executive who analyzes the values of various companies
across the country.

He said:

I talked about what teams mean to cities to the
chairman of the board of Westinghouse. He said, 'How
can I bring people to Pittsburgh to work for
Westinghouse if I can't tell them that we have a major
league community?' Now you want to translate that into
dollars.
It can't be done. But that's not the
important thing.
It's the desire, the image.
And, according to Dave Mona, a public relations executive
who worked to keep the Timberwolves in Minnesota after they
threatened to leave for New Orleans:
There is a real benefit to people in other parts of the
country looking in their newspapers and seeing
"Minnesota'' in stories and in agate.
It's one of those
intangibles that makes an area "major league." For a
long time, this was the smallest area that had every
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major-league sport.
The defection of a professional team can also have
negative perceptions towards the community.

University of

Minnesota Athletic Director, McKinley Boston concludes: "My
sense is that [the relocation of a professional team]
changes the overall perception of our [Minneapolis]
community.

I think professional sport franchises have a lot

to do with how people out of the area view you"

(Bennet,

1994).
Cities also take pride in their sports teams.

Often,

the success of the franchise on the field is perceived to
add considerable prestige and status to the community.
Claims that Chicago is the greatest sports town in the
country and that its residents should be proud to reside
there are constant subjects of discussion on the local
sports radio shows (SCR-820 and WMVP-1000).

In these sports

stations, during the period of the championships won by the
NBA's Chicago Bulls (1991-1993), it was common to hear
analogies being made between the success of the team and the
greatness of the city.

Similarly, the sudden decision to

move the Browns of the NFL from Cleveland to Baltimore in
1995 was viewed as unfair by the residents of Cleveland.
They repeatedly described themselves as members of a firstclass city which continued to support the franchise over the
many years when the Browns exemplified poor performance on
the field (Pearson, 1995).
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Civic-identity and civic self-esteem arguments have
also been made to support the construction of sports
facilities at considerable public cost.

Edward Williams in

1988, as part of a request to the Maryland General Assembly
to fund a stadium replacement (retire the 35-year-old
Memorial Stadium in Baltimore) for his Baltimore Orioles,
argued for the status that his team provided to that city.
It was portrayed that, if the Orioles decided to leave
Baltimore, the social cost to the city would be extremely
high.
Fearing the loss of this baseball franchise, especially
when a few years earlier in 1984, the Colts of the NFL
carried through their threats and moved to Indianapolis, the
State Assembly voted for a new baseball stadium.

According

to Marc Ganis of SportCorp, a stadium development and
financing company: "Baltimore is a perfect example of a
community that developed an inferiority complex because they
lost a team"

(Buursma, 1988).

As a result, the proposed

50,000 open-air seat stadium was expected to cost the
Maryland taxpayers $155 million.

Yet, as it turned out, the

48,000 seat Camden Yards actually cost them $206 million.
In order for a city to gain the perceived status
resulting from the presence of a professional franchise, it
is believed that, that city should be willing to make
considerable financial contributions to its team(s).
Michael Mccaskey, the owner of the Chicago Bears of the NFL,
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in 1995, requested over $185 million in public funds for a
new stadium.

On a question as to whether the state and the

city should provide him with these funds or invest the money
in education and health care, Mccaskey responded:
In logic class we call that a false dichotomy.
It is
not a question of choosing between schools or inner
city hospitals on the one hand and sports and
entertainment amenities on the other. A great city has
resources to do both.
I firmly believe that Chicago is
a great city (WBBM RADI0-780AM, 1995) .
A sports franchise also, according to some, has the
ability to transform the status of a city.

Hudnut (1995),

former mayor of Indianapolis, pointed to the effects which
the presence of a team can have:
In Indianapolis, we fought to keep the Indiana Pacers
from moving to Sacramento because we realized it would
be devastating to our image as an emerging American
city if the team relocated. We fought for the Colts
against Baltimore, San Antonio, Phoenix, Birmingham,
Jacksonville and Memphis because the potential benefits
were equally as dramatic . . . . They [Colts] transformed
us from "India-no-place" into a destination city, "a
Cornbelt city with Sunbelt sizzle."
Some cities will even promote new sports stadiums as
landmarks since they believe that they add to the status of
their city.

For example, The Ohio Turnpike Commission

(1994) went as far as to advertize Cleveland's Jacobs Field
in its James W. Shocknessy Ohio Turnpike Map as a site for
tourists to visit.

The Indians' ballpark was listed along

the Toledo Museum of Art, the Toledo Zoo, Sea World & Cedar
Point, and a variety of other theme parks.

In addition, the

inclusion of stadiums as landmarks informs us of the extent
to which city officials will go to present these structures.
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In the process, cities engage in the debasing of landmark
status.
The presence of a professional sports team is also
perceived to ''put on the map" and benefit small cities which
search for the attention that large cities gain.

Attracting

the Giants from San Francisco to San Jose has been viewed as
a status builder strategy for San Jose (Seal, 1992).
Kenneth Adams, an attorney who worked on the Irwindale,
California stadium deal is quoted in the Reich (1989)
article saying:
The value of a major professional sports franchise to a
young and growing community that is trying to put
itself on the map is inestimable . . . . The inescapable
conclusion of the last 10 years is that a professional
sports franchise has more value to an Irwindale or a
Sacramento than to a Los Angeles or a San Francisco.
And accordingly it's very difficult to persuade the
citizens in the big cities to spend taxpayer money on
retaining a team.
This notion of the difference between newer and older
cities, as it relates to the extent to which they are
willing to attract a professional franchise, depends on
factors such as local political organization, organized
labor and citizen interests.

Wilson (1994: 241) addresses

some of these factors:
The bidding war for franchises tended to pit newer,
prodevelopment cities against older, more
democratically run communities.
Cities in the South,
Southwest, and West, such as Atlanta, Houston, Dallas,
San Antonio, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Miami and San Diego
were especially well adapted to more open competition
because they had weaker public sectors, fewer calls for
public accountability, an unorganized working class,
and a far stronger military influence. Their goal was
to encourage growth, rather to regulate it. They were
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not disturbed by the fact, commonly acknowledged, that
the sports business mainly benefitted developers,
financiers and realtors, rather than the average
citizen, who could only be expected to enjoy its
benefits as they "trickled down."
Recently this ''easier acceptance" of propositions to
accommodate the interests of professional teams in the
Southwest is changing.

Such challenges to the intentions of

local government come from residents who have retired to the
Southwest and might be more aware of the uneven benefits
which come from building a new stadium.

A proposal to build

a new stadium to replace the Cubs' current winter home of Ho
Ho Cam in Mesa, Arizona with a new $24 million reminiscent
of Wrigley Field, was opposed by area residents.

The locals

felt that taxpayers' money should not assist the Cubs'
interests (de Lama, 1994).

Other Proposed Social Benefits for the City Resulting from
the Presence of a Professional Sports Franchise
Additional social benefits have also been advocated to
result from the presence of a professional sports franchise
in a city.

The perceived value of a franchise has made

public officials view the team as being one with the city
itself.

Pat Quinn, an Illinois Democratic candidate for

U.S. Senate, who proposed the "Sports Fans Bill of Rights",
indicated that the Bears of the NFL are one with the
community of Chicago (WBBM-TV2, 1995).

He noted:

The Bears are like utilities. They belong to the fans.
There is an issue of trust. Generation after
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generation people have come to see them.
to the community.

They belong

But, how did statements like the one above, which indicates
a very strong relationship between the city and the
professional franchise, come to be?

In attempting to answer

this question, I will discuss the way city officials and
others across America, who are involved in attracting or
retaining professional franchises, argue the prevailing or
anticipated social benefits.

A Professional Franchise as a Generator of Social Cohesion
and Community Building
In addition to the status related arguments mentioned
earlier, the presence of a professional franchise has also
been viewed as a means of community empowerment, pride and
community maintenance.

Jerry West, a long-time NBA great

and most recently General Manager of the Los Angeles Lakers,
described the 1995-1996 regular season success of the
Chicago Bulls as a community building experience for
Chicago.

For him, Chicago is fortunate to have this great

team play there.

According to West, the achievements of the

Bulls on the court "builds community pride ... It is great for
Chicago ... This is great to have in your city ... [and], I wish
that we had it here in Los Angeles"
1996).

(WSCR-SCORE 820 AM,

William Hudnut (1995), former mayor of Indianapolis

also noted that the Colts of the NFL have served a similar,
socially cohesive function for that city:
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The team can supply some of the glue that holds a
community together.
The Colts galvanized the spirit of
Indianapolis.
This notion of community building has also been
expressed recently in Tampa, Florida.

As the NFL Bucs

threatened to leave the city, unless they received a
commitment for a new stadium, social cohesion and community
building arguments surfaced.

These arguments were

constructed to support every effort to keep the team in the
area.

According to Edwin Roberts, Jr.,

(1995), columnist

for The Tampa Tribune, the economic benefits, though
critical, are not the most important reasons for keeping the
franchise.

Rather it is the "civic worth" which is "the

major reason for keeping the Bucs."

He wrote:

The economic benefits accruing to the citizenry as a
whole from the presence of a professional football team
are probably smaller than advertized. Nevertheless,
the civic worth of a sports franchise has less to do
with expanding local wealth than with expanding local
pride, and that's not easy to evaluate.
. .. when the
[Washington Red] Skins won their first Super Bowl, there
was so much hugging among strangers in Washington and
its suburbs that the celebration put one in mind of V-J
Day. Nothing, absolutely nothing can bring to a
diverse community so much shared rapture . . . . The Bucs'
great gift to us is the unity they inspire among so
many different sorts of people, and it is a unity that
thrives on the team's success but doesn't entirely
dissipate when the team fails. 29
Similarly, in Chicago, when the Bears of the NFL
threatened to leave the city for a suburb or another city, a

29

It is important to note that success on the field
does not always result into happy street celebrations. The
Chicago Bulls' championship victory in 1993 led to deadly
riots after the game.
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Chicago Tribune commentary (Papajohn, 1995) responded:
The Bears have long been a unifying element for a city
where North Side, South Side, West Side and the Loop
all distrust one another, where the Sox and the Cubs
split the baseball community and where racial divisions
run below the surface like so many fault lines.
Public officials and community leaders have also
outlined the social effects which a professional team has on
a city.

In a Los Angeles Times article, Keneth Reich (1989)

assesses the value of sports teams for various cities.

In

that same article a number of public officials proclaim
their importance.

Alameda County Supervisor Don Pareda,

addresses why focusing on bringing the NFL Los Angeles
Raiders back to Oakland is important for building city
morale and social cohesion.

He noted:

It really provides a galvanizing affect for the
community.
It fuses an identity.
It provides the
community a separate and distinct interest which people
share in common, and for us, in Oakland, that is very
important because we have such a diverse community,
socially, economically and ethnically.
It provides a
common reference for us and we know that that's very
valuable.
It is a similar value for the city of Los Angeles that
California State Senator Bill Cambell identified:
I think there is an extreme value, even to Los Angeles,
in these teams. You have the community pride, the
cohesiveness that a sports franchise brings.
. .. In the
office, everyone is talking about the game the day
before or the night before.
It brings an esprit de
corps to a community that otherwise is not there.
This idea of community togetherness and identification
is also interestingly argued by labor leaders such as Bill
Robertson who was instrumental in bringing the Raiders from
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Oakland to Los Angeles.

In assessing the value of a

professional franchise for the city of Los Angeles he
stated:
The same conditions apply today. Not only the primary
economic effect, and the ripple effect in Los Angeles
at large, but also because the [Los Angeles] Coliseum
is located in a depressed area and it's very important
for the morale of the people living in that community
to keep it busy.
What might also be inferred from this statement is that
professional sports have the ability to pacify the masses
and to misdirect their attention from the issues facing
their community.

Cultural and Symbolic Elements
Cities across America pride themselves in their
museums, orchestras, art galleries, etc.

These cultural

institutions prove capable of communicating the status of
the city.

As a result, the recent Monet Exhibit at the Art

Institute of Chicago, was viewed to not only convey artistic
expressions, but also proved to be an opportunity for
Chicago to showcase itself to the rest of the nation.

Thus,

through art, the connection between the Institute and the
city becomes reinforced.
Yet, the symbolic influence which a museum and an
orchestra have on its citizens is limited.

As forms of high

culture, these institutions prove mostly accessible to a
segment of the city's population (those with higher
socioeconomic background) .

Sports on the other hand, are
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part of a mass culture, which, because of extensive media
coverage, proves widely available to the city's residents.
In this regard, the success and/or failure of a professional
team, its style of play and its history will be likely more
known within the community than the latest exhibit at the
museum would be.

As a result of this broader audience base,

sports and professional franchises become strong
representations of urban centers across America.
Numerous cultural and symbolic elements serve as means
of strengthening the relationship between the professional
team and the city.

The team shapes the identity of the

community and in turn, the team becomes shaped by the values
and attitudes of the community itself.

The "finesse",

"fast-pace" and "flamboyant" type of basketball played by
the NBA Los Angeles Lakers at the L.A. Forum during the
1980's, communicates the life style and culture of the city
of Los Angeles.

In Chicago, sportswriters and sportscasters

use the term "Bear football" to describe the playing style
by the Chicago Bears in the NFL.

"Bear football" means

hard-hitting, in your face, as players reach deep within
themselves when no energy is left.

It is these same

descriptions that also characterize the residents of the
city, as well as its roots.

Such descriptions imply that

Chicago is an honest city whose residents are not afraid to
work hard and get the job done the laborious way.

These

descriptions have emerged out of the historical position of
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Chicago as a manufacturing center and out of the blue-collar
attitudes and values which characterized its residents.

In

the 1970's, the NFL Pittsburgh Steelers, through their style
of football, represented the values of the working class
"Steel Town."

Their dominant defense on the field was

referred to, even today, as the "Steel Curtain."

Finally,

as observed in nationwide radio sports shows, the image of
the NBA Detroit Pistons as a "dirty" team in the late 1980's
and early 1990's, carried on to generate a similar
impression of its residents.

Thus, there is a dialectic

relationship between the city and its team(s).

The image of

the team can inform us of the city, as the image of the city
can affect the actions of the team.
When the Raiders of the NFL moved back to Oakland in
1995, the city welcomed the franchise and according to Elihu
Harris, Mayor of the City: "There are clear economic
benefits, because corporations can identify with sports
teams.

And it's a source of pride, at a time when there are

so many negative influences"

(Witt, 1995).

The move back to Oakland, brought the Raiders to their
"heritage."

The hard working, blue collar approach of the

Raiders on the field, exemplified by Davis's motto "Just win
baby", best complemented the Oakland community than the
'glitsy' and football passive community of the City of Los
Angeles.

Bringing the franchise back to the bay area meant

that the City of Oakland and the Raiders belonged to each
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other all along.

According to Matt Millen, a football

player who played with the Raiders at both Oakland and Los
Angeles: "Los Angeles is where the score is tied in the
third quarter, you're driving for the go-ahead touchdown,
someone yells 'Surf's up and ... everybody heads for the
beach."

Gene Upshaw, head of the NFL players association,

and a Hall of Fame Raider also noted: "Anyone who played in
both cities knows the difference.
the Oakland fans.

There was a passion to

Every game was life and death.

talked about us in the bars.

They

In Los Angeles we were just

another bit of passing entertainment"

(Goldberg, 1995).

The city and the team then become representations of each
other.
Can New York City think of itself without the Yankees,
Boston without the RedSox, or Chicago without the Cubs and
the White Sox?

These franchises often, through traditions,

take on a life of their own within the urban environment and
develop influence over the metropolis that very few other
businesses could showcase.

These cultural and symbolic

elements depict the strong relationship between the team and
the community.

It is because of this strong relationship

and the perception that the team represents the community,
that local governments will often go to extremes to satisfy
the business needs of these professional franchises.
A recent commentary by Chicago Tribune staff writer
George Papajohn (1995) best exemplifies the relationship
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between a sports team, the Chicago Bears and the City of
Chicago.

He writes:

The Bears, more than any other Chicago franchise,
represent every cherished character trait and every
tour-bus cliche that gives the city its identity.
Thinking of big shoulders? Think Dick Butkus. The
ethnic success story? Think Bears founder George
Halas, the son of Bohemian immigrants.
Personalities
as unforgiving as steel? Think "Iron Mike' Ditka.
Tough but graceful architecture? Think of Walter
Payton's bruising and baletic build. The beautiful
lakefront? Think Soldier Field. The brutal Chicago
weather? Think Bear weather. The Bears are the only
reason Chicagoans can take pride in our miserable
winter.
These symbolic and cultural connections between the
city and the professional teams have been at the core of
many social arguments made to support the interests of
professional franchise owners.

In the process, the notion

that cultural images are increasingly utilized to represent
and define cities and the urban environment (Bourdieu, 1984;
1986; Harvey, 1990; Gottdiener, 1994) also finds support in
sports.

Stadium Construction as a Source of City Greatness
Cities have also viewed the construction of a sports
stadium as a way to showcase their position as progressive
cities or identify themselves as being capable to rebound
from natural disasters or other catastrophes.

The

construction of stadiums, especially domed facilities, have
in recent decades become sources of civic identity and
pride.
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The Astrodome in Houston, the Superdome in New Orleans,
the Metrodome in Minneapolis, the Kingdome in Seattle, the
Silverdome in Detroit and the RCA Dome (formerly Hoosier
Dome) in Indianapolis, have all been sources of pride for
their residents and have also been viewed as signs of city
progress (Gershman, 1993).

In New Orleans, for example, the

Superdome is more than just a place to play.

During its

construction, Moon Landrieu, the Mayor of New Orleans,
noted: "The Superdome is an exercise of optimism.
statement of faith.

A

It is the very building of it that is

important, not how much it is used or its economics"

(Reid,

1974) .
On the other hand, in San Francisco, Bob Lurie, the
owner of the Giants of the National League vowed in 1989 to
take the team to another city if he did not get a
replacement stadium.

The city attempted to generate support

for a publicly financed ballpark.

The November 1989

earthquake in San Francisco, directed the attention of its
residents to issues other than the stadium proposal.

Yet,

the Mayor of the city, Art Agnos, used the stadium
development proposal as a way to bring the city together
after this natural disaster.

He noted that "It's our last

and final shot to keep the team in San Francisco.
or never."

It's now

Agnos also viewed the construction of the

stadium as a civic response to those who challenged the
ability of the city to recover from its most recent natural
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disaster.

In a letter to the residents of the city he

noted: "Building the ballpark will be a signal that says to
the rest of the world that we believe in our future"
(Buursma, 1989) .

Perceived Social Benefits as Reasons for Franchise Support
Sports franchises are communicated to be ways of
citizen identification and part of a process toward
community building (Mitnick, 1984; Bickley, 1995).
Regardless of citizen doubts, the commitment to the
professional franchise by the local government and the
perceived status symbol which it brings for the city has
persisted.

In the end, these social effect arguments ensure

public support for professional franchises.
The following quote by the Mayor of Kansas City Richard
Berkeley from a U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary hearing in 1983 shows the importance of the team
for the city and the support his city is willing to extend:
Professional sport leagues are a unique form of
business. One level they sell entertainment, but they
also sell civic identity, emotion and community
involvement. The name Kansas City Chiefs says it all.
The Chiefs belong to the fans and the community of
Kansas City. We support the team. We share the glory
of their victories. We share the bitterness of their
defeats.
It is because we, the citizens of Kansas
City, share so much with our team that we have been
willing and we will continue to be willing to make the
public investments in stadia and other projects to
provide the teams with the facilities which are
necessary to operate (quoted in Wilson, 1994, p. 246).
Similarly, a civic task force in Milwaukee, the Greater
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Milwaukee Committee, fearing the loss of the Brewers of the
American League noted:
The success of the team as a business is the
responsibility of team management. However, a
community can and should take supportive steps to
assist a team's survival and to help ensure that it
will remain a part of the community. Teams need civic
support (Buursma, 1988) .
By considering the above comments, one would conclude
that there is a symbiotic relationship between the franchise
and the community.
strategy worked.

In the case of the Brewers, such
Late in 1995, the state of Wisconsin

approved the public financed construction of a new stadium
for the baseball franchise.

The Problematic of Exclusively Viewing Sport
as a Social Function
One of the general critiques of viewing sports as a
social function has been the extreme emphasis on social
order and stability, while failing to fully account for
social change (Edwards, 1973; Melnick, 1975; Figler, 1981;
Gruneau, 1983; Coakley, 1989b; Leonard, 1993).

A number of

assumptions are being made to view the social institution of
sport in a manner which always makes positive contributions
to society.

When considering the arguments by public

officials, franchise supporters and the media, no reference
is ever made to any negative implications which sports might
have on society.

Coakley (1989:29) outlines this point:

Since sport has been around for some time and is an
increasingly significant component of our social
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system, most functionalists conclude that it does make
positive contributions to society. This conclusion
leads them to ignore or underemphasize the negative
aspects of sport. After all, it is also possible that
sport could distort values and behavioral guidelines
(norms) .
It could impede goal attainment and interfere
with methods of coming to terms with the external
social and physical environment by diverting a group's
attention away from crucial personal and social issues.
Sports also allows for the development of a citizen
consciousness which does not engage its members into
substantive dialogues as they relate to the social system.
As a result the activities within the stadium and the
sporting industry as a whole, work to pacify the crowds and
assist in the development of a culture which does not
challenge the existing social status quo (Hoch, 1972;
Aronowitz, 1973; Petryszack, 1978).

This "opiate" function

of sports diverts attention and even supports the interests
of the upper class.
Viewing the social role of professional sports
franchises also tends to assume that what might be good for
the social system is good for the individual.

The

possibility of exploitative and coercive strategies employed
by the owners of the franchises in order to get the best
deal possible for themselves at the expense of the public is
not considered within this framework.

The innerworkings of

powerful interests within sports is also downplayed.

Thus,

as a result of city efforts across the country to benefit
professional franchises, issues of displacement, maintenance
of the political and economic interests of big business,
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deterioration of the physical and/or cultural environment
when stadium construction occurs, etc., receive no serious
consideration.

Conclusion
Cities are connected to their cultural institutions;
their museums, the arts, the orchestras and even their
professional sports teams.

Professional franchises are

viewed to be urban representations, to have symbolic value
and to communicate civic status to the rest of the nation
and to the world.
Integration, tension management, and the stability and
maintenance of the social order are at the heart of these
community status and social cohesion arguments.

Civic

identity, community involvement, and civic pride have been
identified as some of the ways through which professional
teams contribute to the city.

As a result, the professional

franchise becomes more than a team on the playing field.

It

becomes an integral part of community.
These social factors prove to be another intangible
which has been utilized by public officials and the owners
of the various professional franchises as the justification
for the use of public resources to construct stadium
facilities.

Because of these advocated social benefits,

public policy decisions have directly and indirectly
supported the interests of private enterprise.

In the
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process, the existing capitalist social relations, social
structure and ideology become reproduced.
Regarding the social effects such as community
identity, status, overall social cohesion and instillment of
pride, it is true that a sense of identity is provided by
having a professional franchise.

Professional franchises do

allow residents to identify with the successes and failures
of their team.

Yet, the exclusive reliance on these factors

must be reconsidered.
The validity of this socially-based approach to
assessing the social significance of professional franchises
on urban centers across the United States is questionable.
Though certain aspects of its analysis could be accepted,
when these social assessments are considered, gross
generalizations should not serve as a complete understanding
of the relationship between sports and society, nor should
they be considered as comprehensive knowledge in guiding
public policy decisions.

CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW COMISKEY PARK
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE
Introduction
The intense competition among cities for professional
franchises has led to the public finance and maintenance of
stadiums.

In the cases where city and state governments do

not provide these franchises with the incentives they
require, the teams threaten to leave for another city.

This

strategy results into a bidding war as cities battle with
their public resources to retain or attract professional
teams.
The case of the White Sox in Chicago, is an example of
how, through threats, a professional sports team can
successfully pressure the City and the State into financing
a new stadium.

The old Comiskey Park, which until the 1990

season was the oldest ballpark in America, lacked the profit
generating features that most of the newer facilities could
showcase.

The co-owners of the team, Jerry Reinsdorf and

Eddie Einhorn, successfully convinced the city that the old
facility was too costly to maintain and even structurally
dangerous for the public.

In addition, they threatened that

unless a new stadium is provided, the White Sox would move
out of Chicago and even out of state.
123
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Fearing the loss of this franchise to another city and
state, the Illinois General Assembly voted in December of
1986, and later in June 1988, to finance the construction of
a new baseball-only stadium for the White Sox.

The state

and the city gave absolute negotiating power to the Illinois
Sports Facility Authority (ISFA).

The responsibility of the

ISFA was to oversee the construction of the new facility,
and afterwards own and operate it.

The board membership was

appointed by both the governor and the mayor.

Despite

efforts by fan groups to restore the old Comiskey Park
because of its historical status, and despite a well
thought-out proposal which would create a ballpark
responsive to the corporate needs of the White Sox and of
the local community, 178 privately owned housing units and
12 community businesses were pushed aside to make room for
the construction of the New Comiskey Park.
The case of the Chicago White Sox provides an
opportunity to investigate the relationship between the
state and private interests within the context of
professional sports, as well as the social effects of these
policies on urban communities.

Pelissero, Henschen and

Sidlow (1992:70) in an analysis of the political policy
implications as they relate to professional sports in
Chicago, concluded that the White Sox case was an example of
emerging, progressive, urban politics.

Such assessment

poses serious questions about the social component of these
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policies.

They write:

The Washington-Sawyer coalition of 1983-1989 delivered
an acceptable stadium package to the White Sox while
successfully mediating the competing needs of social
and economic development in Chicago. The policy
response was innovative when it came to the use of
economic development tools, eminent domain, regulation,
public authority, and social policy.
Though this assessment is accurate in describing a recent
shift in the development of politics aimed at the mediation
of conflicting interests, serious questions remain regarding
attainable outcomes of social and economic development.

To

what extent did such progressive policy achieve a union
between urban economic/social advancement, and satisfaction
of private interests?

Was there even an intent to produce

any related economic and/or social development?

This case

study concludes that the state, through its deliberate
actions, promoted the interests of private enterprise at the
expense of a politically and economically powerless minority
community.
At the same time, several additional issues emerge from
an investigation of this case.

Specifically,

(1) the

apparent competition amongst cities to attract or retain a
professional sports team is the outcome of a strategy,
resulting in financial gains for the franchise's ownership,
(2) government intervention supports the activities of
private enterprise since it perceives that its loss would
pose negative economic, political and social effects,

(3) a

predominantly African-American, low-income community becomes
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displaced to make room for the new stadium,

(4) alternative

baseball stadium restoration and construction plans, which
could have proved beneficial to residents and developers,
receive no serious consideration, and (5) in addition to the
political and economic implications surrounding the
construction of the new sports facility, the cultural
environment of an urban community becomes reshaped.
This case study is divided into two chapters.

The

purpose of this segmentation is not to distinguish between
politics, economics and community response as they relate in
this case study.

Rather, the division into two sections is

conducted for the purpose of organizing this analysis in a
coherent manner and it is not intended to reflect a thematic
split.
The first chapter outlines the political economy of the
White Sox stadium development plans.

While taking into

consideration the franchises' intense motivation for profit,
this chapter addresses:

(1) the franchises' declaration of

the old Comiskey Park as structurally dangerous and the
opposition of "Save Our Sox", a fan group,

(2) the efforts

of the ownership to create a climate of competition for the
White Sox between the city, the suburbs and St. Petersburg,
Florida,

(3) the perceived economic benefits of the team for

the city, the county and the state,

(4) the role which the

media and the government played, leading to the passage of
the 1988 Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act, and (5)
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the new Comiskey Park, a failed attempt at the construction
of an urban ballpark.
The second chapter concentrates on community issues and
the community response to the stadium development plans.
Specifically, this chapter of the case study, provides (1)
information about the South Armour Square community,

(2) an

historical insight of the relationship between the old
Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities,

(3) the

political implications of displacement and the community
division over the proposed relocation program,
tactics,

(4) community

(5) the cultural transformation of the area,

resulting from the destruction of McCuddy's, a local
landmark and the laws restricting locals from selling their
products during the games,

(6) proposed stadium development

alternatives, including the restoration of the old Comiskey
Park and the Armour Field proposal, and,

(7) community

redevelopment following the completion of the new Comiskey
Park.
Stadium construction within the urban environment is
becoming a unique, urban development tool.

Beyond the

economically related arguments, social considerations have
been also utilized to support stadium development.

In the

case of the White Sox, loosing the team was perceived to be
an embarrassment to the city and a bad way to showcase the
political will of its residents.

Yet, as this case study

shows, social inequality becomes a central outcome of these
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"pro-growth" efforts.

Was it Unsafe or was it the Posts?
When it was announced that the White Sox were
interested in moving from the existing old Comiskey Park to
a new facility in the Chicagoland area or in another state,
a group of fans organized themselves to resist those plans.
The group called itself "Save Our Sox" and it had a two fold
strategy.

Mary O'Connel, a leader of the group told me:

We were so surprised to hear the ownership making these
proposals.
I have been a White Sox fan all my life and
we could not let that happen. Our interest was
initially to preserve the old Comiskey.
Some of the
questions we asked included: why should it be torn down
and if there is money to build a new ballpark why not
restore the old one?
The ownership of the old Comiskey Park and of the White Sox,
contended that the facility was structurally unsafe and too
costly to maintain.

The "Save Our Sox" group took issue

with that approach and searched to identify the extent to
which the ballpark had "truly" deteriorated, beyond
restoration.

A letter from structural engineer Peter

Krallitsch of George A. Kennedy & Associates to the group
read in full:
The purpose of this letter is to emphasize some of the
points we raised at yesterday's meeting. As we
indicated, we were very surprised at the rapid
deterioration that has occurred at Comiskey Park since
the extensive renovation project just three years ago.
Unfortunately, we foresee the likelihood of significant
expenditures on an annual basis to keep the park in
safe and usable condition through the 1989 season.
Beyond that time there are no realistic long-term
solutions since the deterioration is irreversible.
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Simply put, Comiskey Park is nearing the end of its
useful life (letter released by Jerry Reinsdorf, July
11, 1986).
Was the condition of Comiskey Park so deteriorated that it
rendered replacement or did the White Sox inflate its
condition so that they could campaign for a new stadium?
Would a new stadium provide the franchise with the prof its
that only new ballparks can offer?

It was the latter

approach which the "Save Our Sox" took and one which
community residents adjacent to the park later supported.
According to this group, the White Sox claims that the
park had deteriorated irreversibly were false.

This group

challenged the franchises' recommendations noting that:
(1) The short letter provided by the structural
engineer who assessed old Comiskey and was employed by the
franchise, communicated no technical data.

In addition it

generated no cost estimates of renovation and maintenance or
any other information which could be utilized to compare the
renovation cost to the proposed cost of constructing a new
facility.
(2) The ownership of the White Sox avoided any
discussion about the condition of the Comiskey Park.

Such

discourse, according to "Save Our Sox", would have worked
against the corporate interests of the franchise, since it
would have brought the issue to the public's attention.

In

the Addison Press (November 14, 1986, p. 1) of Addison, IL,
one of the proposed sites for a new stadium, team vice
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president Howard Pitzer was reported saying: " ... the Sox
released an engineer's letter explaining the report and do
not have to justify the contents of that report to anyone."
(3) Other information on the condition of the facility
by city inspectors indicated that the park was not in an
extremely deteriorating condition as reported by the team.
Though city inspectors reported numerous concerns with the
structure of the ballpark, they did not close the park and
the team continued to generate income from its activities.
In addition, prior to a game between the Cubs and the Sox at
Comiskey, city inspectors declared the condition of the
ballpark as safe.
(4) When the team was for sale in the 1980's inspectors
for prospective buyers reported its structure to be sound
and safe.
(5) Though skyboxes were added in 1982, at that time,
there was no report indicating the inability of the ballpark
to accommodate their weight.
(6) Other reports showed that the facility was sound
and it could accommodate activities for many years.
(7) The franchise had been continuously successful in
obtaining liability coverage for their game seasons, thus
precluding its sound structure (Bukowski, O'Connell and
Aranza, 1987) .
But, why did the White Sox attempt to show the ballpark
as dangerous and too expensive to maintain?

It is because a
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new stadium would provide increased prof its to the
franchise,

since the architectural style of old Comiskey was

not conducive to generating the expected income.
An integral part of architecture in old ballparks is
the presence of posts which provide support for the second
deck, while allowing for a slow incline, bringing those on
the upper deck close to the action.

The old Comiskey Park

had many of those posts supporting its structure.

Yet, this

set-up created many obstructed view seats, thus, minimizing
potential income.

The old Comiskey Park had 2,000

obstructed view seats due to these posts, many more than
other baseball ballparks. 30
Furthermore, the presence of posts in the old Comiskey
Park made the installation of additional luxury boxes
practically impossible.

A comparison of old and new

Comiskey Park aerial pictures, on September 30, 1990, during
the last game day played at the old ballpark, shows
according to Gershman (1989:228) that:
Side by side, the old and the new (unfinished) Comiskey
parks have little in common ... particularly the
steepness of the rake of the upper deck and the overall
height of the new park compared to the old.
It is due
to the inclusion of log seating between the upper and
lower decks, a way of gouging a few more dollars from
the well to do, while ignoring the legitimate interests
of the average fan.
And according to O'Connell:

°
For example, Wrigley Field (1914) has 500 columnobstructed seats, Riverfront Stadium (1970) has 0 columnobstructed seats, and Royals Stadium (1973) has O columnobstructed seats (Bess, 1989).
3
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Posts generated obstructed view at the old Comiskey,
thus, with the assumption of removing them to increase
revenue, every report on the old Comiskey Parks'
viability would turn negative. Under this assumption
it would be very costly to renovate the ballpark.
It
was this large cost which provided the justification
for the construction of a new stadium.
Similarly, independent architect Philip Bess, who proposed
the construction of Armour Field in the area, told me that:
One of the distinct features of old ballparks is the
columns which allow for a close and intimate viewing
experience. Though viewing would have been obstructed,
architecturally, it is possible to carefully place
limited columns, control the obstructed viewing, and
still allow for an intimate viewing experience.
Another reason reported for "making" the old Comiskey
structurally dangerous was that Reinsdorf and Einhorn did
not want to own the old ballpark.

It was too expensive to

maintain and the tide of ownership nationwide had definitely
shifted toward public rather than private construction and
maintenance of stadiums.

The White Sox were one of 6, out

of 26 teams in the major leagues, which owned their own
stadium (Bukowski, O'Connell and Aranza, 1987).
Though the state decided to authorize its own study on
the structural status of the old Comiskey Park, that report
was made public on August 5, 1988, a month after a favorable
lease agreement was passed by the Illinois legislature (June
30, 1988).

Though this engineering report supported the

findings of the previous White Sox study, by that time, a
new stadium agreement had been finalized and no group was
able or even willing to challenge a done deal.
The strategy of declaring the old Comiskey Park unsafe
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enabled the franchise to gain the attention of the local and
state governments.

From then on, the stage was set for the

team to present its demands for a new facility.

Moving to the Suburbs
Reinsdorf and Einhorn realized that the location of the
old Comiskey Park was not suitable for generating the
attendance which would result in high incomes from ticket
prices, parking and concessions.

Suburban Chicago,

especially in the west and northwest, was a booming area.
Those who could afford to pay the increased prices at the
games were not frequenting the old Comiskey Park.

In

addition the black fans did not regularly attend White Sox
games.

A move to the suburbs would bring the team closer to

its consumers.

The ownership also viewed a suburban

location as one with an opportunity for additional real
estate development to augment the proposed stadium (Goozner,
1986).

Anti-Urbanism, Racism and the Loss of the Black Fans
The presence of the White Sox fans in the suburbs can
be extracted from a White Sox promotional brochure which
posed the following question: "Who attends White Sox games?"
The answer provided was: "Demographics of White Sox fans
reveal they are the same people who comprise the majority of
DuPage County.

Approximately 50 percent of White Sox season
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ticket holders and 75 percent of all fans who attend games
at Comiskey Park live in the suburbs"

(Cattau, 1992).

The local press viewed the move to the suburbs
consistent with the larger suburbanization movement of the
1950's and 1960's.

It was believed that, the White Sox's

interest in moving was due to the large African American
population living in the general area and the slumlike
neighborhood around Comiskey Park (Wood, 1988).

That fact

made fans apprehensive about attending games in that area.
According to a Chicago Tribune staff writer:
Comiskey Park, you see, is also a tie to that bygone
age when the ball and everything else about the game
were white. Many of the people who would like to see
the ballpark preserved--a noble sentiment, to be sure-would also like to turn back the clock of urban change.
So no matter how weighty the engineering surveys, no
matter how costly the maintenance, no matter what
rationalizations are used to cover the team's track to
the northwest, another issue cannot be hidden.
It
could politely be called demographics.
"If it [the
move to Addison] happens, it would be part of white
flight, but that isn't the reason for the move,"
Reinsdorf says. The fans moved away from the South
Side. Why can't we?" ... It is one thing, of course, not
to have blacks in the park.
It is another to have them
frighten away whites. A perception that the
neighborhoods around Comiskey Park are dangerous began
during the riots of the late 1960's ... many fans have
probably never returned (Hersh, 1986) .
And according to a Chicago Sun-Times staff writer:
I think that Reinsdorf and Einhorn want to move the
White Sox as far away from the black South Side as
quickly and comfortably as possible. Reinsdorf came
close to actually verbalizing this unspoken desire
yesterday when he assured his new suburban pals that
they needn't worry about a dangerous element following
the White Sox into the suburbs.
"We're not gonna bring
bad people to the ballpark" he promised (Fitzpatrick,
1986).
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Finally,
Given the dichotomy of black inner city, white suburbs
found in many metro areas, the anti-urban bias of
stadium relocation often projects an anti-black bias.
The anti-urban, anti-black bias in no doubt related to
the fact that white-middle class suburbanites make up
the bulk of [professional sports] patrons (Devise,
1986).
It is interesting to note here that the neighborhood
adjacent to the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg, also became
an issue for the White Sox when they considered a move to
Florida.

Specifically, the White Sox were concerned about a

public housing building near the dome.

According to a

Chicago Sun-Times staff writer:
The St. Petersburg proposal, released under a court
order, reveals the Sox demanded that a rundown public
housing project near the Florida Suncoast Dome be
demolished by July, 1991, to make way for 2,500 parking
spaces. An estimated 168 black families living in the
Laurel Park project would have been relocated to a new
complex (Spielman, 1988).
Apparently St. Petersburg was even willing to relocate these
individuals if it meant that the White Sox would move to
their city.
Another factor regarding low attendance, is the lack of
black fans at White Sox games and at Major League Baseball
games in general.

According to Sherwood Brewer, an all-star

for the Negro League during the 1949 and 1950 seasons, the
Major Leagues have been unable to draw the young blacks to
play the game.

That has isolated the black fans from

baseball even more.

He said:

Black kids don't care about playing baseball especially
in Chicago. Now they are playing basketball. Very few
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of our [black] players come from urban areas ... If you
go out on Sunday afternoon all across the city you
might see two fields with black kids playing . . . . I
grew up in Centralia, IL, St. Louis territory, all I
heard growing up was; Baseball! Baseball! Baseball!
(CLTV, 1995) .
In the case of the White Sox, even though 69 percent of
blacks in the metropolitan Chicago area live on the South
Side of the City, according to the 1990 census data, market
surveys have consistently shown that only 5 to 7 percent of
blacks regularly attend major league baseball games (Cattau,
1992) .

An analysis of the ChiSox Club membership by zip

code revealed that few club members are black.

Of the 2,600

club members in Illinois, 860, or 33 percent, live in
Chicago zip codes.

Of those Chicago members, only 10

percent live in zip codes which are more than 50 percent
black.

From the predominantly black suburban zip codes of

Maywood (60153) and Markham (60426), the club list did not
indicate even one member.

Sam Cannizaro, President of the

ChiSox club, also echoed the results of this analysis: "Our
Black membership is a lot lower than what I think it should
be ... the racial composition of the club reflects the fans
who go to the park"

(Cattau, 1992).

For some of the Negro League stars who played in the
past, the White Sox have not made an effort to attract the
black fans to Comiskey, a claim which the team has denied.
Jimmie Crutchfield, who played for the Chicago Negro League
team in the outfield during WWII, no longer visits Comiskey
Park.

After Veeck's death, the team has made no effort to
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invite him to any of the events which would showcase the
history of baseball in Chicago to the new generations of
baseball fans

(Cattau, 1992) .

It was a combination of the potential revenue generated
from the suburban market, fears of decreased revenue due to
the location of Comiskey, and the inability to attract the
black fans to baseball games, which drove the ownership to
search for a suburban location.

In this regard, anti-

urbanism and racism can be viewed as two factors which have
contributed to the franchises' interest to look elsewhere.

The Addison Location
One of the sites sought after by the White Sox owners
for the construction of a publicly owned stadium was in
suburban Addison, IL, a village of 30,000.

The franchise

applied through CWS Development, a White Sox company, for
$100 million in tax-free state bonds to finance a stadium
with a retractable, shell-shaped domed roof, on a 140-acre
site owned by the White Sox in Addison.

The land was

purchased by Reinsdorf in December of 1984 for $7 million.
The early purchase indicates that, as early as 1984, the
team was interested in moving out of the old Comiskey Park
and to the suburbs.

The application for the state bonds was

approved by the Illinois Development Finance Authority and
the proposed facility would seat 55,000 and have parking
space available for 15,000 cars.
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During this process, the ownership of the White Sox
maintained that Chicago remained a serious contender for the
team in case the plans fell through. This approach by the
team ownership, is one which will repeat itself as the White
Sox would later threaten to leave for the Tampa Bay area in
Florida.

Professional franchises increasingly showcase

strong negotiating skills forcing cities to offer
co~siderable

incentives to attract or retain them.

A report prepared for the White Sox by the accounting
firm of Laventhol & Horwath of Chicago, noted that a
possible domed stadium in that area would mean 1,321 new
jobs for DuPage county and an additional annual income of
$41.4 million for county.

The economic benefits in the form

of jobs for the area would be 224 full-time and 1,070 parttime jobs.

The annual wages and salaries, according to the

report would result in $18.5 million.

The construction of

the facility would also generate 1,902 construction jobs in
DuPage County and 1,516 construction jobs in Cook County.
The report concluded that from the construction activities,
$82.1 million would remain in DuPage County.

Regarding the

community of Addison, this report noted positive economic
affects.

Specifically, the construction of the facility

would generate over $2.9 million for the village in sales
taxes and the operation of the stadium would bring in $1.7
million annually (Presecky and Fuentes, 1985) .
The local Addison community opposed the move of the
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White Sox to their suburb.

The primary concerns were the

traffic, alcohol, and the overall impact of night games on
their community.

The "Save Our Sox" group also worked with

the residents opposing the move and according to O'Connell:
"we built a coalition with that group and supported their
effort to def eat the referendum, because we were most
interested in keeping the Sox in Chicago."
In the end, Addison did not become the new home of the
White Sox, even though the local political leadership
supported the concept.

A vote by the residents would

determine whether the community would approve the stadium
development proposal and have the White Sox move to their
area.

Though the White Sox invested over $100,000 on a

campaign to pass the referendum and the opposition spent
only $3,000 to stop relocation, the team lost its battle in
a narrow outcome, since 50.3 percent voted against the
measure and 49.7 percent voted in favor of having the White
Sox in Addison (Euchner, 1993:146).

The Chicago Response
The announcement by the White Sox that Addison was the
preferred site, generated concern in Chicago.

Mayor

Washington worked hard to retain the White Sox in the City
of Chicago, as he proposed numerous plans.

He said: "We

don't want to lose the team ... We will move as speedily as we
can to provide what they need"

(Presecky and Fuentes, 1985).
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His initial proposal included the construction of a
multipurpose facility for baseball and football.

The

facility would house both the White Sox and the Bears of the
National Football League.

The proposed location of this

stadium was along the east bank of the Chicago River, south
of Roosevelt Road in the South Loop area.
This proposal proved unsatisfactory to the ownership of
the White Sox.

Though the franchise approved the city's

efforts to retain the team and construct a new facility, the
idea of sharing that facility with another team, especially
a football team, was unacceptable.

Reinsdorf criticized

this part of the proposal noting that baseball fans would be
removed from the action in a facility which would have to
also meet the large dimensions of a football stadium.
Fearing the loss of the team to the suburbs, Mayor
Washington made the White Sox the priority and revisited the
issue of the stadium proposal.

He noted: "The pressing

force right now is the White Sox ... They seem to have the
greatest urgency"

(Mccarron, 1985a) .

This "urgency"

provides for a unique insight into the role of professional
sports teams in urban politics.

Specifically, what would

the potential implications for urban politics be if a mayor,
and in this case an African-American mayor, failed to retain
the White Sox in Chicago?

Though this question, connecting

political effectiveness and sports franchise behavior, have
surfaced in cities across America, there is no evidence to

141
support such correlation.

Specifically, between 1953 and

1990, there is only one case where a mayor of a large city
was re-elected because of that mayors' position on a stadium
construction issue. 31
Yet, a new stadium proposal came forth which also
outlined the South Loop area as the location site.

While

the city remained sensitive to the financial concerns of the
White Sox, they also took into consideration the previously
expressed dissatisfaction with the multi-purpose facility
proposal.

As a result, the city outlined a plan for a

baseball-only, open-air structure.
This 50,000 spectator facility would cost $125 million
to build; $25 million would come from the developers, and
$100 million from the sale of city's tax-exempt industrial
bonds.

The city would also provide $54 million in

infrastructure improvements.

The 60-acre parcel required

for the construction of the facility would be purchased from
three railroads.

The taxpayers would not be affected, since

the $10 million annual debt service would come from the
White Sox in the form of rent and other related payments.
The proposal drafted by the city ensured that the team would
31

The case is that of Thomas D'Alesandro who in 1955
was re-elected mayor of Baltimore overcoming a number of
family scandals and Baltimore's newspaper endorsements of
his opponents. The D'Alesandro campaign was helped by his
position and leadership in building a new stadium and
bringing the Orioles to that city. Apart from this
instance, voters typically perceive a stadium issue as one
of many others to be considered when electing
representatives (Baim, 1994:180-190).
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not lose financially if annual attendance fell below 1.5
million a season (Mccarron, 1985b) .
The South Loop community did not approve the site for
the construction of the proposed sports facility.

The

residents feared traffic, noise and the related effects of a
stadium in their neighborhoods.

For the South Loop

residents, there was a strong possibility that other events
such as concerts were to be held at the proposed facility,
if playing baseball proved economically unsuccessful.

This

would create even more community problems.
At the same time, the area was becoming gentrified as
new developments such as River City, Dearborn Park and
Printer's Row were added to this community.

A stadium in

the area would have posed serious limitations to further
residential development.

According to Ken Calvin, a

spokesperson for Citizens Against the Stadium (CATS) : "The
proposed South Loop location would stifle the development of
a neighborhood that is in its infancy"

(Devall and Sjostrom,

1986) .
In this regard, having two forms of development
(residential and stadium) raises the issue of profitability.
Which one of the two is more likely to return higher profit
to its investors?

In the long run, the economic benefits of

residential development were to be much more extensive than
those accruing from the construction of a sports facility.
The potential profitability of residential development in
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the South Loop can then be attributed to the decision not to
utilize this area as the site for a White Sox stadium.
The residents of this community were also vocal about
the proposed plans.

CATS, a local neighborhood

organization, resisted these stadium development efforts.
They politicized the issue by attacking the mayor who had
received campaign contributions from developers of the
stadium project.

They signed petitions to enlist the

support of Ald. Fred Roti (1st Ward) and attempted to ban
the sale of alcohol in the area.

Finally, they campaigned

through demonstrations against the issue, ensuring that
these stadium development plans were not to be pursued any
further (Euchner, 1993).

Economic Rationalizations and the Eventual Site
Ira Elderson, an advisor to the Mayor on the stadium
issue, responding to criticism that the White Sox might be
using the Addison site as a way to get Chicago to propose
the best deal possible, explained that the White Sox are
worthy of the attention, since the team is a viable economic
contributor to the city.

He said:

Loosing a major-league baseball team is no different
than losing a Wisconsin Steel [the far Southeast
Chicago steel plant] . The White Sox generate about
$100 million a year in economic activity for the city,
and the direct loss of sales and amusement tax revenues
would alone amount to several million dollars
(Mccarron, 1985a) .
The implications of this statement are clear; the city would
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do anything in its power to keep the team in Chicago, even
if that meant providing these private interests with support
that no other business can retain so openly from government
officials.
The White Sox commissioned a study which claimed they
contributed to the economy of the city, the county and the
state, $100.3 million annually (Laventhol and Horwath,
1985).

The study noted $30.6 million in direct and $69.8

million in indirect economic benefits.

The results of this

study were confirmed by a study conducted a year later by
the City of Chicago on the impact of major league baseball
on the local economy (Department of Economic Development,
1986).

This study also linked new stadium development to

additional economic incentives for local economies.

A

Department of Economic Development study (1986:8):
... demonstrated that a baseball team has a substantial
impact on the local economy, both through measurable
effects and 'intangibles.'
The Department has also
shown how a team is a substantial source of revenue for
the City, County and State.
Finally, we have indicated
that a new stadium will increase the cumulative
economic impact of a Chicago baseball team, and sharply
boost the revenues received by local government.
The report, which was eventually employed to convince
the lawmakers in Springfield, IL that an approval of funding
for a new White Sox stadium was a rational act, provided
some interesting comparisons between the economic
contributions which an old vs. new stadium would have on the
state of Illinois and the City of Chicago.

The comparison

(See Table 2) shows that a new stadium makes higher economic
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contributions to the local and state economy than does an
older one.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF THE ANNUAL AVERAGE VS. PEAK
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF A BASEBALL TEAM IN ILLINOIS & CHICAGO,
AND TAXES PAID TO THE STATE, COUNTY AND THE CITY BETWEEN AN
OLD AND A NEW STADIUM
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Average*
Peak**
Old Stadium
Old Stadium
93.7

134.9

CITY OF CHICAGO
Average*
Peak**
Old Stadium
Old Stadium
78.6
STATE TAXES
Average*
Old Stadium
4.2

115.3
Peak**
Old Stadium
5.7

Average***
New Stadium
112.1
Average***
New Stadium
94.8
Average***
New Stadium
5.0

COOK COUNTY TAXES {in thousands}
Average***
Average*
Peak**
Old Stadium
New Stadium
Old Stadium
103

133

CITY OF CHICAGO TAXES
Average*
Peak**
Old Stadium
Old Stadium
2.6

3.5

752
Average***
New Stadium
8.6

Peak****
New Stadium
161.4
Peak****
New Stadium
137.5
Peak****
New Stadium
6.9
Peak****
New Stadium
788
Peak****
New Stadium
9.7

Source: Department of Economic Development, 1986:14, 18, 22.
Based on annual attendance figures from 1982-1985.
* Indicates an average attendance regular season year
without post-season play.
** Indicates 2.2 million in attendance, plus 300,000
attendees in six-post season games.
*** Indicates 2.2 million as an average attendance regular
season year without post-season play.
**** Indicates 2.7 million in attendance, plus 360,000
attendees in six-post season games.
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Even though a new stadium usually heightens fan interest and
leads to increased attendance, viewing the new facility
wears off and yearly attendance levels drop (Johnson, 1983),
especially if the ballpark is an architectural bust, as
proved by the new Comiskey Park.
While negotiations persisted between the two sides,
some challenged the strategy utilized by the ownership of
the White Sox to receive financial gains.

Simultaneously,

these same critics undermined the supposedly, publicly
provided economic benefits which the franchise and others
claimed.

A Crain's Chicago Business editorial (7/14/86, p.

10), asserting the poor winning record of the team in recent
years, noted that its economic distribution to the area has
been less than impressive:
And as for being a contributor to Chicago's gross
metropolitan product, the Sox are strictly second
division.
In the course of an 80-game home season, the
Sox, filled a few hotel rooms with visiting team
players, sold a few hot dogs and plastic batting
helmets at the park and stimulated the sale of a lot of
beer at neighboring watering holes. Sears, Roebuck and
Co. exerts a bigger impact each week when it brings in
field personnel for education sessions at the [Sears]
Tower.
In addition, serious questions could be raised about
the tax benefits which the White Sox supposedly contribute
to the City.

According to a comparison of the 1987 tax year

assessment for White Sox properties and South Armour Square,
some interesting observations can be made.

The total

assessed value of White Sox properties including the
Comiskey Park was $2,672,917 and the taxes owed were
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$488,418.

On the other hand, the entire community of South

Armour Square, excluding the White Sox properties which rest
within the area, was $1,795,703 and the taxes owed were
$328,126 (Staton, 1988).

Thus, serious questions should be

raised about these publicized economic benefits, since the
economically devastated community of South Armour Square
nearby contributed to Chicago's tax base as much as the
White Sox.
The clash between the city and the suburbs became
interestingly exemplified by the position which the city of
Chicago took in its efforts to ensure the financing options
for a White Sox stadium in Chicago.

Mayor Harold Washington

attempted to stop suburban Addison from selling tax exempt
bonds to finance a stadium for the White Sox.

The Mayor,

according a Crain's Chicago Business editorial, asked Rep.
Dan Rostenkowski to "rewrite a grandfather provision in a
tax reform bill protecting the city's right to issue taxexemptions to exclude anyone else hereabouts from using the
clause"

(8/4/86, p. 12).

This "guerrilla warfare approach"

would not prove to be the type which would allow the city
and the suburbs to work together and cooperate for the wellbeing of the metropolitan community.

Another Crain's

Chicago Business editorial advised the Mayor to make the
deal which he offered to the Sox more competitive, rather
than downplay and sabotage the attempts of the opposition
(8/11/86, p. 10).
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In the end of 1986, an agreement between the White Sox
and political leaders was reached calling for a new stadium
across from Comiskey Park in the community of South Armour
Square.

Construction cost would be financed by state-bonds

through a city-state authority.

This agreement proved to be

less costly than the one discussed where the South Loop area
was the proposed site.

The estimated savings for the city

were approximately $54 million.

The cut in cost was due to

the fact that the new ballpark at this new site would not
require the infrastructural developments necessary at the
South Loop location.

Many city services which had supported

Comiskey Park (transportation, sewage, etc), would be
utilized to support the new stadium.

In addition, land at

this new location was more attractive to the stadium
developers.

Across from Comiskey Park, land was estimated

at as little as $35,000 an acre.

In comparison, the cost of

land at Roosevelt Road was estimated at $261,000 per acre
(Bayard, 1986).
Finally, the status of this new proposed community was
different from the one which successfully resisted the
stadium plans in Addison and South Loop.

The new community

was comprised of predominantly African-American, low-income
residents, many of which were senior citizens in public
housing.

This type of community, from the perspective of

the stadium developers, could be more easily convinced of a
new facility in their area, an assessment which would later
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prove correct.

Going to Florida or Staying in Chicago: The Media Push
The city of St. Petersburg, Florida observed the
developments in Chicago as the White Sox threatened to leave
the city.

In 1988, St. Petersburg attempted to attract the

team to the Tampa Bay area.

That city had begun, in the

mid-80's, the construction of a domed stadium which was
nearing completion.

The White Sox, frustrated with the slow

moving pace of events in Chicago and Springfield turned to
Florida searching for the economic and political support
which that state and city claimed to offer.
This interest by the White Sox could be categorized as
more directed at applying pressure on the political
leadership in Chicago and Illinois, than representing a
genuine intent to move to Florida (see discussion below on
whether a move to Florida would have been financially sound
for the team).

Yet, those in the Tampa/St. Petersburg area

viewed the possibility of a team in the area as a great
opportunity and worked hard to lure the franchise.

The

Tampa Bay Baseball Group, a private group seeking to bring a
team to Tampa, with the support of the Tampa Sports
Authority,

"blessed" the efforts of St. Petersburg to

attract the White Sox, indicating they would not compete
with the nearby city for the team.
An

editorial by the Chicago Tribune on May 11, 1988,
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fearing loss of the White Sox to St. Petersburg, chastised
the government for moving slowly and requested the franchise
break talks with representatives from Florida until
adjournment of the Illinois legislature.

At the same time,

the editorial admitted the possibility that the White Sox
might be trying to set-up the best possible deal for
themselves.

According to the editorial:

Their [state government] abrupt decision to break off
discussions with White Sox owners raises doubts about
either their sincerity or their judgment.
Intentionally or not, this latest shift once again
nudges the Sox toward St. Petersburg . . . . Maybe the Sox
owners have no intention of staying in Chicago, and are
only using these talks to win more goodies from St.
Petersburg . . . . if the stadium authority persists in
refusing to negotiate, it virtually guarantees that the
Sox will move, and puts much of the blame on itself.
In Chicago, the media pressured the government to move
quickly and ensure that the White Sox stay in Chicago.

Bob

Verdi (1988), a columnist for the Chicago Tribune attacked
the political leadership in Illinois and Chicago.

He

criticized them for acting slowly and not agreeing to meet
the needs of the White Sox, thus allowing the team to ponder
the possibility of moving to Florida:
If meetings [with government representatives in
Illinois and Chicago] were mortar and if promises were
pipes, the White Sox presently would have a facility
large enough to accommodate the entire population of
Florida instead of every reason to move there .
. .. Should Reinsdorf and Einhorn depart for clearly a
better situation in St. Petersburg, they will be gone,
out of sight, out of mind. But not forgotten will be
those striped suits who helped arrange the going-away
party. They are the ones who will have to stand up for
a change and explain what happened.
They are the ones
who will have to answer questions from voters who put
them in office. They are the ones who will beg for an
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expansion franchise and be laughed at by major league
baseball, because major league baseball understands
that the White Sox are not doing the squeezing, but are
the ones getting squeezed . . . . And a major league
baseball franchise must be fairly special, because
there are only 26 in existence. Does [Governor
Thompson] want the St. Petersburg White Sox on his
resume?
Even though political representatives in Springfield
agreed with this logic, they felt caught in the middle.

On

the one hand, political support would indicate the
advancement of private interests, and, on the other hand,
losing the White Sox could have direct re-election
implications.

According to Rep. Robert Churchill (R., Lake

Villa) :
It's a difficult thing for Democrats or anybody else to
sell to voters-that you voted for Reinsdorf and Einhorn
but not for schools. But this White Sox issue could
generate some heat later. No leader or legislature
wants to be collared with the mantle of loosing the
Sox. That's not good politics either (Kass, 1988a).
This type of reasoning, outlining the political implications
for government officials involved in the negotiations,
applied additional pressure to retain the White Sox in the
City.

In addition, other, economically driven rationales

were utilized to retain the White Sox.

According to some,

keeping the White Sox in the city would allow Chicago to
"retain an estimated $112 million to $162 million in annual
local spending, taxes and economic activity"
1988a) .

(Hornung,

What politician would want to be responsible for

the loss of this revenue?
The governor of Illinois attempted to def end his slow
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action on the matter and noted that the White Sox should
discontinue talks with St. Petersburg.

According to Gov.

Thompson:
It's kind of hard to negotiate when you have given the
other party everything they asked for.
That's the
astounding part of all of this, I mean, we said last
night, 'Okay, we'll give you everything you've asked
for, literally everything, every single thing.' Now
what's left? (Kass and Franklin, 1988).
The White Sox ownership responded with disagreement.
According to a team representative: "They [government]
wanted us to cut off one leg in exchange for a promise that
Springfield would try and give us another.
wanted the deal.

We said we

They wanted us to go along and kill other

options on a promise.

That's not good business"

(Kass and

Franklin, 1988).
On the other hand, in St. Petersburg, the construction
of the state funded Suncoast Dome, was nearing completion.
Negotiations between the White Sox and the political
representatives in Illinois and Florida persisted.

The

Florida legislature, in order to make its case more
competitive, considered providing another $30 million to the
construction project if that meant that the dome could have
been completed by the opening of the 1989 season (117-0 vote
on the passage of Florida's House appropriations bill which
included support for the funding of the Suncoast Dome in St.
Petersburg) .

The delaying actions and uncertainty in

Illinois was viewed with excitement in Florida.

According

to a state of Florida representative "They're [Illinois
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government] pushing the Sox out the door and right into St.
Pete."

(Kass and Engler, 1988b).

The ''Save Our Sox" group in Chicago also realized that
losing Comiskey Park was not going to be as painful as
losing the White Sox to Florida.

O'Connell indicated to me:

When Reinsdorf and Einhorn threatened to move the team
to St. Petersburg much of the support to our group
decreased. Many of our members dropped out fearing
that their pressure on the ownership to save Comiskey
could have an impact on driving the team out of town.
All of a sudden we thought that our team would be
gone ... I remember testifying at a hearing and I held an
orange with an 'X' on it and told them that the
Floridians would not take our team.
In the end, the following five factors can be cited for
the backing of a proposal in Springfield to retain the White
Sox in Chicago, and finance the construction of an open-air,
baseball-only stadium:
"Save Our Sox" group,

(1)

fan support as expressed by the

(2) the perceived negative political

implications by state representatives,

(3) the perceived

economic loss for the city and the state,

(4) pressing

support by the media for keeping the White Sox, and,

(5) the

willingness of the franchise to remain, since in the longrun, Chicago would continue to provide a larger market for
the team.

State Financial Support and Implications
Representatives from the two sides (Illinois and
Florida) began the development of financial packages which
would be "most appropriate" for the White Sox.

The proposal
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which the city of Chicago and State of Illinois offered to
the franchise, pending state legislature approval, was the
one which kept the White Sox in Chicago.

It included the

following points:
(1) $150 million in bonds would be authorized for the
construction of the facility.
(2)

32

If the stadium is not available for the White Sox by

1991, the ISFA will pay the team a penalty of $5 million. 33
(3) The maintenance of the new stadium would be the
responsibility of the White Sox.

The ISFA would contribute,

beyond the debt services, $2 million in annual subsidies
toward that purpose and would assume any and all structural
costs of the facility.
(4) For the first ten years of the lease agreement, the
White Sox will pay the ISFA $2.50 per ticket if yearly
attendance is between 1.2 million and 2 million.

If the

attendance exceeds 2 million, the White Sox will pay the
ISFA $1.50 per ticket. 34
32

The bonds would be retired with revenue generated
from a 2 percent tax on hotel and motels room charge bills.
Direct city and state subsidies would also be required to
retire the bonds.
33

According to the agreement, this penalty would
increase to $7.5 million in 1992 and continue to increase by
$2.5 million every year after that time.
34

During the second ten years of the lease agreement
the ticket cost, which the White Sox will pay ISFA under the
first scenario, will be $4.00 per ticket and the per ticket
price will remain at $1.50 if attendance exceeds 2 million.
During the second ten years of the agreement, if attendance
falls below 1.5 million, the ISFA is responsible for
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(5) The ISFA will pay $10 million for the design and
construction of a scoreboard for the new stadium.

The city

of Chicago will receive no property taxes from the new
sports facility, an estimated loss of approximately
$800,000.
(6) The City of Chicago will spend $19.6 million to move a
garage facility for city vehicles, located on the site of
the proposed stadium.

ISFA will provide $3 million to

defray that cost.
(7) As reported in Bess and Decker (1989), the lease
agreement provides the team with an "exclusive right ... to
any and all proceeds from ... concession and vending machine
rents or payments, sales of souvenirs, sales of food and
beverage, including alcoholic beverages, club membership
fees, parking revenues, and [skybox] Suites rents."
(8) The stadium will be protected in case adjacent

purchasing up to 300,000 tickets from the White Sox,
bringing the estimated cost to the state at more than $2
million a year (Kass and Engler, 1988a). Bess and Decker
(1989:3), provided the following hypothetical: "This [part
of the agreement] means that if the White Sox in a single
year sell every seat for every game, ISFA will receive
approximately $4.3 million; if the White Sox draw 2.0
million, ISFA will receive $2 million; if the White Sox draw
1.5 million during the first ten years, ISFA will receive
$750,000; if the White Sox draw 1.5 million during the
second 10 years, ISFA will receive nothing; and if the White
Sox draw 1.2 million during the second 10 years, ISFA will
pay the White Sox anywhere from $1.5 million to $2.5
million, depending upon the average cost of a White Sox
ticket.
The White Sox have exceeded 2 million in attendance
twice in their history, in 1983 and 1984; in 1987 they drew
approximately 1.208 million fans, in 1988 approximately
1.116 million."
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neighborhoods attempt to ban the sell of beer inside the
ballpark.
(9) The ISFA will be responsible for the "clearing" of land,
removing homeowners, renters and business owners, for the
construction of the sports stadium. 35
(10) The ISFA will receive 35 percent of all local radio and
television broadcast revenues beyond $5.8 million and 35
percent of stadium advertizing revenues that exceed $2
million. 36
(11) The White Sox will play rent-free during the two years
prior to the old Comiskey Park's demolition (1989 and 1990
seasons) .

In the new stadium, the White Sox will not pay

rent, as long as attendance remains under 1.2 million
annually.
The executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe
described the proposed plan between the State of Illinois
and the White Sox in a way which indicates that government
involvement in this case directly assisted the profit
oriented mode of this private enterprise.

He noted: "The

theory of this deal is to provide the Sox a cushion on the
downside, while allowing us to participate on the upside on
35

The estimated cost of this proved to be $12

million.
36

It was also agreed that The ISFA will not claim
any of the revenue generated by the contract which the Major
League Baseball and the White Sox had signed with ABC and
NBC for national broadcasting. Under that particular
contract the White Sox received in 1988 over $7.8 million
(Hornung, 1988a).
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a clearly defined basis"

(Hornung, 1988a) .

The ''upside" as

described by Bynoe is not only difficult to predict in the
competitive nature of sports, but also unlikely to occur
when one considers that the White Sox have traditionally
invested less money than the average team on player salaries
(the ownership of the franchise, for example, has announced
a trimmed players salary budget for the 1996-1997 season).
In addition, if the state expected that through a
winning team,

(a promise made by the ownership of the White

Sox after the approval of the lease agreement), they would
share in the fortunes of the franchise, the events which
took place during the 1993, 1994 and 1995 seasons should
have made the state and Bynoe reconsider.

During the 1993

and 1994 seasons, the White Sox were very competitive,
winning a division title.

Yet, the fan support was as

disappointing as it was during the 1995 season when the
White Sox had a miserable on-field performance.
The real implications of the lease agreement between
the White Sox and the State of Illinois, are not going to be
found on its "upside."

Rather, they can be extracted from

the significance of the "downside" as noted by Bynoe above.
This lease agreement will have two direct, economically
related implications, both favoring the White Sox.

On the

one hand, the deal will significantly increase the $21
million dollar value of the team (its purchase price in
1981) .

On the other hand, this arrangement contributes
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substantial capital to the business, ensuring that a
downfall or "downside" does not occur, thus, continuing the
maximization of its profits.
The St. Petersburg package was also very attractive,
even more attractive than the one put forth by the city of
Chicago and the state of Illinois.
rent-free agreement.

It included a ten year

The team would not have to pay

maintenance costs for the life of the agreement and they
would not have to share any income from their television
contract and marketing revenues with the state.

The

franchise would also receive a $10 million, low interest
loan from the state of Florida (Hornung, 1988a).

Rationalizing Competition: Government Perceptions of Outcome
Though the distribution of costs and benefits in this
partnership between the public and private sectors was
uneven, Governor Thompson strongly supported its passage.
The following statements by the Governor indicate the
urgency of this legislation and the importance of keeping
the Sox in the city.

He said: "Chicago deserves to keep the

White Sox and the White Sox want to stay" and "But they
[White Sox] can't stay at the price of financial abandon"
and "Illinois and Chicago can't afford to lose anything at
all" and " ... we [Illinois State legislature] support county
fairs Downstate, the museums in Chicago, the arts.
can't we support a state owned stadium?"

Why

(Kass and Engler,
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1988a) .
In the end, with the backing of the leadership in the
House, the Senate, and City Hall, the governor asked the
legislature to approve the proposal.

The package was

approved on June 30, 1988 by the Springfield legislature,
largely due to the successful legislative lobbying of
Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan (D., Chicago).
Madigan was able to recruit 36 House Democrats to support
the plan.

These votes provided more than the 60 votes

required to pass the measure.
The Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act

(1988:#3)

made the following declarations:
As a result of deteriorating infrastructure and sports
facilities in the metropolitan area of Chicago, there
is a shortage of sports facilities suitable for use by
professional sports teams.
As a result of the costs to repair or replace such
infrastructure and facilities, and as a result of
current high financing costs, the private sector,
without the assistance contemplated in this Act, is
unable to construct feasibly adequate sports
facilities .
. .. the creation of modern sports facilities and the
other results contemplated by this Act would stimulate
economic activity in the State of Illinois, including
the creation and maintenance of jobs, the creation of
new and lasting infrastructure and other improvements,
and the retention of sports and entertainment
activities which generate economic activity .
. . . professional sports facilities can be magnets for
substantial interstate tourism resulting in increased
retail sales, hotel and restaurant sales, and
entertainment industry sales, all of which increase
jobs and economic growth.
These justifications above, communicate the value of a
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professional sports franchise as perceived by the
government, making the use of considerable public funds to
build a new stadium a rational act.
Governor Thompson, during a home plate ceremony at the
old Comiskey Park in July of 1988, under mixed fan support
from the stands, signed the White Sox deal.

Afterwards, he

reminded St. Petersburg that Chicago is a first class city
and its will could never be undermined.

He said: "I want to

send a message that we don't give up anything in Chicago and
that we don't let anybody take anything away from us"

(Kass,

1988b) .
This type of response strongly describes the tension
which existed between the two sides over the White Sox.

It

also allows for an interesting interpretation of the events
which had precipitated between Chicago and St. Petersburg.
Retaining the White Sox became a contest and a battle of
willpower.

The status and world-class position of the City

of Chicago was at stake and retaining the team was a way to
prove that its political leadership and ability to influence
state legislation was superior to that of another city.
City pride and a proof of Chicago's strong character were
channeled through events surrounding a professional baseball
team.

In the meantime, the real issue (the fact that a for-

profit corporation received unbelievable financial support
from the public, a situation that no other business in
Chicago could probably ever be capable of attaining) , went
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astray.
The city of St. Petersburg felt that there were a
number of positives which came out of its pursuit of the
White Sox.

According to Bill Bunker, executive director of

the Pinellas County Sports Authority in St. Petersburg:
The White Sox interest in this project is the best
thing that happened to us as far as getting our story
across to baseball and the country. We couldn't have
accomplished more if we had hired a fancy New York PR
firm (Sherman, 1989).
Rick Dodge, Assistant City Manager who worked to attract the
White Sox to Florida was also optimistic as he reflected on
the turn of events:
One way of looking at it is that the White Sox went
through their own expansion review.
The good news for
us is that they determined that the best move for them
would have been here, and their analysis of this area
was communicated throughout baseball and elevated the
Tampa Bay area. That was a very important and a
significant assistance to us. What better endorsement
than someone willing to bet their economic future on
you? (Isaacson, 1991).
The events also brought the two cities in the Tampa Bay
area together as they continued their efforts to attract an
existing or expansion baseball franchise.

Finally, the City

of Tampa was awarded an expansion baseball team which began
play in 1996.

Until that time, 7 years after its

construction, the $138 million, 43,000 seat Florida Suncoast
Dome remained empty at considerable tax payer cost.

Was a Sox Move out of State a
Financially Sound Possibility for the Team?
The White Sox threatened to leave Chicago for another
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city unless their demands for a new stadium were not
satisfied by local and state political leaders.

Did the

White Sox use the possibility of their move as a way to
pressure the political leadership in Chicago and Springfield
to attain the best deal possible?

How sincere was the

ownership of the White Sox about leaving for another state?
When considering the profitability of a professional
franchise it is important to account for the implications
which a stadium might have on raising revenue.

The old

Comiskey Park had 35 skyboxes, considerably less from the
number of skyboxes available at newer baseball stadiums.
Even though the White Sox estimated that $15 million was
spent to keep that ballpark "in shape" since its purchase by
Reinsdorf in 1981, continuous claims were made by the
ownership that the team "would go bankrupt" if it were to
stay at that facility.

Yet, other factors should be taken

into consideration when one attempts to determine team
profitability.
Professional sports franchises, regardless of the
amenities which a new stadium can provide, would financially
do much better in Chicago than in most other markets since
mere attendance is not the largest source of revenue.

Julie

Taylor, Director of Guest Services of the Chicago White Sox
told me:
If we [White Sox] sold all the seats for the whole year
we could not pay for the players salaries, but with the
skyboxes and a good marketing of signs, television
contracts etc., we can do that and more, maybe make
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some profit. You see that Boston Market sign out there
in the outfield. That is a new sign and it cost that
company $500,000 for the year, plus they [Boston
Market] have to sponsor a big firework show, that is
about $80,000. On the other hand do you see that small
Fontanini sign in the upper deck.
It costs $30,000 for
the year and the(y) [company] has to sponsor an event
during the season.
The success of television contracts and other
agreements will be determined, to a large extent, by the
size of the local market.

Chicago has the third largest

market in the nation and teams in the largest markets will
be more successful in negotiating attractive broadcast-right
deals with television stations.

In 1986, the White Sox

negotiated a deal with WFLD-TV/Channel 32 for the broadcast
of 70 games.

When compared to the previous broadcast

arrangements, this agreement doubled their revenue.

The

1986 deal brought $8.3 million, which was up from $4 million
in 1985.

Market size will determine the television revenues

generated by baseball franchises across the country.

For

example, the New York Yankees, who played in the nation's
largest market that same year, received $15.5 million for
broadcast rights.

On the other hand, the Seattle Mariners

who played in the twenty-second, largest metro area
generated $2.1 million, the Kansas City Royals, who played
in the twenty-ninth, largest market received $2 million and
the Cleveland Indians, who ranked twelfth received $3
million (Bremner, 1986).
If playing at the old Comiskey Park was such a
financial

strain~

then why would the ownership take the team
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to Tampa or Denver which ranked twenty-fourth and twentyf irst respectively in market size and settle for revenues
between $1.5 to $2 million from television broadcast rights?
In addition, though the White Sox could have attempted to
leave the metropolitan area, under the shared revenue clause
that exists in the league, the team owners of the American
League would have to approve the move, something which would
have cost them additional income in fees and penalties.
Though owners have successfully challenged this clause in
recent years (both the Raiders and the Rams of the NFL can
be cited as examples) , moving the team against the will of
the league would have been an additional hurdle.
Revenue generated by the advertisement opportunities in
a new market could not be guaranteed for the White Sox to
the extent to which it was established in Chicago.
Representatives of two cities which courted the White Sox,
Denver and Tampa, noted that revenue could not have been as
easily generated in their smaller markets.

An

executive of

the Denver Baseball Commission noted "the TV deal in Chicago
is significantly better than the one they could get in
Denver" and according to a spokesman for the Tampa Bay
Baseball Group involved in attracting the White Sox to that
area: "it is difficult to move an [established] franchise."
The officials in Florida proposed to call the team the
"Florida White Sox", aiming to market the team at a wider
state level.

Yet, that would not necessarily generate
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increased revenue.

Bryan Burns, Director of Broadcasting in

the Baseball Commissioners Off ice commented on the statewide
broadcast offer that: "The regional sports networks don't
have a great track record"

(Bremner, 1986) .

It seems that, from a financial point of view, when
taking into consideration the above mentioned economic
implications, it would have been most profitable for the
White Sox to stay in the Chicago area and take advantage of
the type and size of the existing market.

The introduction

of the relocation possibility to another state was a way to
hold Chicago "hostage" and in the end pressure the local and
state government into providing the franchise with a new
stadium; a source of increased revenue.

Contracting the Facility and the Actual Product
The proposed construction of a new stadium brought a
bidding war between politically powerful firms in the
Chicago area.

Some of the firms competing for the $90-100

million, initially estimated cost award of the sports
facility,

included close supporters of Governor Thompson and

House Speaker Madigan (D., Chicago).

Owners of other firms

competing for the contract, had previously served in various
local and state government positions (Mccarron, 1988b) .
The ISFA signed a no-strike agreement with the 26
unions expected to participate in the construction project
and approved six construction companies to present their
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bids.

From the six, four companies submitted stadium

construction costs.

All four exceeded the expected cost.

The lowest bid was at $129 million and the highest was at
$139 million.
Bynoe described the proposed cost as a "serious
problem."

Added to the $150 million available in the form

of construction bonds, there was approximately $33.5 million
from the 2 percent hotel tax.

This raised the total

available money for the project to $183.5 million.

Yet, $35

million had already been spent for land acquisition and land
clearance.

The relocation costs of residents were also more

than $6 million.

Accepting the lowest bid at $130 million

would make the overall project financially risky.

In

addition, according to the lease signed in 1988, in the case
that the ISFA was unable to proceed with a contractor, the
White Sox could break the agreement and search elsewhere for
another deal (Mccarron, 1989a) .
This developing scenario would seriously undermine the
actions of those involved with the approval and
administration of this project.

Up to this point,

millions of taxpayers' dollars had been spent,

(1)

(2) an

extremely favorable agreement was given to the franchise and
a neighborhood had been physically destroyed,

(3) residents

were to be relocated and others had been displaced, and (4)
the culture and atmosphere surrounding the old Comiskey Park
had been transformed.

Yet, there was still a chance for the
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White Sox to leave Chicago.
The ISFA managed to bring the stadium cost down by $10
million.

The cuts included television sets and wet bars in

some of the skyboxes, an amenity to be added in the
following two to three years.

The authority also received

assurance from the White Sox that they would contribute $18
million toward the construction of the new stadium.

The $18

million contributed by the White Sox would go back to the
team in the form of rent subsidies.

Reinsdorf responded,

characterizing the entire agreement as "a bad deal":
All we are doing is continuing a bad financial deal.
But we didn't enter into this for financial purposes.
We feel an obligation to remain in Chicago if it's at
all possible (Mccarron, 1989b) .
The Authority then awarded the contract to the lowest bidder
at $120 million.
As scheduled, the new Comiskey Park opened across the
street from the old ballpark in 1991 at a final cost of $135
million.

The new Comiskey Park has no columns to obstruct

the view, but a visit to the new facility and a seat
assignment in the steep upper deck will convince anyone that
intimacy is not its strongest point.

The upper deck in this

stadium begins where the upper deck ended at the old
Comiskey Park.

The measurement from home plate to the

beginning of the upper deck in the new Comiskey is 160 feet.
The distance to the end of the upper deck at the old
Comiskey measured only 150 feet.
The slope of the upper deck's design has allowed for
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the construction of 103 luxury skyboxes, layed out beneath
it in three different levels.

Those skyboxes are leased for

3 to 5 years ranging in price from $60,000 (10-12 persons)
to $90, 000 (18 to 25 persons)

(Sherman, 1991).

After taking a private tour of the new Comiskey Park, I
had a fir.st hand look at the amenities of a "new ballpark. "
From the 16,000 square foot clubhouse which seats 340
people, one has a direct view of the action on the field.
In order to become a member and have the privilege of paying
for a meal, you must be a season ticket holder and pay a
$700 yearly membership fee.

The White Sox rent the

clubhouse for wedding receptions and other functions during
the off season.
The skyboxes provide a birds' eye-view and are wall-towall carpeted, equipped with wetbars, seating areas, kitchen
cabinets with sinks and large refrigerators.

Suite 431 &

432 are directly overlooking home plate, and are reserved
for Reinsdorf and Einhorn.

Square footage wise, each could

easily qualify for a residential apartment.

Between the two

open suites, there is a smaller skybox which enables them to
join as one.

According to Julie Taylor: "That is were Mr.

Einhorn and Mr. Reinsdorf would meet to discuss a financial
deal."
The reviews of the new stadium have become increasingly
negative.

The recent openings of Camden Yards in Baltimore

and Jacobs Field in Cleveland, two ballparks that have made
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great strides

in going back to preserving the nature of the

traditional ballpark, have proven the new Comiskey Park a
failed attempt at an urban ballpark design.

According to

Gershman (1993:226-227):
From both an architectural and a baseball point of
view, Camden Yards has passed tests that have exposed
the new Comiskey Park as a shallow pretender. The
White So:x had buildings condemned and businesses moved
so that they could surround their park with parking
lots and souvenir stands owned by the team instead of
independent shops and restaurants that would have added
to the neighborhood feeling.
It bears no relation to
its surroundings and, at first glance it might be a
municipal power station or similarly anonymous public
building.
It's also the kind of place that belies the
White So:x blue-collar heritage, which Charles Comiskey
respected and for which he made allowances.
The new Comiskey Park seems to be a suburban style ballpark
which has proved unable, from an architectural point of
view, to communicate any of the mystique found in the
"traditional ballpark."

CHAPTER 6
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of South Armour
Square and addressees the relationship between the old
Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities.

The local

political developments, the community responses to this
stadium development plan and the physical and cultural
effects of the new Comiskey Park on the community are
discussed.

The chapter concludes with an examination of

viable alternative plans as well as recent attempts towards
community redevelopment.

The Community of South Armour Square
The community of South Armour Square is located on the
southern part of Comiskey Park, approximately four miles
south from downtown Chicago.

The first settlers to the area

were Irish, German and Swedish laborers.

The Chicago White

Sox first built a ballpark at Pershing and Wentworth which
was later used by the Negro League.

Comiskey Park was built

on 35th and Shields which extends from 35th to 33rd Street
and was positioned in the middle of the Armour Square
community.

In the 1940's the population of Armour Square
170
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increased due to the influx of African Americans moving to
Chicago to work in the industries.

In the 1960's, the

community was racially split between the north and south
part of Comiskey Park which served as a physical boundary.
As the following table shows, the north was predominantly
white and the south predominantly African American.
TABLE 2
POPULATION OF PRECINCTS BY RACE
IN THE VICINITY OF WHITE SOX PARK
Precinct
East
Bridgeport

37
39
42
3-precinct total

Population

%Black

%White

%Hispanic

789
930
612
2,331

2.0
0.0
0.7
0.7

74.5
82.0
70.6
76.5

21. 9
16.9
28.9
21. 8

53

787

22.7

71. 9

5.0

34
46
2-precinct total

681
317
998

18.2
20.2
18.8

76.9
73.8
76.0

4.7
2.5
4.0

1,663
629
2,292

99.7
99.5
99.7

0.1
0.0
0.1

0.2
0.5
0.3

Northwest
Armour Square
Northeast
Armour Square

South Armour
Square

33
54
2-precinct total

Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Block
Statistics: Chicago, IL.
Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area: PHC80-1-119.
City of Chicago, Map of 11th Ward as of
January 1986.
Like many other urban communities in Chicago, South
Armour Square was economically affected by the population
movement to the suburbs.

The number of jobs in the zip code

area which encompassed the old Comiskey Park from the 70's
to the mid 80's decreased by half.

The community has been

struggling to provide economic opportunities for its

172
residents (Strahler, 1986).

According to a report by the

Natalie P. Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of
Illinois at Chicago,

(1995:3) the South Armour Square is:

... a small community of 1,500 residents, all AfricanAmerican, who either live in the Wentworth Gardens
public housing development or the TE Brown Senior
Citizen building. TE Brown is a federally subsidized
202 development owned and operated by the Progressive
Baptist Church.
The same report noted that the 1989 median income was $7,000
and that the majority of the households were headed by women
(82 percent).

Most of the households receive public aid or

social security and 43 percent of the population is over the
age of 55 years old.
According to the U.S. census data, the percentage of
families with income below poverty level in that area
increased from 45.4 percent (1980) to 88.3 percent (1990).
The percentage of high school graduates was 40.7 percent in
1980 and 51.5 in 1990 (U.S. Census 1980, 1990).
Yet, the residents perceive their community to be
stable and established.

At a community meeting a resident

noted: "A lot of money has gone into improving conditions
here.

These people, mostly lower-income families, have sunk

a lot of money into restoring their property ... "

Another

resident described the community as "an old, established
neighborhood"

(Jamison, 1987) .

The Old Comiskey Park and the Local Community
The old Comiskey Park opened in 1910 and was designed
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by architect Zachary Taylor Davis at an estimated cost of
$750,000.

The so called,

"Baseball Palace of the World" was

constructed with a 420 foot centerf ield wall which proved to
be favorable to pitchers.

The seating arrangements made it

a friendly ballpark where fans felt close to the action.
According to a report (Bukowski, O'Connell and Aranza,
1987:4), the ballpark, from its early years, was considered
the preferred baseball entertainment of the South Side's
working-class.

It was positioned in the heart of many

industries which employed blue-collar workers:
Close to the [Comiskey] ballpark were the Union
Stockyards and the International Harvester Plant,
somewhat further the steel mills of South Chicago.
These and other factories nurtured blue collar
neighborhoods like Bridgeport, Canaryville, and
Hegewisch. There, people worked hard and lived simply.
By necessity, entertainment had to be close at hand or
at least a bargain. Even if the White Sox lost 90 or
more games a season, Comiskey Park always was
accessible and affordable.
It also offered real
working-class heroes to cheer.
The location of the ballpark made it the favorite of many
generations of South Siders in Chicago.

It was a place

where the fans could identify with their heroes, since their
hard work ethic in the factory was similar to the one
exemplified by the Sox players on the field.

According to

that same report: "They [players] hustled on the field the
same way their working-class fans hustled on the job"
5) .

In that regard the old Comiskey Park was well

integrated and strongly connected with the immediate
community and the South Side of the city.

(p.
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The local steel industry often advertized for openings
at White Sox games.

A 1953 White Sox scorebook contained an

ad from the U.S. Steel, South Works.

The ad read "Join a

Major League Team: Work at United States Steel Corporation,
South Works."

Charles Comiskey's commitment to the White

Sox blue-collar heritage was also evident by the allowance
of a considerable 10,000 bleacher seats at the old Comiskey
Park (Gershman, 1993).
According to Douglas Bukowski, a White Sox historian,
this ballpark was also a unique place in terms of racial and
ethnic relations.

The events hosted by the park included

the boxing fight between Joe Louis and James Braddock in
1937, when before an integrated crowd Louis became the first
African American to win the crown.

Minnie Minoso, a Cuban

black player for the Sox from the early SO's and into the
mid 60's was a Comiskey Park favorite.

William Veeck, a

colorful Chicago sports personality, a two-time owner of the
Chicago White Sox and the founder of the exploding
scoreboard, was very invested in bringing black players into
the league.

Many of the black players still communicate an

enormous respect for Veeck, and according to Al Smith who
was signed by Veeck in the late 1940's: "He [Veeck] was like
a dog.

He didn't know about color"

(Cattau, 1992).

The Chicago American Giants, a team of the Negro
League, would regularly draw 10,000 to 20,000 black fans to
their games on the South Side.

The Negro League began in
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1933 their annual East-West games at the old Comiskey Park,
an occurrence which became the major black sports event in
the country and continued for many years.

For many blacks

attending a White Sox game was an exciting form of
entertainment.

Many would write back to their families and

friends in the South noting their attendance of a game at
Comiskey.

According to James Grossman, Newberry Library

historian,

"that [type of letter writing] was some heavy-

duty bragging"

(Cattau, 1992).

This integration between the White Sox and the
community also included the residents of South Armour
Square.

But, in a new environment where profitability is

intensely pursued by professional franchises, and a critical
element of this search includes the construction of a new
sports stadium, South Armour Square is now a hurdle in the
path of increased revenues.

It is from within this

framework that local government support of private
enterprise results in the eventual displacement of this
community.

Setting the Stage for the Takeover: Politicizing the Issue
The political will of the state became illustrated
through its negotiations with the White Sox and the final
passage of the lease agreement, keeping the franchise from
moving to Florida.

The City government's support for the

team was exemplified in its dealings with the community of
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the South Armour Square.

The community residents were split

in their response to the takeover plans.

The split was

primarily due to city politics, specifically the upcoming
Chicago mayoral elections, which influenced the residents'
approach to the situation.
The site chosen for the construction of the new stadium
was on the side of the street immediately south from the old
Comiskey Park.
businesses.

That area was occupied by residences and

Many of the structures had to be removed so

construction could begin.

The proposal for property

clearing did not include the nearby Wentworth Gardens public
housing development and the TE Brown Senior Citizen
building.
The Wentworth Gardens was a public housing development
built in 1945 located at the southeast corner of the South
Armour Square community.

It covers 16.34 acres of land and

consists of 37 low-rise structures, of which 28 are two
story and 9 are three story apartment buildings.

But why

did the stadium plan not include the demolition of this
public housing development?

Diane Kallenback of the Center

for Economic Policy Analysis in Chicago speculated on this
question:
If Wentworth Gardens were destroyed by public action,
city officials would have to relocate replacement
housing for 1,246 low-income people. The paucity of
units now available for low-income people and, coupled
with the lack of federal government support for new
low-income housing, would make the destruction of 422
units of public housing a politically unfeasible option
(Kallenback, 1988).
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The ISFA, under the agreement with the White Sox, had
to have residents removed and have taken control of the
properties by October 15, 1988.

If the ISFA was unable to

retain the properties by that time, the White Sox could
break their lease agreement and move to St. Petersburg.

To

ensure that the deadline was met, the ISFA was given legal
power over these residential properties to be enforced on,
or before September 15, 1988.
Since the agreement between the government and the
franchise was signed on July 1988, the deadline of October
15 afforded the residents only 3 months to ponder the
potential loss of their homes and a short period of time to
reflect and develop a strategy that would benefit the
community at a time of crisis.

In reality, when one

considers the September 15 court action threat by the ISFA,
the residents had only two months to decide.

Johnnie Tyler

who owned a small restaurant and lived in the area for 25
years noted: "How can I move all my staff by October.
don't know what to do.
have anywhere to go"

I

I can't go anywhere because I don't

(Devall, 1988a).

As it turned out it

was in early August 1988 when the relocation agreement was
reached and approved; it took the ISFA less than a month to
remove 178 privately owned housing units, 12 neighborhood
businesses, thus, wiping out an entire community.
The political implications of the removal of these
black residents were serious.

At a time when mayoral
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elections were a few months away, Mayor Sawyer did not want
to be identified as the black mayoral candidate who
orchestrated the displacement of black residents to benefit
white business interests.

As a result, Mayor Sawyer

distanced himself by noting that he was only following the
plans of the late Mayor Washington.

In a meeting with

residents from South Armour Square, immediately following
the signing of the agreement, the Mayor criticized the
actions of his enemies as politically motivated (Kass,
1988b) :

Most of the people [here] have legitimate concerns, but
you could see some of Slim Coleman's people, some of
Jacky Grimshaw's people, in here manipulating and
trying to make me look bad ... I see my opponents had
their people in there ready to criticize me for keeping
the White Sox. But this is the Harold Washington's
site. This is his legacy to keep the team and other
people are picking and choosing on which of Mayor
Washington's points they want to side with ... Anybody
who knows politics could tell you what that means. 37
Both Ald. Timothy Evans (4th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis
(29th Ward) became openly critical of the proposed
relocation of black residents.

As Evans was preparing to

campaign against Sawyer in an upcoming mayoral primary
election, politicizing the issue and presenting an

37

Walter "Slim" Coleman was an organizer from the
north side community of Uptown. Along with Jacky Grimshaw,
Coleman served as political organizers for Mayor Washington.
They were both supportive of Ald. Timoty C. Evans (4th) for
mayor. Grimshaw and Coleman had organized a political rally
for Evans and characterized it as a memorial for the late
mayor.
In addition, the two activists supported Evans who
criticized Mayor Sawyer for supporting the displacement of a
predominantly African-American community.
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insensitive, black Mayor who was willing to assist in the
displacement of other blacks could prove helpful to his
election efforts.
The ISFA attempted not to politicize the issue, since
such a strategy would make the acquisition of land even more
difficult.

According to Bynoe of the ISFA, in reference to

Evans and Coleman: "Our job was to keep those outside
interest groups out of the discussions"

(Kass, 1988e).

But,

the politicization of the issue brought a split within the
community.

Some viewed the relocation as an urban renewal

program, while others viewed the relocation as a racist act.

The Community Response
It was in 1987, under the leadership of the South
Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition, that the residents of
South Armour Square, fearing the loss of their homes and
businesses to a new stadium, organized to fight against
relocation.

This community organization, after a split

within the community and the approval of the relocation
package in 1988, became controlled by those who opposed that
offer.
The organization hired Mary Milano of the law firm
Baker & McKenzie to assist in their efforts.

The residents

operated without information from the ISFA regarding their
neighborhood, and were not part of the site decision making
process.

At a local meeting, confusion and complaints about
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lack of information regarding plans by the government and/or
the franchise owners were communicated.

According to a

resident:
It's just as if we don't exist ... Area residents only
know what they have read in the newspapers. No one has
talked to us. No one has answered our calls or
letters, and no one has responded to our petitions
(Jamison, 1987) .
As the signing of the agreement between the state and the
White Sox was nearing a close, the residents began to loudly
resist their possible relocation.

A resident at a meeting

noted:
... We have a choice area and we do not want to give it
up ... My roots are here. My family moved here when I
was 6 months old [in 1946].
It's going to be hard to
get me out of here" (Jamison, 1987) .
Armed with $10 million for the relocation, the ISFA
initiated its efforts to acquire the titles of the
residential and industrial properties.

A way for ISFA to

speed up the process was to avoid confrontation with the
community.

Thus, $200,000 was offered to the residents for

a consultant who would assist them with their relocation
plans.

In return, the residents promised that they would

not sue the ISFA.
The ISFA's position was that the residents had very
little choice in the matter and at this point they should
attempt to negotiate the best deal possible for themselves.
According to Thomas Reynolds, chairman of the stadium
authority:
We want to let the neighborhood residents have input.
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It would result in a more congenial relocation ... I
think they [residents] realize that they will be
displaced and that they ought to work on a plan that
gives them as many options as they want and as many as
we can afford (Camper and Davis, 1988).
At this point the residents became divided.

Some felt

strongly about challenging the stadium developers, while
others supported a settlement.

George Marshall, president

of the neighborhood coalition, fearing complete loss noted:
"If we can stay in the area - namely, about two blocks south
of here - and get some decent replacement housing built,
that'll be a victory"

(Devall, 1988a).

Willie Jones,

another resident, responding to talks of a lawsuit against
the White Sox provided a similar response and urged for a
compromise: "The White Sox are going to get this land, so we
better make the best deal we can.
good deal.

And we are looking at a

Let's not ruin it with a lawsuit"

(Kass, 1988c).

The lawsuit was advocated by Walter "Slim" Coleman, an
Uptown community activist and supporter of Ald. Timothy
Evans (4th Ward) .

Coleman encouraged the community to stop

negotiations with the ISFA and take the city, the state and
the White Sox to court.

A class-action law suit would

charge the White Sox, the city and the state with racially
motivated, discriminatory actions; specifically, that the
ISFA and the White Sox did not exhaust their efforts to
avoid displacement and, based on the racial composition of
the South Armour Square community, continued to push their
plans forward.

Others called for a cautious decision making
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process.

According to a coalition board member:

I don't think that people from outside the neighborhood
should be talking anybody into a lawsuit. We reserve
the right to sue, but we are also negotiating. Let's
see how far negotiations will take us (Kass, 1988d)
This division proved critical as the ISFA successfully
removed the residents, making room for the stadium
construction plans.
The proposed relocation package which the ISFA offered
the homeowners included the following options:

(1) a cash

payment for the market price of the homes, plus a $25,000
"good will" payment,

(2) move existing structures to a

nearby site and provide a $2,500 cash settlement,

(3)

provide replacement housing in the form of new construction
or from existing available houses, and (4) renters would
receive a $4,500 settlement, assistance in locating a new
apartment and a $500 moving allowance.

Fearing that

relocation would increase property taxes and thus rents, tax
breaks were later requested by the residents (Kass, 1988d;
Kass, 1988e).
The agreement signed between the ISFA and the South
Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition received mixed
community response.

Most residents accepted the relocation

package proposed by the ISFA.

Yet, residents from Wentworth

Gardens and the TE Brown Senior Citizen building were
dissatisfied and continued to fight the relocation of the
stadium.
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One Voice: Accept the Relocation Package
For those who accepted the relocation package (98
percent of all neighborhood residents in the area) , it was
viewed as the best deal under the circumstances.

The

relocation sites which were presented to the residents by
the ISFA included Bridgeport, Kenwood-Oakland, a site nearby
South Armour Square, and the Gap, approximately eight blocks
east of South Armour Square.

The Gap was an upscale

neighborhood which was rapidly becoming gentrified.

Of the

47 residential lots affected by the move, 27 of the owners
elected to accept the option which called for a market value
of their home plus a $25,000 cash settlement.

The other 20

families chose to receive a replacement home.

The ISFA

rejected an earlier request by the residents to be exempted
from increased property taxes due to relocation (Davis,
1988).
From the 20 residents entitled to a replacement home,
19 expressed interest in relocating to the Gap.

Homes in

the Gap were selling considerably higher that those in the
South Armour Square neighborhood and the ISFA would have to
provide additional subsidies.

Those extra subsidies would

come from the 2 percent hotel tax which would be used to
repay the $150 million bonds.

According to George Marshall,

President of the Neighborhood Coalition:
The Gap is a good neighborhood, close to shopping and
close to our old neighborhood ... We didn't like the
other sites the authority offered us (Kass, 1988f).
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The Chicago Tribune in a series of articles entitled
"Chicago on Hold: Politics of Poverty" praised the decision
of these residents and chastised the claim of others to
continue a "battle" with the stadium developers.

An article

from the series entitled "1 Community Finds Renewal Can Pay
Off" by urban affairs writer Mccarron (1988a), referred to
the approach of the residents in South Armour Square as
"pioneering a community-based approach to urban renewal-an
approach that could be used by families ... anywhere in the
city where major redevelopment is contemplated."

According

to Mccarron, a move to the Gap would allow the 25 residents
to "trade their tired by tidy cottages south of the existing
Comiskey Park for new houses worth three times as much in a
more fashionable neighborhood ... "

At the same time, the

article praised the decision of these residents to reject
those promoting the "politics of displacement."
Specifically,
... a politics exploited by a handful of politicians and
community organizers bent on enhancing their positions
by stopping change in neighborhoods that needs change
the most.
Though the replacement homes at the Gap would be valued
at $150,000 each, and the ISFA was investing a total of $3
million in that area of the city, when community organizers
from that area found out the plan of relocation they
expressed concern.

Phillip Jackson, President of the Gap

Community Organization, in a community meeting, noted
concern about the ability of the relocated residents to pay
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the increased taxes.

He indicated:

... being in the Gap means you have to have certain
consciousness ... There's a good chance that those people
[coming from South Armour Square] may not understand
our program for future development" (Seigel and
Karwarth, 1988).
Mary Milano, the lawyer for the coalition, was also
supportive of the relocation agreement and according to her,
as reported in Euchner (1993:154): ''I approached this
project as I would approach a commercial real estate deal,
which is my usual line of work.

I tried to get the best

deal possible for the people affected by the development."
Even though the efforts to relocate and move the residents
continued, concerns persisted for the 70 renters.

These

were mostly elderly residents who were to receive very
little financial support in the form of a cash payment under
the agreement.

It was not until May 1990 that the homes at

the Gap were completed, two years after the signing of the
relocation agreement.

Another Voice: Reject the Relocation Package
Residents of the Wentworth Gardens, TE Brown and some
renters were outraged with the arrangements.

For Marcella

Carter and others from Wentworth Gardens this was a really
bad deal.

These residents felt left behind to experience

all the negative consequences of the new stadium.

Increased

traffic, littering, fans under the influence of alcohol
following the games, noise from the exploding scoreboard and
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even fireworks.

According to Carter: "There's 300 of us

here from Wentworth, and we are angry because we are getting
nothing" and for Robert Robinson, a renter in the area:
"[this] is worse than slavery ... We've been sold down the
river, with no choice at all.

It's either get out or get

(Kass and Luft, 1988)

On February 9, 1989, this

group filed a federal lawsuit.

The suit has 49 plaintiffs

put out"

charging the violation of the community members' civil
rights.

The case is still pending in the courts.

Sheila Radford-Hill, a community activist in South
Armour Square, representing the interests of the Wentworth
Gardens, TE Brown Senior Citizen Building and of the general
community of South Armour Square, outlined for me the
various strategies utilized by these residents:
(1) Grassroots Campaigning: For a two year period
demonstrations were held at the games in the old Comiskey,
City Hall, and the offices of ISFA.

The residents, during a

neighborhood meeting, also staged a mock funeral of their
community.

Many gathered around and told stories of their

lives in the area, raising their children, interacting with
one another, etc.

The residents also engaged in a letter

campaign, drawing support from other community organizations
in the City of Chicago to protest displacement.
(2) Coalition Building:

The residents organized with other

groups, such as the "Save Our Sox", a fan group which also
advocated no displacement.

Though the two groups, the
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residents and the fans, had different agendas, saving the
old Comiskey Park would have been welcomed by both.

The

fans would continue to attend games at the oldest park in
the league, and the residents, who feared displacement
resulting from a new stadium in the area, would save their
homes.
groups.

As a result, a coalition emerged between the two
O'Connell told me:

We had a common interest with the residents.
They were
concerned with saving their homes and concerned about
the impact of a new stadium on their community,
parking, police protection, drinking, etc. We were
concerned about saving the team and saving the park
because we loved the White Sox.
Though these two groups had similar interests, obvious
divisions of race existed.

According to O'Connell:

The plan was for the two groups to meet at a tavern and
discuss a plan of action.
I walked in with Sheila
[Radford-Hill, a community organizer for the residents]
before the meeting, and we saw the whites sitting at
one side, and a few tables away, at another corner, the
blacks. Yet, the two groups worked together to the
extent possible to challenge the government and the
stadium developers.
It was also because of racial tensions, that the
community residents were unable to recruit support from the
nearby white, middle-class community of Bridgeport whose
long history of asserting power in city politics could have
proved beneficial (Euchner, 1993).
According to a Bridgeport resident the new stadium
would be good for the area since it would "make the
neighborhood look better."

He noted:

Sure you got lots of jobs at the park. That's
important and we're gonna make the neighborhood look
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better. We're gonna clear out that old neighborhood.
It'll be a lot classier (McNamee, 1986).
These statements outline the sharp divisions which existed
between the residents in the larger area.

An investigation

of mayoral election results in the ward support the notion
that race is a critical factor in determining voting
behavior in that area (see TABLE 3).
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TABLE 3
1983 & 1987 PRIMARY AND GENERAL MAYORAL ELECTION RESULTS IN
THE WARD SURROUNDING COMISKEY PARK*
1983 Primary (February 22)-Ward Map dated December 16, 1981
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour
Precincts

37

39

42

Washington 0.83 1. 02 1. 06
Burns
3.88 9.39 7.45
91.97 87.96 87.23
Daley
0.28 0.00 0.35
Others

53
.54
15.18
79.40
0.27

34

46

54

64

10.57 14.66 56.08 67.22
10.34 10.42 8.44 6.47
71.49 64.17 22.58 19.87
1. 61 0.98
.74 0.45

1983 General (April 12)-Ward Map dated December 16, 1981
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour
Precincts

37

39

42

Washington 7.04 5.38 5.92
Epton
88.86 93.58 92.33

53
3.02
95.60

34

46

54

64

25.06 45.36 94.15 96.45
68.62 47.50 0.98 0.55

1987 Primary (February 24)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour
Precincts

37

39

42

Washington 5.56 3.42 3.70
Burns
88.89 94.29 91.36

53
3.05
91.36

34

46

33

54

20.05 41.80 90.99 90.08
70.18 50.41 1.10 0.83

1987 General (April 7)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour
Precincts

37

39

42

Washington 5.90 6.10 6.28
Vrdolyak
87.50 90.14 84.94

53
2.51
93.04

34

46

33

54

21.23 41.51 95.90 96.10
74.42 41.51 0.37 0.00

* Note that the 11th Ward Map changed between December 16,
1981 and January 8, 1986 in South Armour Square.
Specifically the precincts numbers in that area changed from
54 and 64 to 33 and 54. This change did not have a
significant change on the racial composition of those
precincts. All figures in percentage points.
Source: Center for Economic Policy Analysis,
Chicago, IL. Arthur Lyons, Director.

(1995),

An additional observation from Table 4 can be made as to the

voting behavior of the predominantly white precincts during
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the general elections.

Though these precincts have been

historically democratic, when it came to voting, they chose
not to support a black democratic candidate.
supported a white republican candidate.

Rather they

Race, in this case,

becomes a more important factor than party identification in
terms of influencing voting behavior, a fact which further
outlines the racial tensions in this area.
(3) Negotiation of Benefits:

The South Armour Square

Neighborhood Coalition called for additional spending on the
relocation of the residents.

Eventually more than $10

million was authorized by the ISFA to address this
resettlement.
(4) Civil Rights Class Action Suit: The suit charged that
relocation of the stadium to the North of the existing old
Comiskey was possible (see the discussion below in Second
Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal).

Yet, it would have

resulted in the displacement of some white families.
According to the suit, those involved in the construction of
a new stadium: "in the course of their conspiracy ... have
destroyed or are in the process of destroying approximately
178 sound residential units which provided affordable
housing for over 425 black residents"

(Gorman, 1989).

Though the law-suit was utilized by the residents to
stop the destruction of their homes, after it became clear
that the plan would move forward, the law-suit was about
reparations.

A secondary goal of the law suit, according to
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Radford-Hill, was to keep the community together and
communicate the injustices to the rest of the city.
(5) Community Planning: Even though the loss of the homes
seemed imminent, the residents attempted, through a
redevelopment grant from the City of Chicago, to anticipate
and address the physical changes of their community.

The

grant was used to plan for community business services taken
away during the stadium development process.
Radford-Hill also recommended ways to make similar
cases more responsive to community needs.

Specifically:

(1) The government should be allowed to utilize its "quick
take and imminent domain powers" only in projects which
could clearly benefit the public.

The case of a sports

stadium, according to Radford-Hill, is not a public benefit.
It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing back to
the community affected, and,

(2)

If the government becomes

involved in these cases, it should be responsible and
accountable for the entire cost of displacement, extending
beyond replacement housing.
The city and the state were extremely satisfied with
the turn of events.

According to Mayor Sawyer: "[the

agreement is] a noteworthy example of public-private
partnership that works for the good of the entire city" and
according to the executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe:
"The relocation issue is the most critical one facing
completion of this project, the one that was potentially the
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most explosive, the one with the most down-side risk ... "
(Kass and Luft, 1988).

Finally, Crain's Chicago Business,

credited Mary Milano, the coalition lawyer and the ISFA with
the success of the relocation package (Hornung, 1988b).

McCuddy's: The Loss of History and Local Culture
McCuddy's, across from the old Comiskey park, was more
than a neighborhood bar.

It had been there since 1910, when

Charles Comiskey opened the ballpark.

The pub would do

business only during the baseball season, approximately 80
days a year.
There was a special connection between the White Sox
and the surrounding neighborhoods, and McCuddy's was the
link.

Most immediately associated McCuddy's with Comiskey

Park, giving it landmark status.

For White Sox fans the bar

was imprinted in their memories.

It was the place where the

magic and fantasy of the sports world would meet the
pragmatic nature of everyday life.
McCuddy's was built across the ballpark in 1910 by John
McCuddy, a friend of Charles Comiskey who had tipped him as
to the position of the new stadium.

Since then, thousands

have visited the bar which has contributed to the aura and
culture surrounding the area on game days.

The true White

Sox fan never achieved that status unless he/she visited
McCuddy's; it had become a place of fan initiation.
At McCuddy's fans listened to sports stories,
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confirming the strong connection between the bar and the
White Sox.

One of the stories goes back to the New York

Yankee dynasty and the Babe.

When the Yankees came to town

and the White Sox suffered defeats at the hands of Babe
Ruth, it is said that the Babe himself, during the third
inning, would go across the street to McCuddy's for a quick
beer.

He would then dash back to Comiskey and continue his

"assault" on the White Sox.

Frances McCuddy, granddaughter

of the founder, noted how Ruth once destroyed the carpet in
the bar with his baseball spikes as he rushed through the
tables trying to finish four sandwiches and four beers, and
make it on time back to Comiskey between innings (Kass,
1988g) .

Many Chicago Mayors and politicians would visit
McCuddy's on White Sox Opening Day and it is said that the
bar was a regular hang-out place for members of the Black
Sox.

Governor Thompson, immediately before signing the

agreement which would keep the White Sox in Chicago, stopped
by McCuddy's ·and high-fived the fans who viewed him as their
"savior."
Unfortunately, the development of the new stadium
called for the destruction of McCuddy's.

The bar, according

to the plan, was located around third base.

This was a

disappointment to many since, a few months earlier, Thompson
had promised the McCuddy's patrons that the bar would be
saved and that it would be moved across the street from the
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new stadium.

Yet, the ISFA plans called for control of all

properties by October 15.

The ISFA, under its quick take

power, filed lawsuits to obtain the commercial parcels
before the deadline and planned to settle with their owners
afterwards.

One of the parcels was McCuddy's and the

history and local culture generated by this neighborhood bar
went down as fast as the one hour that it took, on March
1989, when a wrecking ball demolished its structure (Davis,
1989) .
The authority eventually settled with Pat Senese, the
owner of the bar for $235,000.

Senese was extremely

disappointed as he reflected on the proposed settlement:
... I don't want the money.
It's the place.
It's the
name that should remain across the street. Do you just
break history off like a stick? Wash it away? I want
my grandchildren to see that sign up there. That's
what I want" (Kass, 1988g).
The owners of McCuddy's attempted to re-open their pub
in the winter of 1991, months before opening day of the new
Comiskey Park.

Their proposal called for a new McCuddy's

right across the street from the new stadium or within the
nearby vicinity of the site.

The presence of this

establishment would continue the long historical and
cultural relationship between the neighborhood and the White
Sox.

The proposal was turned down by the ISFA.

According

to executive director Peter Bynoe: "[McCuddy's] cannot be
relocated on the [stadium] site" because of state law and
due to the fact that the White Sox have "the exclusive right
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to sell food and liquor" within and surrounding the sports
facility (Reardon, 1991a) .

It is that same franchise right

which took much of the culture and atmosphere which
surrounded the ballpark as the local vendors sold their
merchandise outside the ballpark.

First Alternative: Restoring Old Comiskey Park
Those in favor of renovating old Comiskey Park
underscored the importance of the structure for the city by
emphasizing the historic nature of the ballpark.

The

ballpark was the oldest in Major League Baseball, and
according to a proposal by "Save Our Sox"

(1987) landmark

status should be granted to the ballpark.

Specifically:

" [the renovation of Comiskey Park would] celebrate the
oldest ballpark in baseball [and] enhance the tourist appeal
of the park and the surrounding areas of Bridgeport and
Armour Square"

(pg. 10).

The group advocated Comiskey Park

as a National Monument and upon its purchase by the ISFA, it
should be donated to the National Park Service which would
be responsible for its control and operation.
The renovation proposal reintroduced the facility to
its 1933 physical stature during baseball's "Golden Age."
In addition, the proposal called for the construction of a
nearby baseball museum where "its archives would focus on
baseball as social history"

(pg. 14).

Exhibits of White Sox

history and Chicago baseball would make the museum an
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excellent addition to the proposed landmark plan.
The report also proposed that the city take advantage
of its unique position to have the oldest ballpark and
called for a marketing of the facility as a place of tourist
attraction.

It described a renovated Comiskey Park as "a

major tourist draw", a place for people from all over the
country, to experience an era in American history gone by.
In addition, according to this proposal, Comiskey Park
could become the focal point from which the entire history
of the South Side of the City of Chicago could be
communicated to the rest of the nation.

The nearby

neighborhood of "the Gap", the distinct architecture of the
Illinois Institute of Technology, the surrounding centuryold churches, Armour Square Park, the historic past of
adjacent neighborhoods, blues and jazz, could all become
part of an effort to showcase this section of the city.
Under this general scenario, the local community could
receive substantial economic benefits and could even be
rescued from its current condition.
The last rationale put forth by those attempting to
convince the city and the White Sox that a renovation of the
old Comiskey Park should be seriously considered was based
on sentimental reasons.

Over the years, the ballpark had

gained a special place in the hearts of many Chicagoans.
Drawing on emotional factors, the report described the
ballpark as "an urban institution, an irreplaceable piece of
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Chicago"

(p. 20).

A place where generations after

generations of residents witnessed events which have
remained in their memories forever.

In the end, this

proposal was never realized as the old Comiskey Park was
pushed aside to become a parking lot for the new Comiskey
Park.

Second Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal
When the Illinois Sports Facility Authority was created
in 1986 by the Illinois General Assembly to oversee the
construction of a new baseball facility for the White Sox,
it was given both the land and the money necessary to
accomplish this task.

The ISFA was provided with over 90

acres of land by the City of Chicago.
Phillip Bess, an independent architect in Chicago saw
this as an opportunity to propose a plan for a baseball park
which would challenge the current trend in sports facilities
architecture.

Stadium construction in the 60's, 70's and

the 80's, concentrated on circular, multi-purpose
structures, high in volume, with maximum use of acreage, due
to the fact that parking lot space was critical to this
suburban style model.

For Bess, this was a chance to

propose "the urban baseball park'' since the site selected
for this facility was in the core of a large urban center.
According to Bess:
I worked on the design of this plan for over four
months.
Contemporary ballpark construction poses no
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physical constrains to the designer.
The reason for
that is because their [sports stadium] location has
been primarily either in suburban communities or near
railroad yards where acquiring space is not an issue.
Here is an opportunity to attempt something different;
building a stadium in the midst of a neighborhood.
I
was first interested [with my proposal] to address the
nature of the urban ballpark, the building of the
facility was of secondary interest.
Bess proposed the construction of Armour Field.

This urban

ballpark proposal is one which deserves special attention
since its implications extend beyond the play of baseball.
Such structure can affect the fabric of the city itself.

The Armour Field Proposal: The Ballpark
Armour Field, was named after Armour Square Park, a
park adjacent to the old Comiskey Park.

The park on the

north side of old Comiskey would be the site of the proposed
stadium and it would occupy only 79 acres.

The design

projected for a $63 million, open air-ballpark.

It would

accommodate 42,250 seats and it would include 66 luxury
boxes.

The footprint of the ballpark itself would be 9

acres.

To place this figure into perspective, the footprint

of Wrigley Field, arguably the most intimate ballpark in the
majors, is just 8 acres.

On the other hand the footprint of

the new Comiskey Park is 12.1 acres (Bess, 1995).
Approximately 7,560 spaces will be provided in the form of
(1) surface parking,

(2) designated parking lots within a

mile of the ballpark, and (3) four, two-and-a-half story
parking garages (Bess, 1989).
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The proposal would also avoid displacement of
residents.

Specifically, Bess (1989:29) notes:

The ISFA proposal [of the new Comiskey Park] requires
the demolition of 78 privately-owned dwellings, and
displaces approximately 220 families.
Our Master Plan
would require the demolition of about 25 buildings
containing approximately 50 dwelling units to
accommodate one of the parking garages; but no families
would be displaced from the neighborhood because we
propose that an equal number of replacement housing
units be built right in the neighborhood, on the new
east/west block south of 35th Street, and on currently
vacant lots on Shields, Princeton, and Wells Streets.
Some of the residents to be displaced by the construction of
the sports facility south of the old Comiskey also offered
the Armour Square Park site as a more appropriate location.
According to a resident:
I'm a sports fan, I'm an athlete. But why displace
people? The team's owners could have moved the
ballpark to the blocks now occupied by Armour Square
Park ... That's more room than we have over here (Devall,
1988a) .
The loss of the Armour Square Park to the proposed
ballpark was also addressed by Bess.

He outlined the

creation of two smaller parks on vacant land.

The area

which the old Comiskey Park covered, south of the proposed
Armour Field facility, would also be transformed into a
recreational area.

That space would accommodate the

activities of Armour Square Park, while being functional for
the local community.
Another interesting observation regards the proposed
design of Armour Field.

It takes us back to the golden era

of baseball park construction between 1912 and 1914 when
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Fenway Park, Ebbets Field and Wrigley Field were built.

The

distance from the top seat in the upper deck to the home
plate at Wrigley Field is 210 feet.
Park that same distance was 150 feet.

At the old Comiskey
The Armour Field

proposal listed that distance at 225 feet.

The baseball

parks which have followed the architectural direction of the
60's, 70's, and 80's present lengthier figures.
Specifically, that same distance at the New Comiskey Park
(250 feet), Riverfront Stadium (262 feet) and Royals Stadium
(265 feet), indicates that viewing a game in those
facilities is likely to generate a different feeling.

The Armour Field Proposal: The Local Community
In addition, this proposal attempted to accomplish
something which recent stadium construction has been unable
to; integrate the stadium structure into the existing
environment of the local community.

Bess indicated to me:

One of the challenging aspects of stadium design is to
integrate that facility into the city. Generating
local development as a result of a project of this kind
could be something which can be accomplished.
Suburban
style stadium developments need not respond to
integration since they utilize superblocks. Here you
have to take into consideration the existing
boundaries. The physical layout of the community in
the form of streets, blocks, parks ... should be
preserved.
Bess' plan called for nine acres of land around Armour
Field to be designated for mix-use development.

The

development would produce retail stores, 480 condominium and
rental units, studio housing, and other all-year round,
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small-scale businesses and living quarters.

On game days,

the two and three story nature of these developments
surrounding the ballpark, would allow the residents to
escape the street traffic and enable them to view the game
from their balconies.
This urban structure would not impose itself on the
physical environment.
the local neighborhood.

Rather it would blend and complement
It would make the streets active

and it would bring people closer together, providing
opportunities for interaction. 38
This proposed plan can be cited for its multiple
positive contributions.

The design of Armour Field can

accommodate the construction of a new, single-purpose,
contemporary ballpark with luxury boxes, while outlining the
mystique of a classic ballpark.

The proposal also ensures

that displacement would not be the issue that it proved to
be in the new Comiskey Park plan.

The Armour Field proposal

could have also assisted community development and could
have served as a model for urban ballpark design.

As Bess

(1989:33) notes: "Our design of Armour Field itself was
governed by a concern that it be a genuinely urban building,
constrained by its block, with an architectural presence,
scale, and monumentality befitting its status as a public

38

This notion of mix-use development, emphasizing
human interaction is similar to the ideas advocated by Jane
Jacobs (1961), who was a strong critic of single-purpose
urban design during the SO's.
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building."

The Armour Field Proposal: Its Defeat
But if this proposal had so many positive implications
for the city and the surrounding community, why did it not
receive the attention it deserved?

First the proposal

received negative reviews from the architectural firm HOK of
Kansas City, MO, which was retained by the franchise.
According to HOK architects involved: "[speaking of the
Armour Field proposal] it would be unwise to put stores and
apartments so near a stadium"

(Mccarron, 1987d) .

Second,

both the management of the White Sox and the City of
Chicago, had an opportunity to review the Armour Field
proposal, but they did not support the concept for different
reasons.

The White Sox were not interested in the urban

ballpark concept, since they were sold on the revenue
capabilities of the suburban model (Euchner 1993:158)

On

the other hand, the city did not want to address the
multiple issues which the Armour Field proposal raised.

The

city, primarily interested in keeping the team in Chicago
and fearing that the White Sox would move to St. Petersburg,
FL, did not want to delay by debating the Bess proposal.
With the change in administrations after the death of Mayor
Washington, Mayor Sawyer worked to see the deal through as
quickly as possible.
Bess indicated to me that the close relationship
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between the private and the public sectors in this case was
the primary reason for the eventual defeat of his proposal.
He noted:
The assumption by the City was that whatever the White
Sox wanted was good for Chicago residents.
If one
takes that approach then whatever the White Sox
proposed was good for the public. The ownership of the
White Sox, especially Reinsdorf, was fascinated with
the Royals Stadium in Kansas City. Every team owner
wanted one just like that. Why? Because it was the
prototype at the time [being built in 1973) of not only
the suburban-style stadium, but also the baseball-only
facility.
That's "big" and HOK had designed it. Well,
the team recommended HOK and the City responded that
HOK is good for Chicago.
It is an interesting logic.
Bess also felt that the implementation of his proposal
would have been difficult, even if it had been supported by
the management of the team and the city administration.
Armour Square Park, the site of the proposed Armour Field,
was a public park which served as a physical boundary
between the white, middle-class Bridgeport neighborhood to
the North and the African-American community to the South.
According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the census track south of
the old Comiskey was 99.9 percent African American (99.9
percent in 1980) and the census track north of the ball park
was 26.0 percent African American (20.6 percent in 1980).
Bess told me:
The proposal would have faced resistance from one of
the neighborhoods to the North. We would probably be
tied in court since that was public property and
belonged to the Chicago Park District.
The real threat to that community was not the loss of the
park, since the proposal would replace the park with two
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smaller parks in the area.

Rather, it was the Armour Field

location and the surrounding elements of that proposal
(shops, adjacent residences, etc.).

Armour Field could have

been a catalyst, generating a lively neighborhood
environment.

The ballpark could have served as a "seam",

between two racially distinct communities.

Taking into

consideration the long history of segregation in that
general area, this proposal would have threatened the
separation between these groups.
It is unfortunate that the Armour Field proposal was
never implemented since it will never be known what its
implications for the community could have been.

Once again,

corporate interests prevailed at the expense of a plan which
would have been responsive to both the interests of the
franchise, as well as to the interests of those who live and
work in the area.

Attempting to Rebuild: Redevelopment After New Comiskey Park
In 1988, South Armour Square residents began to
investigate the effects of the physical reorganization
resulting from the construction of the New Comiskey Park.
The goal of the South Armour Neighborhood Coalition (SANC) ,
a community organization, was to consider these potential
changes and create a plan aimed at rebuilding South Armour
Square.

One of the major community concerns was the loss of

economic revenue, resulting from the removal of community
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businesses.
After applying for a City of Chicago community planning
grant in 1988, the SANC completed a feasibility study in
December of 1994 for the construction of a commercial
shopping center in the area.

The shopping center would

replace the businesses destroyed by the stadium developers.
The residents realized that with the removal of various
small community goods stores, many dollars had left the
local area.

The goal of this plan was to reclaim that

spending.
The residents worked closely with The Natalie P.
Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of Illinois
at Chicago to advance their plans for community planning and
community development.

Upon completion of a market survey

in South Armour Square, they concluded that a shopping
center would generate the highest amount of income for the
community.

After reviewing four schematic design

alternatives, they agreed on a shopping center which would
include a convenient grocery store and a restaurant.

Based

on the market survey, the grocery store would be expected to
generate $1.2 million in annual sales, whereas the
restaurant could post $414,000 in annual sales.

In

addition, plans to add a video arcade to the shopping center
as well as other retail space, is currently under review.
The development would be located in the corner of Pershing
Road and South Wentworth Avenue, south of the new stadium
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(South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition Redevelopment
Project, 1995) .
The community also agreed that this development would
be owned and operated by the South Armour Square
Neighborhood Coalition.

This would be a consumer owned

cooperative and according to the report, its goals would be
to:

(1) meet community needs for local goods and services,

(2) employ community residents,
and control,

(3) maintain local ownership

(3) ensure the quality of goods and services,

and (4) capture community dollars.

The coalition would rent

space to entrepreneurs in the shopping center, ensuring that
the economic benefits in spending remained in the
neighborhood.

According to the report,

"the importance of

community ownership of the development is key to the South
Armour Neighborhood Coalition's efforts to rebuild
community", and "this development would ensure the economic
viability of the community"

(p. 9).

After observing the recent developments in South Armour
Square, it becomes clear that out of the defeat which the
community suffered in the form of displacement by the city,
the state and the stadium developers, efforts to address
various community concerns are currently underway.

The

question though remains as to the extent to which these
efforts will be sustainable and whether the proposed
benefits will materialize.
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Conclusion
Under the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act,
according to a 1989 state audit, the taxpayers will pay $657
million over the next 20 years to keep the White Sox in
Chicago (Pearson and Mccarron, 1989).

This study shows that

this extraordinary amount of public spending is the outcome
of a smooth functioning relationship between a professional
franchise and the state.

As a result, private, corporate

interests become interconnected with public policy actions.
At the same time, this case study reveals the vast
inequalities, based on class and race, which exist in
American society.

A predominantly African-American, low-

income neighborhood becomes displaced in order for a stadium
development to occur.

The residents, excluded from the

planning stages of this stadium project, are incapable of
confronting, in a united manner, the powerful private
interests as advanced by the state.

In addition, other

forms of societal inequalities become communicated.
Specifically, the status and treatment of individuals who
fall into different residential categories (homeowners,
renters and public housing residents) varies.

Thus, based

on the relocation arrangements of this case, the homeowners
received the best possible deal, followed by the renters,
and as for the public housing residents, they were left
behind to suffer the social consequences of the new stadium.
The last conclusion which can be reached from this
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analysis regards the increasing role and effect of sports in
American society.

As shown in this case study, stadium

development plans proved influential in shaping the urban
environment.

The destruction of McCuddy's, a landmark area

institution with a long history in the community; the
removal of a tight knit neighborhood and the inability of
small businessmen to sell their products outside the stadium
due to the White Sox lease agreement, support the fact that
life around the ballpark has been transformed.

The

rearrangement of the physical environment has implications
which occur at the core of everyday, human experience.

The

reorganization of physical space then reshapes our social
experiences.
The stadium development plans of the White Sox extended
beyond having merely political and economic implications.
Their effect entered into the reorganization of the cultural
fabric of the city.

Thus sports are capable of

reconstructing the urban terrain at the political, economic,
as well as, at the cultural level.

CHAPTER 7
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS ON THE
NORTH SIDE: THE LIGHTS INSTALLATION AT WRIGLEY FIELD
Introduction
The notion of symbolism and representation between
professional franchises and cities is well exemplified in
the case of the Chicago Cubs.

Over the years, the Cubs have

shown strong cultural connections with the city and the
community surrounding Wrigley Field; Wrigleyville.
According to Bart Giamatti, former National League
President: "Most of our franchises, even the new ones, have
sunk real roots ... the Cubs may have the deepest roots of
all"

(Holtzman, 1988).
Wrigley Field has added to this long relationship

between the City and the franchise.

The continuation of

daytime professional baseball at Wrigley Field was a
connection to the past, something that no other professional
baseball park in the country could offer.
In the early 1980's, the Chicago Cubs expressed a
strong interest in installing lights at Wrigley Field.

The

addition of lights, a stadium development plan, would
provide for increased revenue in the form of television
programming and increased attendance at the Cubs games.

The

franchise would have to convince the City Council to pass an
209
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ordinance, making the conducting of night baseball games at
Wrigley Field possible.

The Cub's organization and the City

would also have to persuade the residents surrounding the
ballpark that night games would not threaten the existing
status of their neighborhoods and would not deter from their
lifestyles.
The following two chapters comprise a case study which
investigates this stadium development plan at Wrigley Field
in Chicago.

The first chapter provides an insight into the

political economy surrounding this issue, while the second
outlines the community response and community effects.

It

is important to note here that one cannot distinguish
between politics, economics and community response.

That in

fact, political developments are interwoven with the
community response.

The segmentation of these areas into

two sections is conducted for the purpose of organizing this
project in a coherent manner and it is not intended to
reflect a thematic split.
While taking into consideration the above observation,
the first chapter addresses:
the Cubs,
Chicago,

(1) the economic incentives for

(2) the use of threats by the franchise to leave
(3) the use of economic impact studies to justify

the importance of the Cubs for the local and state economies
and rationalize state support,
surrounding this issue, and,

(4) the local politics

(5) the role of the media.

media proves to be in a unique position.

The

On the one hand it
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part of the ownership of the Cubs, while on the other it is
capable of influencing policy making.
The second chapter investigates the community response
and the long term implications for the community of Lake
View.

Specifically, some of the issues addressed in the

second chapter of this case study include:

(1) the strong

community response to the lights issue and the community
strategies utilized,

(2) the ability of the community

residents to maintain the city's commitment to
improving/protecting the neighborhood after the installation
of lights by applying continuous pressure, and (3) the
effect(s) which this stadium development plan has had on the
area surrounding the ballpark.

Night games at Wrigley, the

outcome of this stadium development project, have assisted
in generating a cultural environment which has contributed
to reshaping the local community area of Lake View.
The case of the Chicago Cubs and the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field extended for over a six year period.
It is an example of a professional baseball team which,
drawing from its perceived economic and social standing
within a large metropolitan area, is able to enlist the
support of Chicago politicians to achieve its goals.

In

addition, this case is an example of how stadium development
plans, though aimed at advancing the corporate interests of
its ownership, also assist in the creation of a culture
which transforms the local urban environment.
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Night Play in the Majors
The introduction of playing baseball under the lights
in Major League Baseball was primarily a response to reduced
attendance at the ballpark during the Great Depression.

The

first night baseball game was played on May 24, 1935 in
Crosley Field in Cincinnati. 39

The Reds experienced a

sharp decrease in attendance during the early 1930's and in
reaction to the small gate revenues, they were able to
convince the league owners to permit baseball under the
lights and reverse an existing rule passed by the National
League which outlawed night baseball.
The argument by the Reds concentrated on economics,
noting that 70 percent of the income for the team during the
1934 season derived from fifteen days-holidays, opening days
and Sundays.

Allowing lights would strengthen the

attendance during the scheduled week day games, since such
action would make the game available to more fans
(Pietrusza, 1993).
Even though a number of exhibition games followed,
night baseball was perceived to be acceptable for the far
39

Crosley Field was not the ballpark where the first
night game in America was played.
It was the minor and
negro leagues which invented night baseball. E. Lee Keyser,
president of the Class A Western League's Des Moines Demons
installed permanent lights at a cost of $19,000 and the
first game was played on May 2, 1930 between the Demons and
the Wichita Aviators. The game was also nationally
broadcast by NBC radio (Pietrusza, 1993). According to The
New York Times: "In the opinion of many fans, the contest
was viewed as clearly as a game played under daylight
conditions" (Gershman, 1993:152).
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away cities but not for the large metropolitan centers.

In

those large cities, the perception was that baseball was not
the only form of entertainment and that night time should be
reserved for the theater and other related, outing events.
The issue of baseball under the lights became a unique event
and spread throughout the league in the following years. 40
Although night games eventually became fully accepted,
related concerns persisted.

Some felt that night games were

not good for the future of the game.

Playing at night

limited the youngsters from corning to the ballpark, thus
isolating the future supporters of the game.

Others noted

that the game would dramatically change since the players
were becoming actors.

Finally, others, such as Senators'

owner, Clark Griffith responded in the early years of night
baseball: "There is no chance of night baseball ever
becoming popular in the biggest cities ... High-class baseball
cannot be played at night under artificial light" and Phil
Wrigley responded to Bill Veeck who attempted to convince
the owner of the Cubs and Wrigley Field to install lights at
the ballpark: "[lights are]

just a fad.

A passing fancy"

(Gershman, 1993:155).
The one thing clear about playing night baseball was
its strong economic implications for the team owners.

40

The Detroit Tigers were the last, before the Cubs,
to play night baseball in 1948. The economics of night
games was the primary reason for playing under the lights in
Detroit (Atkins, 1988) .
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During the first year of playing under the lights, the
Cincinnati Reds brought 123,991 fans during 7 night games
(17,713 avg. per game), while during the 69 other day games,
324,256 (4,699 avg. per game) attended games at Crosley
Field.

At Ebbets Field, the Brooklyn Dodgers' first year of

night games in 1938 averaged 30,000 spectators at night and
only 4,000 during the day (Gershman, 1993) . 41

In Search of Profits through Stadium Development Plans:
The Installation of Lights
After the death of Phil and Helen Wrigley in 1977,
their son, Bill Wrigley took over the Cubs.

In December of

1980, the new owner discovered that he had to pay $40
million in family estate and inheritance taxes to the
federal government, and the states of Illinois, California,
and Wisconsin.

On June 17, 1981, the Tribune Company

purchased the Cubs for $20.5 million.

The Tribunes'

holdings in Chicago included the influential Chicago
Tribune, and the WGN broadcast station (WGN-Radio and
WGN-TV).

WGN-TV at the time, was broadcasting nationally,

televised programming.

In addition, the Tribune Co. owned

many other smaller radio and television stations nation-

41

In later years, Phil Wrigley ordered lights for
Wrigley Field, but after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he
changed his mind and donated the lights to the U.S.
government.
President Roosevelt later gave a boost to night
baseball when he asked Commissioner Landis to extend night
games because it provided an opportunity to the army day
shift to view games (Jauss, 1988).
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wide.
The new ownership, from the very beginning, considered
the Cubs an excellent addition to their other media
holdings.

In their view, the baseball franchise would

complement WGN-TV and WGN radio.

In the early 1980's,

baseball franchises were reaching national markets through
exclusive contracts with nationally broadcasting cable
stations.

Television stations like WOR-TV in New Jersey and

the Superstation WTBS in Atlanta, were exclusively
transmitting games of the New York Mets and the Atlanta
Braves to audiences across America.

The only limitation to

those arrangements was the Major League television contract
itself which had broadcasting priority over these cable
stations.

Because of these cable stations, the above

mentioned baseball franchises, did not have to rely
exclusively on the MLB contract with the big networks (ABC,
CBS and NBC) as their only source of live television
coverage.
As a cable station that broadcasted nationally, WGN-TV
viewed the Cubs as an excellent addition to their televised
schedule.

According to John Madigan, executive vice

president of the Tribune Co., the Cubs were a "good
programming" opportunity.

In responding to the motivation

behind the purchasing of the Cubs, Madigan noted:
It was the opportunity to control live programming
which is the most important thing to a television and
radio station- live programming, good programming
(Gershman, 1993:218).
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The goal of Tribune Co., was to make the Cubs a
nation-wide entertainment product.

In order for that to be

accomplished, the Cubs would have to play at night, enabling
the team to reach a wider national market.

As a result, the

Chicago Cubs became part of the corporatization of American
sports.
According to a survey conducted by Market Facts, Inc.,
for the Chicago Cubs in the Chicago metropolitan area during
the month of September in 1985, lights at Wrigley Field
would allow for more games to be broadcast on television
during the evenings, thus capturing a bigger market.

Of

those surveyed, 38% indicated that night baseball at Wrigley
Field would provide them with an opportunity to view more
Cubs games on television.

Only 11.6% noted that, under

these circumstances, they would view less Cubs games on
television and for 48.7%, lights at Wrigley wouldn't make
much difference in their television game viewing habits
(Chicago Cubs, 1985a) .

Wrigley Field: Chicago's Favorite
The possibility of lights at Wrigley Field became of
interest to many in the Chicagoland area.

The franchise

conducted a general public survey in the Fall of 1985 to
find out how the general public in the 6-county area felt
about the lights issue, Wrigley Field and the Cubs (Chicago
Cubs, 1985a).

This study was eventually employed to support
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the Cubs' request for lights at Wrigley.
According to the survey which was prepared by Market
Facts, Inc., the Cubs were Chicago's favorite professional
baseball team (51.4%).

Among those who considered

themselves to be baseball fans, 77.4% noted the Cubs as
their favorite baseball team.
The survey also investigated how the general public
felt about lights at Wrigley.

Among those who considered

themselves to be baseball fans, 31.7% felt that lights
should not be installed at Wrigley or be available for
post-season play only.

For those who fell in this same

category of opposing lights/restricted use of lights, 15.5%
did not want to see lights at the ballpark under any
circumstances.

The majority of the respondents though

(64.6%), were willing to accept either unrestricted use of
lights, or lights at 18 to 20 games during the season.
Among them, 43.6% were willing to have only unrestricted use
of lights.

When fan respondents were asked to choose

between having some night baseball at Wrigley Field vs. a
new stadium for the Cubs, 59.8% chose baseball under the
lights and 35.6% responded that they would accept a new Cubs
stadium.
This last finding is surprising since one would expect
that a much smaller number of respondents would be willing
to see the Cubs play at a ballpark other than Wrigley Field.
That acceptance of a new stadium for the Cubs was even more
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unexpected when one takes into consideration the strong
rating which Wrigley Field received amongst fans in that
same survey.
When asked to rate the ballpark, the majority of the
fans viewed Wrigley as an 'excellent' or 'very good'
ballpark, 31% and 28.6% respectively.

Only 10% rated

Wrigley as 'fair', and an unsubstantial percentage of 1.9%
rated Wrigley as 'poor'.

The mean of the responses in

regards to rating was 3.79 (5=excellent, 4=very good,
3=good, 2=fair and l=poor), certainly a favorable rating.
In further investigating what makes Wrigley Field an
'excellent' ballpark, fans noted the traditional aspect and
history of the park (19.3%-net), the friendliness and
comfort, including the type of neighborhood in which it is
located (24.3%-net), the traditional characteristics which
the ballpark exemplifies, such as the ivy

(28.9%-ne~)

and

the good seating/layout of the ballpark making every seat a
good seat for viewing the game (28.4%-net).

Based upon the

information provided by this survey it becomes clear that
fans in the Chicago metropolitan area have a great sense of
appreciation for the Cubs and Wrigley Field.
Another study conducted by the Chicago Cubs on the
neighborhood residents (Chicago Cubs, 1985b), showed that
the majority of those living close to Wrigley Field viewed
the presence of the Cubs as an asset to the area.
Specifically, 77.6 percent of those residing zero to half a
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mile from the ballpark, and 91.0 percent of those residing a
half a mile to one mile from the ballpark agreed with the
statement that the ttCubs are an asset to the neighborhood.tt
All this data was used by the Cubs in their efforts to
convince the City of Chicago that they were worthy of lights
at Wrigley and that their presence in Chicago was positive
for Chicagoland and local residents.
challenged by the local community.

Yet, this approach was
They charged that the

Cubs' indication of overwhelming support by the local
residents toward the Cubs and Wrigley Field was inaccurate.

The Issue of the Lights
It was just a few months after the Cubs were bought by
the Tribune Co., on March 10, 1982, that, under the
leadership of General Manager, Dallas Green the franchise
announced publicly its intent to install lights at Wrigley
Field.

According to Green, if the lights are not allowed:

ttwe'll have to think about playing in another ballparktt
(Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6).
A few months later, the Illinois House of
Representatives passed a bill that would make night-time
sporting events a violation of the Illinois noise pollution
law.

The law would apply to sporting facilities where night

sports had not been played before July 1, 1982.

The

amendment noted:
Baseball, football, or soccer sporting events played
during nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a
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city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium
at which such nighttime events were not played prior to
July 1, 1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise
emission regulations promulgated by the Illinois
Pollution Control Board (Note, 1987: 372).
Governor Thompson supported the legislation which
banned night baseball in Wrigley Field.

Thompson noted

after signing the legislature on August 23, 1982: "Wrigley
Field is located in an old, established neighborhood ...
[night baseball] would impose an undue hardship on nearly
60,000 residents who live within a four-block area of the
stadium (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6).
A year later on August 25, 1983, the alderman of the
Wrigley Field neighborhood, in response to the Cubs'
request, proposed and eventually convinced the City Council
to pass an ordinance (42-2 vote) to the Municipal Code of
Chicago.

The ordinance made illegal, night sporting events

in a facility with more than 15,000 seats which is within
500 feet of residences of 100 or more units (Elie, 1986)
In 1984 the Chicago Cubs advanced at the National
League's playoffs.

Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner of Major

League Baseball announced that post-season play should be
played under a night atmosphere and he threatened to move
future Cubs' postseason games to St. Louis.

The franchise

filed a suit in late 1984, in hopes to reverse the city and
state anti-lights legislation on the grounds of being
unconstitutional.

The community around Wrigley Field was

represented by the Lake View Citizens Council (LVCC) and
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challenged the Cubs' suit.

Both the Cook County Circuit

Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
franchises' request to allow the installation of lights
(Elie, 1986) .
Judge Richard Curry of the Cook County Circuit Court
wrote in his ruling:
On the basis of an alleged necessity to play
championship games at night, they ask for a reversal of
the status quo which has existed at this ballpark for
70 years (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6).
And,

Tinkering with the quality-of-life aspirations of
countless households so that television royalties might
more easily flow into the coffers of twenty-five
distant sports moguls is ... repugnant to common decency
(Gershman, 1993:220).
The quality of life argument put forth by this judge was
similar to the position taken by the community residents.
The Economic Development Commission in Chicago was
interested in finding out how the public in Lake View and in
the city of Chicago perceived the issue of lights at Wrigley
Field.

The commission retained Elrick and Lavidge,

which in the Fall of 1987 prepared a report

Inc.

(Economic

Development Commission of the City of Chicago, 1987).
study identified three different groups to question:

The
(1)

those who lived within one half mile of Wrigley Field
(Close-in Lake View) bounded by 1600 W. Ashland, 3200 N.
Belmont, Lake Shore Drive and 4200 N. Berteau;

(2) those who

lived between half a mile and one mile from Wrigley Field
(Expanded Lake View) bounded by 2000 W. Darnen, 2600 N.
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Wrightwood, Lake Michigan and 4600 N. Wilson, and (3) those
who lived over one mile from Wrigley Field but still resided
within the city limits (Greater Chicago) .
The overall reaction to the installation of lights in
Wrigley Field by location showed that those who lived closer
to the ballpark were more likely to oppose the installation
of lights than those who resided further away from the
sports facility.

Specifically, of those who lived within

one half mile from the facility, 32% favored, 52% opposed
and 16% had no opinion on the installation of lights.
Amongst those who lived between one half mile and a mile
from the ballpark, 33% favored lights, 36% opposed lights
and 31% had no opinion on the issue.

Finally, amongst those

in the Greater Chicago group, 49% indicated support for the
lights, 22% opposed and 29% had no opinion on the subject.
It is important to note here that the differences in the
percentages between the Close-in, Lake View respondents and
the responses of those in the Expanded Lake View group were,
according to the report, statistically significant.

From

these findings it becomes clear that the lights were a
neighborhood issue since the residents in that area felt
that they would be directly affected by their installation.
This report by the Economic Development Commission of
the City of Chicago (1987) provided additional findings
between the three groups regarding the issue of lights.
Specifically, all three groups equally agreed that the city
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of Chicago would suffer if the Cubs were to move to the
suburbs.

Yet, respondents from the close-in Lake View

sample were more likely than the other two groups to agree
that the installation of lights would negatively impact the
atmosphere at the ballpark.

Respondents from all three

groups also agreed that the neighborhood would not be better
off if the Cubs moved elsewhere and that the franchise
should not move to a new stadium with lights.
Regarding the Cubs' threat of leaving Wrigley Field if
they could not install lights, amongst those who opposed the
lights, 22% in the close-Lake View category, fearing the
loss of the Cubs, would now approve their installation
compared to 40% (Expanded Lake View) and 42% (Greater
Chicago).

On the other hand, regardless of the threats, 72%

(close-in Lake View) continued to oppose the lights, as did
53% of the respondents from the "Expanded Lake View" sample
and 46% of the respondents from the "Greater Chicago"
sample.
Amongst those favoring lights at Wrigley Field, the
three most frequently mentioned reasons for that support
included:

(1) increasing attendance,

(2) keeping the Cubs in

Wrigley Field, and (3) the team being good for Chicago.
Other, less frequently mentioned reasons for favoring the
lights included:

(1) being that other teams have lights and

play night games, there is no reason why the Cubs should not
play night games too,

(2) lights would provide increased
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revenue for the city and the team, and (3) lights would
enable post-season play at Wrigley.
On the other hand, among those who opposed lights, the
most frequently mentioned reason was the effect which the
lights would have on the neighborhood resulting in the
deterioration of the community, including the general
disruption in the form of increased traffic, trash, fan
rowdiness and noise.

A much smaller group opposed the

lights because they felt that the tradition and the
uniqueness of day-only-play at the ballpark would be
jeopardized.

The Threat of Moving Out of Wrigley Field:
Its Implications for Chicago
With the Chicago Cubs receiving heated opposition from
the residents around Wrigley Field, discussions of the Cubs
moving out of the "friendly confines" surfaced.

The threats

became even more serious after the failure of legal efforts
by the Cubs to get lights at Wrigley.

A spokesman for the

team on June 30, 1985 indicated that "the lights issue is
dead" making the consideration of moving out of Wrigley
Field a strong possibility (Wrigley Lights Chronology,
1988:6).

A number of different scenarios were speculated.

One scenario saw the Cubs move into a new, multi-purpose,
domed stadium with the Chicago Bears.

Another viewed an

attempt by the Cubs to move out of Chicago to the nearby
suburbs, specifically to Schaumburg, Illinois (Cappo, 1985).
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A Cubs move under either of the above mentioned
scenarios would have meant that Wrigley Field would become
the possible victim of a wrecking ball.

Along with that,

the history of the ballpark would also disappear.

According

to Donald Grenesko, the Cubs vice president for operations:
"Lights is still our first choice and without them we cannot
stay at Wrigley"

(Mccarron and Burton, 1986) .

That was a

frightening thought for many in Chicago. According to an
editorial in the Crain's Chicago Business (6/24/85, p. 10)
the loss of Wrigley would be the loss of a Chicago
trademark:
A domed stadium may be a good deal for the Bears and
the White Sox. And we can't recall anyone praising the
delights of watching games at Soldiers Field, Comiskey
Park or the Chicago Stadium. But Wrigley Field is one
of Chicago's greatest treasures - right up there with
the Chicago Theater and the rest of the
preservantionists' causes. As Cubs General Manager
Dallas Green recently gushed to Chicago Tribune
columnist Jerome Holtzman: "I'm not the same guy I was
in '81 and '82 ... Wrigley Field is a landmark.
It's
Chicago."
That same editorial, fearing that the Tribune Co.,
would pull the Cubs out to the suburbs called for a
settlement between the two sides.

Specifically, since the

owners were willing to be satisfied with 20 night games
during the season, the residents should give in a little and
meet them half way, thus allowing lights at Wrigley and
ensuring the presence of Wrigley Field for the years to
come:
Tribune Co. made it clear that the Cubs will play night
baseball sooner or later-at Wrigley Field or elsewhere.
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The company's compromise offer-no more than 20 night
games a year and expanded seating in the upper
decks-sounds reasonable to us.
If the company can be
held to those terms, we'll back it. The Wrigley
neighbors should do likewise.
At this point the Chicago Cubs began to pressure the
city, documenting the positive economic effects which the
franchise generated for Chicago.

First, they commissioned a

neighborhood survey and then they prepared a detailed
economic impact study.

The ownership of the Cubs publicized

the results of the survey and the impact study, outlining
the need for serious consideration of their request.
The survey conducted by the Cubs showed that an
overwhelming majority of those living close to Wrigley Field
indicated that their neighborhood would be negatively
affected if the Cubs were to move out of the area.
Specifically, 61.2 percent of those living zero to half a
mile from Wrigley Field and 73.9 percent of those who lived
half a mile to a mile from the ballpark indicated a negative
effect on the community if the Cubs were to move.

The

majority of the respondents cited negative economic/business
effects on the local community (Chicago Cubs, 1985b).

This

data, was intended to motivate the City of Chicago rethink
its position.

The report was also meant to communicate the

possibility that if the city of Chicago did not take into
consideration the positive economic benefits which the Cubs
generate, it is certain that another community would grant
the franchises' wishes.

What strengthened the position of
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the Cubs even more was the results of their commissioned
economic impact study.
In 1986, the franchise employed the consulting services
of Melaniphy and Associates, to prepare an economic analysis
report.

The study, outlining the economic impact, concluded

that $90.7 million are contributed annually by the Cubs to
the Chicago's economy.

Of that contribution, $37 million

came from direct economic benefits, while $31.4 million came
from "indirect benefits."

That second figure was arrived at

by considering the $12.2 million spent on concessions, $8.1
million on restaurants and bars, $3.5 million on business
which the Cubs organization provided to local suppliers,
licensed and unlicensed parking from the games accounted for
an additional $3.6 million, $2.5 million from the use of
hotels and CTA services, $600,000 from taxi, bus charter and
gasoline, $600,000 was added from fan expenditures at retail
stores and from street vending, and $300,000 from towing and
parking fines

(Melaniphy and Associates, 1986) .

The report also added another $22.3 million in Cubs
related spending to the Chicago economy through the use of a
multiplier effect contribution using a 3.2 percent
multiplier figure.

This income is accrued to neighborhood

residents and others in the city of Chicago as a result of
the presence and activities of the Cubs in the economy
(Melaniphy and Associates, 1986).

The 3.2 figure is

considerably higher from those employed by other studies
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which also aim at estimating the economic impact of
professional franchises on local economies.
This same study also identified the revenue, in the
form of taxes, which the Chicago Cubs contribute to the
State of Illinois and Cook County.

According to this

report, an estimated $2.9 million in State of Illinois taxes
and $26,000 in Cook County property taxes resulted from the
spending generated by the presence of the Chicago Cubs.

Of

the state generated taxes, approximately $1.4 million were
in the form of income taxes, $620,000 was from concession
related activities, $400,000 from restaurant/bar spending,
$134,000 from hotel related uses, while service stations and
overall gas taxes added another $41,000.

The report

outlined an additional $30,000 in taxes resulting from
retail and vendor sales and $10,000 in utility taxes in the
forms of phone, electricity and natural gas usage (Melaniphy
and Associates, 1986).
Finally this study reported the direct and indirect tax
revenue contributed to the City of Chicago as a result of
the Cubs' presence.

The overall amount was estimated at

$2.8 million annually.

The taxes paid to the City as a

result of direct economic activities due to the Cubs were
identified at $1.2 million; $649,000 from amusement taxes;
$223,000 from property taxes, $122,000 from concession
taxes; $46,000 from parking; $36,000 from utility taxes;
$18,000 from employment and direct sales taxes and $60,000
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from miscellaneous taxes.

The city taxes generated by

indirect activities were estimated at $131,000; $43,000 from
hotel sales, bus fares and parking tickets; $80,000 from
restaurant and bar spending; and $8,000 from vendor, service
station and retail spending.

Other indirect revenue in the

form of taxes included the amounts generated by CTA and
parking tickets, totaling $1.5 million (Melaniphy and
Associates, 1986).
If the franchise had not made its point to the city
officials that loosing the Cubs to another city would have
serious economic implications for Chicago with this report,
another report prepared by the City's Department Economic
Development in 1986, strengthened the economic importance of
the Cubs even more.

This three month study not only

accepted the findings of the Chicago Cubs' economic impact
study, but concluded that the overall economic contribution
of a baseball team to the city of Chicago was even higher,
at approximately $100 million annually.

The study stated

that: "It is interesting to note that the consulting reports
prepared [for the two baseball teams in Chicago] come to
remarkably similar conclusions about the total impact of a
baseball team on the local economy--about $100 million"
(Department of Economic Development, 1986:2).
The city commissioned study also proposed that the
Cubs' previous economic impact report did not consider
additional revenue for the City of Chicago in the form of
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taxes which would result from multiplier economic
activities.

Specifically:

The Department added two other sources of tax revenues
to the list identified by the [Cubs] consultant. About
2.5 percent of state income taxes are returned to the
city of Chicago; thus, a baseball team will generate at
least $23,000 for the city coffers. More
significantly, the consultants [for the White Sox and
the Cubs] did not consider the fact that the multiplier
activity generated by a baseball team will lead to
added tax revenues. Using rough ratios of City, County
and State revenues to economic activity, we made a very
crude estimate of how much revenue this added activity
produces (Department of Economic Development, 1986:7).
As a result of these multiplier activities, the added
revenue in taxes for the State of Illinois was estimated by
this city sponsored study to be between $1.8 and $2.5
million.

For Cook County, it was estimated to be between

$77,000 and $107,000 (pp. 22).

For the City of Chicago

these additional tax revenues were estimated to be between
$230,000 and $319,000 (pp. 24).
The information provided by these reports helped the
Cubs with their demands for lights.

Robert Mier,

commissioner of Economic Development during the Washington
and Sawyer administrations, and mayoral advisor on stadium
issues, warned at a 1988 city council committee meeting that
the issue of the lights might become the reason for the Cubs
leaving Wrigley Field and possibly Chicago.

Mier also noted

that his experience would support such possibility.

He

said:
I have always taken business seriously when they say
they have problems and are going to move.
I've seen
too many say that, and when there is no solution, they
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move (Strong, 1988a).
Accounting for the importance of the Cubs in the local and
state economic spheres, in ways that very few other
businesses can demonstrate, made the political leadership
more attentive and eager to resolve any of their concerns,
and to ensure that the city did not lose a viable economic
and social partner.

The Politics of the Lights at Wrigley Field
Advancing the lights proposal within the political
arena and convincing the City Council to pass a related
ordinance proved to be a process which included various
components.

Threats, the media, mayoral politics, and

political power, all played a role in a process which ended
with an approval of night games at Wrigley Field by the
Chicago City Council.

The Lights Issue During Mayor Washington
Mayor Harold Washington, fearing the loss of the Cubs
and the perceived economic benefits that the team provided
Chicago, attempted in October of 1986 to bring together
local community leaders and representatives from the
franchise to resolve the lights issue.

He sponsored

numerous, close door discussions and two open summits
between the two sides and the city.

However, his efforts

did not bring success since opposition by the community
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persisted.
What pushed Mayor Washington to take a stronger stance
on the issue was a threat made by the Cubs in May of 1987.
Specifically, if the franchise was not allowed to install
lights at Wrigley by the following year, they would move to
St. Louis .and play their post-season games on the astroturf
of Busch Memorial Stadium. 42
In July of 1987, Mayor Washington, pressured by the
turn of events, took an approach which he felt would be fair
to both the Cubs and the neighborhood residents; he openly
supported a limited number of regular season games to be
played under the lights at Wrigley Field.

This compromising

approach to the issue also received the support of the City
Council, since Washington's political stature allowed him to
easily recruit the necessary votes.

In early November of

1987, the passage of an ordinance by the Council seemed just
weeks away.

The ordinance would allow the Cubs to play 8

night games during the 1988 season and 18 night games every
season thereafter.

But with the death of the mayor two

weeks after, the lights issue lost political direction and
the endorsed plan lost momentum.

42

St. Louis and the Cardinals had been long
archrivals and the possibility of a playoff game being
played there would surely be not accepted or forgiven by
Chicagoans.
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The Loss of Political Direction After Washington
Early in 1988, the incoming Mayor Sawyer announced his
support for the Washington plan.

Yet, the new mayor had

lost some of the support of the City Council which his
predecessor had so easily enlisted in the past.

The

repealing of a noise ordinance, which stood in the way of
lights at Wrigley Field, under the Washington administration
was almost surely to occur.

Yet, now under the Sawyer

leadership it seemed impossible. 43
The situation became even more complicated when Ald.
Bobby Rush (2nd Ward), chair of the Energy, Environmental
Protection and Public Utilities committee, held a public
hearing on the issue in January 1988.

Though Rush openly

advocated the 18 regular game night proposal, his action not
only delayed the possible repeal, but also fueled the hope
of the residents to, if not eliminate the lights plan at
Wrigley, at least slow down its process.

At that hearing,

both city officials and representatives of the Tribune Co.
urged for a city approval of the installation of lights at
Wrigley Field (Mccarron and Devall, 1988).
Increasingly, because of the time delay to revisit the
43

One way to advance the idea of lights at Wrigley
was to limit the plan for seat expansion proposed by the
Cubs and provide additional parking. The Cubs would also
limit the 3:05 p.m. game starts to 7 from the usual 29.
It
was believed that this proposal would be more attractive to
the residents around the ballpark. Yet, even with these
concessions the anti-lights activists with the support of
Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th Ward), continued their strong
opposition (Devall and Mccarron, 1988).
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issue, Ald. Hansen (44th Ward) began to generate support
from colleagues in the City Council to stop the installation
of lights in his ward.

For example, although Ald. William

Banks (36th Ward) on the far west side of the city had no
directive from his constituency on the issue, supported
Hansen.

Other aldermen showed similar support, since in the

absence of Mayor Washington, to advocate for an elected
official who represented the interests of his constituency
seemed most collegial (Strong, 1988a).

The Passage of the Lights Ordinance
Mayor Sawyer pushed for the passage of an ordinance by
lobbying the support of other aldermen on the issue.

Along

with the Cubs, the mayor underscored the importance of the
lights issue since the franchise was ready to submit a
proposal for the 1990 All-Star Baseball Game to be played at
Wrigley Field. 44
Ald. Rush (2nd ward) criticized the mayor for his
political maneuvering and charged that Sawyer wanted to
"pass a barebones ordinance granting lights without adequate
neighborhood protections or city wide benefits."

Fearing

that the mayor's move to rally aldermanic support would mean
a soon to be released mayoral proposal, Rush, prematurely

44

The Cubs strongly advocated the importance of an
All-Star game in Chicago, since, according to the
management, it would mean an additional $15 to $35 million
to the local economy (Solomon, 1988).
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offered a new ordinance which would allow night baseball
under conditions which would be responsive to the community
demands (Strong and Sly, 1988).
The Rush ordinance failed.

A Sawyer proposal then

offered to repeal the existing law and allow the
installation of lights at Wrigley Field.

The terms of the

mayor's proposal could be characterized as "pro-Cubs" since
the desired economic outcomes from lights at Wrigley Field
would come from national television programming and its
related advertising revenue.

After the proposal received

the support of the Environment and Energy Committee (7-2
committee vote), Mayor Sawyer responded:
Thanks to the input of the residents of the community
and the responsiveness of the Chicago Cubs, I'm
confident that we have come up with a compromise
proposal which will ensure that one of America's most
loved baseball teams stays in Chicago for all of us to
enjoy (Strong, 1988c).
Ald. Hansen (44th) viewed the proposal as insensitive
to the feelings and concerns which the residents of his ward
repeatedly expressed.

Hansen unsuccessfully attempted to

delay a full city council vote after a March 15 scheduled
referendum on the issue by voters in 21 precincts of the
44th and 46th wards (the area surrounding Wrigley Field)
(Strong, 1988c) .
On February 25, 1988, the mayoral proposal was approved
by the city council (29 for-19 against-2 absent) .

An effort

to delay the vote until after the March 15 referendum by
Ald. Luis Gutierrez (26th Ward) was defeated by a 28-19
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council vote, as was an effort by Ald. Lawrence Bloom (5th
ward) who proposed to (1) provide the city with the right to
repeal the lights vote if the neighborhood improvement plan
was not implemented, and,

(2) commit the Cubs to play all

home games in Chicago until 2002 (Solomon, 1988).

The Role of the Media
The role of the media in this case proved to be
significant.

Specifically, the media served as a link

between economic development and cultural representation.
The Cubs utilized social/cultural and economic rationales to
convince the city and its political leadership that the
passage of a city ordinance to allow lights at Wrigley Field
was necessary.

In terms of social/cultural reasoning, the

Cubs publicized opinion survey results which showed the
strong connection between the residents and the team.
Similarly, the franchise argued its economic contributions
at the state, county, city and even neighborhood level by
promoting the findings of its economic impact studies.

In

this regard, the team utilized the media to advance its
stadium development plans.
The Chicago Tribune became a corporate tool as the
Tribune Co. attempted to advance its business interests.
The newspaper took strong positions against politicians and
anti-lights advocates when the momentum seemed to shift away
from the passing of a lights ordinance.

In this regard, the
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media played a dual role in both owning the Cubs and in
having the ability to influence public policy making.
For example, a 1988 editorial by the Chicago Tribune
(1988a) referred to those aldermen who once supported the
lights installation, and now were having second thoughts on
the subject as "boneheads."

Specifically, the editorial

read:
Suddenly, some old Washington supporters who were for
the lights compromise now are against it. Maybe it is
just coincidence that they are the same boneheads who
keep trying to thwart commercial and residential growth
in the city and get criticized by the newspaper for it.
But not likely. The only change from the
Vrdolyak-Madigan days is that it is a different set of
political manipulators who think they can silence or
negate Tribune editorial criticism and undercut a mayor
at the same time (pp. 22).
At the same time the Chicago Tribune editorial reminded
the city that it was not charged to support the Tribune Co.
and influence the installation of lights at Wrigley Field:
And in case that anyone still thinks that Cub decisionmaking and editorial position-taKing have any
connection, consider this: if the Tribune editorial
board had any say in Cubs policy, the team would long
since have had enough of political rebuffs and
runarounds, and be ready to move into a new Wrigley
Field replica in the suburbs. And the opponents of the
lights would be trying to figure out whether to pave
over the hole in the ground left at Clark and Addison
(pp. 22) .
The editorial angered many city politicians who saw it
as an attack on their political integrity.

Ald. Rush (2nd

ward) who had been an advocate of the lights at Wrigley
responded:
If the vote were right now, I feel as a result of this
editorial this [ordinance] would fail 50 to O... I think
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they [Cubs] are obviously impatient with the democratic
process. Maybe they want a back-room deal to be signed
by a rubber stamp council. That's not going to happen
(Strong, 1988b).
For others, the editorial was viewed as an effort by
the Tribune Co. to move the Cubs to the suburbs and place
the blame on the city council (Dellios, 1988) .

Regardless

of the intent, the editorial brought the issue once again to
the forefront of the city's agenda.

For the Cubs this was

especially important at a time when, after the death of
Mayor Washington, the passing of an ordinance was clearly
off-track as politicians began to view the lights issue as
an opportunity to test their own political power.
The Chicago Tribune also charged the anti-lights
activists as self-serving and insincere.

Columnist Mike

Royko, for example, attacked Ald. Hansen (44th ward),
identifying the adlerman's attempts to stop the Cubs from
installing lights at Wrigley Field as inconsistent with
other community issues.

Because of night games at the

ballpark, Hansen contended that late evening drinking by the
fans would negatively affect the community and cause serious
problems for the residents.

According to Royko, the

alderman should also attempt to control the late drinking of
the 200 or so bars in his precinct.

Royko wrote:

Hansen seems to be perfectly content to have a million
people getting drunk in his ward year in and year out.
He just wants to prevent Cubs fans from having a few
beers before the 7th inning, 18 evenings a year ... With
200 bars in his [Hansen's] ward ... that probably
explains how he gets elected (Royko, 1988).
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Even at the end, after the passage of the lights
ordinance, a Chicago Tribune editorial (1988b) charged that
the anti-lights community activists were "still determined
to make the Cubs play only day baseball game or leave town."
The editorial once again blamed the Chicago politicians as
being responsible for sacrificing economic development and
the strengthening of Chicago's neighborhoods by acting in
ways which advanced their personal political agendas over
the good of the public.

It described the lights issue to

"have served best as a diversion of attention from more
critical urban problems that are paralyzing Chicago, its
neighborhoods and its political leadership."

The editorial

concluded by congratulating the Cubs' civic actions of
bringing an All-Star game to Chicago.
The role of the media proved extremely influential in
advancing the interests of the franchise.

The Chicago

Tribune worked to support the installation of lights at
Wrigley Field by communicating the social/cultural and
economic value of the team to Chicagoland residents.

At the

same time, the newspaper engaged in agenda building, a
political function of the media.

Specifically, through its

editorials, the newspaper ensured that the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field remained an issue of concern for
Chicago's government.

Yet, the inherent conflict of

interest in the relationship between the newspaper and the
issue of the lights proved to be an advantage for the Cubs
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as they searched for approval of their stadium development
plans.

Conclusion
The process through which the installation of lights at
Wrigley Field occurred is a good example of how a
professional franchise is capable of advancing its business
interests through stadium development plans.

The ownership

of the franchise was successful, regardless of the strong
opposition by the residents, in convincing the City Council
that lights at Wrigley Field were more important than the
potential negative quality of life effects of the
surrounding residents.
The process of advancing these stadium development
plans can be categorized into four general areas:

(1)

economic rationales,

(3)

(2) social/cultural factors,

political developments, and (4) media effects.

The

franchise successfully outlined, through its own studies,
the economic contributions which it makes to the City, the
County and the State.

At the same time, the city itself

supported these projections.

In the process, legitimate

questions related to the method and utilization of these
analyses never surfaced.

Similarly, the franchise also

convinced the public and the elected officials that the Cubs
are an important element of the social fabric of the city,
making the team worthy of special attention.
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The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley
Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor
Washington's death.

Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw

the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or
test their political power.

Though most Chicago aldermen

supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced
by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed by Mayor
Sawyer, many became populists and supported the neighborhood
anti-lights campaign.

In reality, with mayoral elections in

the near future, the lights issue became an opportunity for
these politicians to put forth an early challenge to Mayor
Sawyer.

In the end, not even a referendum proved capable of

changing the will of the city in passing a lights ordinance.
The media also played an important role.

The Tribune

Co., utilized the Chicago Tribune to advance its interests
by shaping public perceptions.

In the process, the

arguments favoring the franchises' position were furthered.
The following chapter continues the investigation of
this stadium development plan by addressing the community
response and community effects.

In this regard, the chapter

also discusses the ability of the community to maintain the
support of the city in its efforts to address the
implications of the lights installation at Wrigley Field.
Finally, the chapter outlines the community effects of this
stadium development plan in Chicago, including how lights at
Wrigley, a stadium development plan, have contributed in
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reshaping this part of the city.

CHAPTER 8
TURNING THE LIGHTS ON AN URBAN COMMUNITY: THE IMPACT OF
WRIGLEY FIELD ON LAKE VIEW IN CHICAGO
Introduction
After a brief profile of the community of Lake View,
this chapter is divided into two sections.

The first

section investigates the community response to this stadium
development plan, the community strategies utilized by the
residents, and the creation of the "Neighborhood Protection
and Improvement Plan."

This plan showcases the success of

this community in ensuring that Lake View remains a focal
point for both the city government and the Cubs after the
installation of lights at Wrigley Field.
The second section concentrates on the community
effects of this stadium development plan.

The installation

of lights contributed in reshaping the culture of this area.
In this regard, this stadium development plan can be viewed
to have effected this community in two ways.

On the one

hand, lights at Wrigley assisted in producing a vibrant
night life within the community and contributed to
gentrification.

On the other hand, the long term effects of

this plan could include a much different type of coexistence
between Wrigley Field and Lake View.

.

The presence
of this
..

ballpark within a residential community might cease to
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describe the future relationship between Wrigley Field and
Lake View.

Thus, stadium development plans can directly and

indirectly affect the urban environment.

The Community of Lake View
Lake View is an old established community located on
the north side of downtown Chicago, along the lakefront.
During its early years, the area was occupied by German
immigrants and according to the U.S. Census, like many other
urban communities in Chicago, Lake View went through
population increases until the 1950's.

In 1950, over

125,000 made their homes in Lake View.

Since then, the area

has experienced considerable population decline. During the
1960's, housing along the lakefront became high priced, and
today, Lake View is predominantly a white residential
community.
Over the years, the southwest corner of the community
has remained a strong retail center (Belmont, Lincoln and
Ashland Avenue) .

In addition, other commercial developments

can be found along Clark Street, between Belmont and Addison
and along Broadway Avenue (Diversy and Belmont), on the east
part of its boundaries.
Wrigley Field is located in North Lake View.

The

ballpark was built for the Whalers and in 1916, after a
league merge, the sports facility was taken over by the
Cubs.

Originally called Weeghman Park, it was renamed
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Wrigley Field after the Wrigley family purchased the stadium
and the team following WWI.

Community Response to the Lights
Upon announcement of the Cubs' interest in installing
lights at Wrigley Field in 1982, the local community, under
the leadership of the Citizens United for Baseball in the
Sunshine (C.U.B.S.), protested and contested the stadium
development proposal.

Since then, the community became

involved in a battle over the Cubs' stadium plans which
spanned over a decade.
The residents organized to stop the Cubs from
installing lights at Wrigley Field.

The Lake View Citizens

Council (LVCC) and the C.U.B.S., along with the strong
support of the local alderman, engaged in an anti-lights
campaign representing the community interests.

For them,

night games at the ballpark would mean increased traffic,
noise, vandalism, rowdiness, and related negative community
consequences (Crimmins, 1988) .
The residents testified at city hearings indicating
that lights at the ballpark would generate intolerable
conditions for the surrounding neighborhoods.

At a public

hearing in February of 1988, for example, 350 community
residents reiterated to a city committee their strong
concerns about litter, traffic, crowd rowdiness, drunkenness
and an overall state of neighborhood decline due to night
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games.

The introduction of lights would also negatively

affect the property values in the surrounding area and
evening street parking would be impossible.

Some of the

resident reactions at that hearing included: "We're going to
be prisoners in our own homes" and "We can barely tolerate
what we have now, and please don't ask us to tolerate more
than that."

Wayne Krauss, president of the Lake View

Citizens Council, reflected on the proposed repeal of the
existing ordinance by saying: "We worked hard to get those
laws.

We feel angry"

(Seigel, 1988a).

As the Cubs received political support for their cause
after they threatened to leave Chicago and move out of
Wrigley Field, the residents lobbied against the efforts of
Mayor Washington who supported a compromise on the issue.
After the death of Washington, the community residents and
their elected representative to the City Council began an
effort to reverse the previously outlined support for the
lights.

Yet, Mayor Sawyer's ability to advance a similar

compromising proposal and eventually pass a lights ordinance
made night games at Wrigley Field possible.
As the residents saw their battle being lost and noted
that the Sawyer proposal did not even include an 11:00 p.m.
curfew during night games, they responded angrily with
threats.

Paul Kendall, president for C.U.B.S. a community

organization which led the opposition against the Cubs
noted:
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I can't believe this is happening to Lake View.
If you
go through with this [lights ordinance], there will be
hell to pay. We're getting screwed; it's not
fair ... [if the lights are installed, Wrigley Field]
will not be known as the friendly confines anymore
(Strong, 1988c:l).
The eventual passage of the lights ordinance at Wrigley
Field generated concern and fear amongst residents in the
surrounding neighborhoods.

According to a local resident:

"Sometimes [during day games]

I have to park seven blocks

from [home] ... I have a sick mother, and with all the traffic
we'll have at night, I'm afraid the ambulance would take 10
minutes to go a couple of blocks."

A local store owner

noted: "I'm here [at my store] during the day games and I
see them bang my windows when they walk by ... Now I'll have
to stay here until the games are over for self defense."

A

police officer predicted increased illegal activity with
night games.

He indicated: "Under cover of darkness, I

think we'll see more cars broken into ... More scam operations
will go on.

Also, when you get a large crowd that has been

drinking, eventually they'll get rowdy.
our hands full''

I'm sure we'll have

(Casuso and Montana, 1988).

Regardless of these concerns, the lights at Wrigley
Field became a reality.

Since then, community

representatives have attempted to monitor its implications
and ensure that the city and the Cubs continue to respond to
their promises, making the play of night games at Wrigley as
orderly for the neighborhood as possible.
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The Non-Binding Referendum
Since lights at Wrigley were to become a reality, the
non-binding referendum became the last opportunity for the
residents to express community dissatisfaction.

The results

of the non-binding referendum could also have an influence
on the upcoming Chicago mayoral elections.
As the after-the-fact referendum in the 21 precincts
around Wrigley Field (44th and 46th wards) was nearing a
close, the future political implications of its outcome for
Mayor Sawyer became clear.

Late Mayor Washington's two-term

electoral success was largely due to his effectiveness in
receiving the vote of the north side lakefront.

A strong

anti-light sentiment expressed by these 11,647 residents at
the referendum would signal the unlikely support which Mayor
Sawyer should expect in the mayoral election.

Mark

Atkinson, former president of C.U.B.S. noted on the
political implications of the nonbinding referendum for
Sawyer:
A solid rejection of lights also would send a message
to Mayor Eugene Sawyer who supported the ordinance.
Mayor Sawyer has never been elected mayor.
If he
thinks he can ignore a substantial portion of the North
Side, the lakefront, he could have a hard time being
elected (Devall, 1988b).
What might become even more troublesome for the
election efforts of Mayor Sawyer is how his political
opponents might employ a strong anti-light referendum vote.
Mayoral opponents Ald. Timothy Evans (4th ward), Ald. Edmund
Burke (14th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis (29th Ward), voted
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against the lights ordinance.

They could easily utilize the

referendum results to politically attack Sawyer (Casuso,
1988).
The non-binding referendum results in the 21 North Side
precincts, overwhelmingly supporting the position of the
anti-lights community organizers.

From the total votes at

that referendum, 4,007 opposed and 1,292 favored lights at
Wrigley Field.

The importance of the lights issue for the

community can be extracted from the fact that the voter
turnout in those 21 precincts was higher than those in the
surrounding precincts.

Yet, total voter registration in

both of these wards dropped during the November election
(Devall, 1988c).

Strategies Utilized by the Lake View Community Residents
A number of different strategies were utilized by the
residents during their battle with the city and the Cubs
over the installation of lights at Wrigley Field.
Specifically:
(1) Early advocacy on traffic concerns:

It was years before

the 1988 decision to install lights at Wrigley Field, that
the community of Lake View became involved in addressing
concerns over traffic congestion due to baseball games.

A

Wrigley Field transportation study conducted by the Bureau
of Traffic Engineering was requested by the community in
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1980. 45

In 1984, the community lobbied the Department of

Streets and Sanitation to address traffic related
concerns . 46
These early advocacy efforts by the community served as
an existing base around which the residents could organize
as the Cubs kept their pressure on the city government to
pass an ordinance which would allow for the installation of
lights.
(2) Legal Action: The community threatened to sue the
Tribune Co., the Cubs, the City and Major League Baseball
for a conspiracy to generate aggravation in the neighborhood
surrounding Wrigley Field.

They charged that in addition to

the aggravation, the lights would generate increased
traffic, crime, noise and decreased property values.

The

community also planned to investigate Wrigley Field itself
for being in violation of zoning restrictions since the
45

On April 16th and April 17th, 1980 (season opening
day), the study compared the arriving traffic volume between
11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. and departure traffic volume 3:00
p.m. to 6:00 p.m. The study showed that most of the traffic
volume occurred at Belmont and Lake Shore Drive
(arriving=61% of total/ departing=37% of total) . Based on
these findings, this study recommended that the public
should be encouraged through the installation of appropriate
directive signs to use the Irving Park and Lake Shore Drive
exits (current use at arriving= 10% of total/ current use at
departing=27% of total) (Memorandum, 1980) .
46

In 1984, the Lake View Citizens Council expressed
concerns over parking in the area during afternoon Cubs
games. A communication by this group to the City of Chicago
and the Department of Streets and Sanitation requested that
additional towing trucks should patrol the area since the
cars illegally parked "endanger our homes and families"
(Memorandum, 1985).
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ballpark is zoned for commercial use and not as a sports
stadium (Devall, 1988b).
(3) Non-binding referendum:

The residents placed on the

March 1988 ballot a non-binding referendum on the issue of
lights at Wrigley Field.

The voting results showed an

overwhelming expression of anti-lights sentiment and were
received as a great victory by the community.

Viewed as a

source of hope for overturning the City Council approved
ordinance, the results became a threat to Mayor Sawyer who
supported the installation of lights.

According to

Charlotte Newfeld, coordinator of the referendum efforts for
the C. U. B . S . :
I believe that it will have a great effect. This
referendum push has provided a political army of
trained people who know the political process-and there
will be other elections in Chicago (Casuso, 1988) .
(4) Local Political Support: The community worked within the
confines of the political system, an approach which proved
somewhat successful.

Alderman Bernard Hansen (44th ward)

effectively advanced the interests of the residents and
attempted to generate political support when possible.
During the "battle", Ald. Hansen was concerned if he was
truly representing the voice of his ward, since the Tribune
Co. often claimed that the anti-lights sentiment was
concentrated amongst few individuals.

However, the

overwhelming support of the 1988 non-binding referendum
strengthened his position.
Hansen also utilized the results of traffic volume
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studies showing the effect which day baseball exerted on the
local community.

He requested that the Bureau of Traffic

Engineering conduct additional studies on this subject.

One

of the studies requested by Hansen was completed in 1984.
It showed that, when compared to normal traffic volume, one
hour before each of the Cubs' games (June 14, 15 and August
3, 1994) the traffic in the area increased by 1625 cars, and
one hour after each of these games the traffic increased by
1319 (Memorandum, 1985) .
(5) Strong Community-wide Involvement: The residents engaged
in strong grassroots campaign activities to protest the
installation of lights.

As early as 1982 and 1983 they

lobbied the court system to turn down the Cubs' request to
repeal the anti-lights legislation.

In later years they

sustained pressure on the Chicago City Council by strong
participation at public hearings.
(6) Strong Internal Community Organization:

A critical

factor contributing to the constant public pressure applied
by the community, can be extracted from the fact that the
"cause" did not experience internal divisions.

Former

presidents of the local community organizations involved in
this multi-year issue, continued to provide support, thus
creating a long-lasting united front.

Also, prior to the

March 1988 referendum, the community organizations were
successful in registering additional voters who would resist
the lights ordinance.

That effort was well orchestrated
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since one can consider that the C.U.B.S. organization had
assigned specific individuals to spearhead these efforts.
Even during the first night game, the community
organizers enlisted over 200 residents to participate in a
review of the surrounding events.
"watchers."

Some participated as

They sat in the front of their homes and took

notes on any occurrences on their street.

Others were

responsible for monitoring events taking place at the block
level, and finally, a group of others were involved in
assessing the neighborhood effect at a three to five block
radius (Temkin, 1988).
(7) Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee:

The Wrigley

Field Traffic Operations Committee, a group of elected
officials and community representatives, served as a link
between the Lake View residents and the city.

The purpose

of the group was to assist with the implementation of a plan
which would be responsive to the related community concerns.
In this regard, the primary functions of this group were to
conduct community advocacy at the city level. 47
(8) Efforts to Eliminate Alcohol Consumption: The residents
attempted to use the anti-lights results from the area
referendum to, in a latter referendum, vote both the Wrigley
47

A review of committee meeting minutes in 1991 and
1992 showed that community residents/business owners were
able, through these meetings, to either address or solve
other legitimate community issues and concerns.
Some of
these concerns were unrelated to the scope of the February
25, 1988 city ordinance (i.e, sidewalk replacement) (Wrigley
Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992b).
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Field and the surrounding are "dry."

The community would

take advantage of a state law enacted in 1934, after the
repeal of the Prohibition, which allowed residents of
precincts in Chicago to vote their areas "dry", thus,
canceling all alcohol licenses and making the sale of
alcohol in that area illegal.

This strategy was aimed at

ensuring that the strong anti-lights sentiment expressed in
the referendum was carried through, thus, showcasing
continuous community strength on this issue.

One of the

concerns which emerged from this community planning effort
was the impact which such a "dry" referendum would have on
local businesses.

According to Jimmy Jones, a tavern owner

in the area:
I'm upset.
[The referendum] would hurt me when they're
[community organizers] trying to hurt Wrigley Field.
The biggest tavern owner, the ones that get most of the
people from the games, aren't in the precinct, so they
won't be affected. They should take the small tavern
owner into consideration (Casuso, 1988) .
A few months later, Mayor Sawyer and Governor Thompson
included a repeal of that state law in a legislation
proposal which was approved in June 1988.

This made it

impossible for the residents to carry out their threats of
placing such a referendum on the November 1988 ballot.
(9) Continuous pressure after the installation of lights:
The community groups continued their involvement in the
process of implementing an effective protection and
improvement plan after the installation of lights.
Showcasing such a strong level of involvement ensured that
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the city and the Cubs sustained their commitment to minimize
the negative neighborhood effects.

Community and City Relations After The Lights:
The Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan
Since the issue of the lights at Wrigley was heavily
contested among the city, the Cubs and the local community,
the residents were successful in sustaining the interest of
the city by ensuring that their concerns were to be
continuously monitored and addressed.

The ordinance passed

by the Chicago City Council on February 25, 1988, noted that
the city would "ensure that the interests and concerns of
the residential neighborhoods which surround Wrigley Field
are adequately protected" as a result of the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field (City of Chicago, 1988a) .
Based on the city ordinance, a task force under the
direction of the Department of Planning was formed to
develop a plan which would most adequately respond to the
community concerns.

The task force worked closely with

community representatives and Chicago Cubs officials to meet
its objectives.

As a result, yearly plans were developed to

address the community concerns.

The creation of the

"Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan" shows that
the community proved successful in engaging the city and the
franchise to address the effects of this stadium development
plan on its residents.
This plan, from its inception, recognized the effect of
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night baseball and outlined its development assumptions:
A major premise used to develop the plan is that the
most "extraordinary" impact to the residential
community which surrounds Wrigley Field presently
occurs during the baseball games on weekends and major
holidays and on days when baseball games begin at
3:05p.m. These are the days and times during which
residents normally need access to their community and
to the available but limited on-street parking.
The
community will similarly be impacted by night baseball.
The plan developed is applicable to all weekend, major
holiday, and night baseball games, becoming effective
with the first night baseball game ... A second premise
underlying this plan, is that the primary means for
ameliorating traffic congestion, limited neighborhood
parking, and related community concerns, is the
creation of remote parking opportunities that will
reduce the number of vehicles and persons using Lake
View and Uptown streets in the immediate Wrigley Field
area. An essential element of the remote parking
operation will be a Resident Permit Parking program.
However, the permit parking component of the plan, as
per the ordinance, will be effective only on days which
night baseball games are played (eight games in 1988)
(City of Chicago, 1988b, pp. 1-2).
This plan would add to another plan already in
existence that was advanced in 1984 by community Alderman
Bernard Hansen (44th Ward) .

Alderman Hansen had attempted,

under the 'Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee', a
committee with local elected official and community resident
representation, to address existing neighborhood concerns.
Under that particular plan, a litter pick-up program was
implemented by the City and the Cubs, and police services
during Cubs' games were successfully expanded.
At the end of the first year, a residential parking
permit program and a police hotline was added, service bus
service was expanded, police presence to assist with area
traffic and to address fan related disorderly conduct was
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increased, a new litter control program which required the
participation of the Cubs was instituted, and the Cubs would
restrict the sale of beer during the games.

Finally, the

franchise would advance the entire plan through public
relations.

The task force also concluded that the plan

would be continuously updated based on the input of the
community (City of Chicago, 1988b) .
After the first year, a review of the previous plan and
recommendations for the 1989 baseball season at Wrigley,
would assist in developing a smoother and better
neighborhood improvement plan.

This report acknowledged the

importance of community involvement in the project and
expressed its interest in continuing the improvement of the
plan.

According to the report:
Community involvement has played a major role in the
development of the plan, both before and after the
first night game. Modifications to the plan have
occurred with community participation and input. This
report will serve as an outline for a continuing
dialogue between City agencies and Lake View/Uptown
community and business representatives (City of
Chicago, 1988c, pp. 2).

The overall assessment of the 1988 community plan was
characterized as successful, yet changes would be needed.
Based upon the 1988 plan assessment, some of the
recommendations provided by the task force to be considered
for the 1989 revised plan included:

(1) the reducing the

length of permit parking hours from 4:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.,
to 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.

This would provide for street

parking access to local business employees,

(2) possible
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expansion of the residential parking permit zone to
encompass additional streets,

(3) a public relations program

to communicate these changes to the residents would be
enacted,

(4) expanded parking arrangements and bus services

would be renewed,

(5) a publicity effort will be undertaken

by the City of Chicago to inform the public of the parking
regulations and encourage the ridership of public
transportation,

(6) a reevaluation and improvements of

traffic flow will be conducted,

(7) the Chicago Cubs will

increase its communication with local religious and cultural
organizations to ensure that events which would potentially
generate increased congestion are limited,

(8) signs will be

installed by the city at areas designated by the community,
prohibiting charter bus parking and engine running,
continuation of the litter program,

(9)

(10) the Cubs would

expand their involvement by communicating through their
media, numerous aspects of this phase of the "Neighborhood
Protection and Improvement Plan."
A 1990 city report evaluated the effectiveness of the
1989 plan and made recommendations for the upcoming season.
This report outlined two major problems from the previous
year.

These problems were "people problems on the public

way associated with the consumption of alcohol" and
"residential on-street parking problems in the immediate
Wrigley Field area during night ball games"
Chicago, 1990a, pp. 1).

(City of
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Continuous efforts, according to this report, will take
place by the police department to address the "peoples'"
problems.

The use of the police hotline which will

specifically operate for the night baseball games out of the
Department of Streets and Sanitation Command Post should
prove helpful in these efforts.
The 1990 plan proposed that the city work with the
community to develop a plan which would address these
traffic concerns.

The city would also work with the

community on charter bus operations and continue to promote
the permit parking program for night baseball through
various means of communication, thus, making the residents
aware of its logistics (City of Chicago, 1990b) .
Finally, the city would expand the availability of
remote parking.

Efforts to secure additional parking for

night games by the city were spearheaded by a Cubs' proposal
to turn city-owned vacant land east of Graceland Cemetery,
north of the ballpark, into a remote parking facility.

The

proposal would be taken into consideration by the city, the
CTA, the park district and the community.

This proposal was

approved by the residents neighboring the vacant land
(206-118 vote) in early 1990 (Kendall, 1990).
It becomes clear from the developments presented above
that the city responded with great diligence to the concerns
of the Lake View residents.
baseball on the community,

Due to the effect of night
resident representation has been
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a part of the plan development process to improve and
protect the neighborhood.

The 1990 report, also outlined

community input on the proposed plans.

The report noted:

The 1990 Lake View/Uptown Neighborhood Protection and
Improvement Plan was developed with community input and
participation primarily through the Wrigley Field
Traffic Operations Committee (City of Chicago, 1990a,
pp. 5).
The community of Lake View has been very effective in
addressing the multiple concerns which arose from night
baseball.

Yet, the greatest success of the community has

been its ability to ensure that the city of Chicago respond
to these community issues with great support.

In addition,

the organization of the Chicago Cubs has also been
responsive to the various community apprehensions and has
attempted to address the need to make night baseball an
event with limited negative effects for the surrounding
neighborhood.

This ability of the community to engage and

sustain city support has been largely due to successful
advocacy strategies.

Reshaping Lake View
The community area of Lake View saw the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field in 1988.

What were the implications

of this stadium development plan on the surrounding
neighborhoods?

Did the lights and the implementation of the

area parking permit program, as a result of this stadium
project, assist in transforming this community?

What type
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of population has been occupying this northside community in
recent years and how could the socioeconomic characteristics
of this population complement the environment created by the
lights at Wrigley Field?

These are some of the questions

which can provide us with an insight into whether stadium
development can reshape the urban environment.
Angela Fadragas (1980:17), when considering the future
of Lake View, noted the importance of the relationship
between business and residential interests as a result of
night games played at Wrigley Field:
The latest threat to the equilibrium between businesses
and residential use centers around Wrigley Field, where
the Cubs' organization, no longer managed by the
Wrigley Family, has indicated an interest in staging
night baseball games. A large number of residents in
the central area of Lake View believe that this would
create many problems - parking, noise, vandalism, crime
- that would lower the quality of life. However, some
say baseball contributes to many businesses in the
vicinity, and the introduction of night games would
create more opportunities. Development of Lake View
seems likely to be determined by further variants of
this continuing conflict between businesses and
residential interests (pp. 17).
The development of businesses serving the night games
clientele could have a direct effect on the future of this
community area.
Though many factors can be accounted for when
considering community change (real estate interests,
government, business interests, transportation, etc.), the
goal here is to address the relationship between the stadium
development plans at Wrigley Field and their possible
implications for the local community.

In that regard, an

262
assessment of both the introduction of night baseball and
the parking program could serve as additional factors in the
overall physical and social reorganization of that area.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, demographic
changes should be taken into consideration, such as the
possible movement of population in communities which
surround Lake View.

For example, recent increases in

property values within the community of Lincoln Park,
immediately to the south, could have pushed to the north, a
young, professional, single population, now priced out of
that market.
By taking these issues into consideration, I will
address (1) how the introduction of a parking permit
program, a response to the stadium development plan, and
night games negatively affected some businesses over others,
contributing to the creation of an entertainment area around
Wrigley Field, and (2) how, as a result of these changes, an
increased movement of population characterized as
"cosmopolites" and "unmarried and childless" emerged in this
area (Gans, 1962).

Boosting a Night Life Atmosphere
The stadium development plan at Wrigley Field had a
direct effect on the economic organization of the community.
In order to understand the relationship between the
installation of lights at the ballpark and the
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reorganization of the business establishments in the area,
two factors must be taken into consideration.

The first is

the growing parking problem and the second is the imbalance
in the businesses benef itting from this stadium development
plan.

At the same time, it should be noted that parking

problems contributed to this imbalance.
At a community meeting, representatives recognized the
need for a plan to address a growing parking issue.

The

area problem, according to committee members, resulted from
the increased activities of commercial establishments.

It

is interesting to note here that the community
representatives at that meeting described these "problems"
as being "unrelated to sporting events."

The meeting

minutes read:
It was the consensus of the attendees that there was a
growing need to develop a strategy to deal with the
significant increase in commercial bar, restaurant, and
entertainment activity along Clark Street, Sheffield
and Belmont Avenues in the program area.
This growth
has resulted in traffic control and parking problems,
totally unrelated to sporting events, which aggravate
those experienced during night baseball games (Wrigley
Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992a, pp. 3).
This community concern, three years after the
installation of lights, though initially viewed as
independent of the games at Wrigley Field, can be related to
the newly enforced parking permit program.

The parking

program has had negative economic implications on certain
local businesses since these establishments cannot derive
income from the night games played at the ballpark.
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Specifically, a video store, a cleaners, a salon, etc.,
will not experience increased business activities from the
crowds brought into the area to watch night games.

On the

other hand, restaurants, bars, clubs, and related commercial
activities will benefit from the atmosphere generated by
night games.

The parking permit program then, instituted by

the residents and the city to alleviate the negative affects
of the crowds, has had different effects on the local
businesses.
During the initial stages of the Permit Parking Program
many business owners felt that the introduction of lights at
Wrigley Field and the measures aimed at addressing parking
concerns had negative implications for their operations.
According to Barbara Orre, owner of a salon in the area, the
"Its unfair.

permit program has hurt her business:
customers have no place to park.

My

If you have a license and

can buy a city sticker, you should be able to park
anywhere."

And, according to Richard Friedman, general

manager of a nonprofit theater in the area: "People will
drive around, get frustrated and go home.
dangerous for business in the area."

This could be

Finally, Mike Quigley,

aid to Ald. Hansen (44th ward), agreed that not enough
consideration was given to the effect which the permit
parking program will have on the local businesses.
According to Quigley, the plan is "basically saying they
[local business] are going to be closed

that evening.
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Let's face facts: No one is going to come to this area
during games if there is nowhere to park"

(Burnside, 1988)

Fearing towing and parking tickets, many potential
customers for these business chose not to make any purchases
when night games were played at Wrigley Field.

Some store

owners estimated a drop of business during night games as
high as 75 percent and others blamed Mayor Sawyer for
discouraging non-parking sticker owners from visiting the
area.

Sam Toia, president of the Lake View Central Business

Association, noted: "Even the mayor is saying don't go to
Wrigleyville if you don't have a sticker.
business away"

They are scaring

(Seigel, 1988b).

A new expanded parking plan instituted for 1989 was
meant to take away the pressure from the local businesses.
But according to local businesses it did not help.

The

parking plan continued to negatively impact the small
businesses which did not sell alcohol.

Bob Reschke owner of

a used books and records in the area commented:
I think what happens is that you do get some new people
coming in to the neighborhood that wouldn't otherwise
be around. But with the night games, it's horrible.
I
think that everyone around here will agree it's killed
businesses for them, except for the bars, maybe.
People won't come to the neighborhood at noon, even, if
they know they know there's a night game, because they
feel like they won't find a parking space.
It's a 20
to 30 percent drop in business for us" (McCracken,
1989).
On the other hand, sports bars in the area like
"Sluggers" and the "Cubby Bear" know that when the Cubs are
in town their business will skyrocket.

Mike Vasilevich,
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manager of "Sluggers" outlined his business plan:
What we want is to generate some business when the Cubs
are on the road, because we know we're going to get
them when the Cubs are at home (McCracken, 1989).
Eventually a renewed parking program was instituted
which prohibited parking in the LV-Zone designated areas
from 5:00pm to lO:OOpm during night ballgames.

The effect

of that new parking program has remained the same.

The

owner of a small grocery store in the corner of Darnen and
Addison told me when asked about his perceptions of night
games and business growth:
... right here where I am (about a mile from the
ballpark) they [night games] do not affect me.
Business has not been better here because of the
lights. But I tell you what, my buddy who is further
closer to Wrigley and runs a small bar has seen better
business because of the lights. The people come at
night and they stay outside longer. At night people
will drink, eat ... These businesses benefit from the
night games.
Clark Street between Sheffield and Grace has become a
viable night district.

The overwhelming majority of the

businesses are restaurants and bars.

Though many of these

establishments are sports oriented, trendy Japanese,
Ethiopian and Chinese restaurants, along with noodle shops
and an oyster bar, do well in that area.

The "Wrigley

Side", a few feet away from the ballpark advertises "Live
blues after the game" hoping to attract some of the
thousands who pour out of Wrigley following night games.
The other non-alcohol businesses which have remained,
acknowledge that they might be in the wrong type of
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businesses.

Joe Pinter owner of the Pinters' Violin Shop on

Clark, north of the ballpark told me:
I have been here for 28 years and things in recent
years have changed tremendously. Parking has helped
around here for the better, I mean for the residents.
There have been more bars and restaurants in the area
than ever before. My business has not gotten any help
from all this. The bar and restaurant business is the
type of business you want to get in here. That's where
the money is now.
Jeffrey Frisone has been working for the last two years at
the "Bookworks", on Clark and Sheffield, a store that buys
and sells books and records.

He told me about the business

activity in that store:
There has been definitely an increase in trendy stuff
around here. Many young people are bar hopping. Often
you have long lines outside these bars as people wait
to get in. The lights have been good for those
businesses but they have not helped ours. The crowds
tend to be loaded [with alcohol] and some of them are
even dangerous.
It can get crazy around here
sometimes.
Frisone also told me about the reasons for the late evening
store hours, while commenting on the type of customers that
frequent the store:
Our hours go from noon to 10 p.m. and noon to 11:00
p.m.
Some of the people who come here to go to the
game might stop by and pick up a baseball book. But
you cannot rely on that. Many of the local residents
are our customers. The long evening hours are mostly
for them since you cannot rely on the crowds after the
night games for business.
An investigation of indicators of economic change

support the above assertions.

The data on the number of

employees by sector in the 60613 zip code (Lake View-Wrigley
Field is in that code) shows a decrease in the number of
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manufacturing and retail employees and a sharp increase in
the "other" category which would include restaurants, bars
and similar types of commercial establishments.

This trend

is not observed in the Lake View zip code (60657), nor in
the zip codes which encompass the New Comiskey Park (60616)
and the United Center (60612) .
Specifically, in 1986, two years before the
introduction of night games at Wrigley Field, 6,100 were
employed in the 60613 zip code.

Of those, 3800 (62%) were

employed in the non-manufacturing/non-retail sector.

In

1988, the year that night games were introduced at Wrigley
Field, in that same zip code, approximately 6,900 employees
worked in the area.

Of those, 4300 (62%) worked in the

non-manufacturing/non-retail sector.

In 1990, two years

after night games, the overall number of employees increased
to approximately 8,100.

Of those, 6,100 (75%) worked in

non-manufacturing and non-retail sectors (Woodstock
Institute, 1994).

A New Type of Wrigleyyille Resident
The creation of a night life atmosphere in Lake View
has attracted a specific resident to this community.
According to Herbert Gans (1962), the quality of life in the
urban environment varies since its residents do not assume a
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common lifestyle. 48

Gans described five different

population groups found within the city, of which the first
three live in the city by choice and are protected from the
negative consequences of urban life as described by Wirth
(1938).

Those five different groups are:

(1) the

cosmopolites, who are individuals with high levels of
education and incomes and who are attracted to the urban
environment due to the cultural advantages which the city
can offer them,

(2) the unmarried and childless, who usually

grew up in the surrounding suburban areas and live in the
city because of its proximity to the jobs, the available
entertaining opportunities and the opportunities to meet
others.
marry,

This group is likely to leave the city once they
(4) the ethnic villagers, are a group which relies on

their ethnic ties with other members of similar background.
They have a strong sense of ethnic identity and the
community within which they reside provides them with the
support and intimacy usually needed to "make it" in a
different country,

(5) the trapped, are those who are

elderly and might receive small pensions or public
assistance.

Though they are concerned about the changes in

their neighborhood, they cannot leave the city, and,

(5) the

deprived, who are the poor minorities, the physically,
psychologically and economically handicapped who are most
48

Others, including Wirth (1938), Fischer (1982;
1984), Kadushin (1983), and Creekmore (1985), have viewed
urbanism in either positive or negative ways.
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negatively affected by life in the city.
In considering Gans' typology, Lake View has seen in
recent years an increase in 'cosmopolites' and 'unmarried
and childless.'

According to Ann Ralston, a real estate

agent for Burton Realty in the area: "There are a lot of
young people around here because of the ballpark ... and that
gives the area a youthful, vivacious feel"

(Buursma, 1990b).

It is also interesting to note how the area which was once
called North Lake View, now has received a strong identity
from Wrigley Field and is called Wrigleyville.
Advertisements by real estate agents sometimes use the word
"Wrigleyview" to describe a listing, a fact which also
denotes the influence of the ballpark on the identification
of the area.
A 1985 survey showed that 36 percent of the residents
within a mile distance from Wrigley Field (31.3 percent of
those living between zero and half a mile from the ballpark
and 40.7 percent of those living between half a mile and a
mile from the ballpark) outlined the presence of Wrigley
Field as a positive factor in their decision to live in the
area.

Only 9.3 percent (11.9 percent of those living

between zero and half a mile from the ballpark and 6.5
percent of those living between half a mile and a mile from
the ballpark) indicated that Wrigley Field was a negative
factor.

The rest, 54.8 percent, described the ballpark as

neither a positive nor a negative influence in their
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decision-making (Chicago Cubs, 1985b).
Bob Murphy moved in the area in the late 1980's.

Bob

grew up in the Chicago suburbs, went to college, and when he
completed his degree, found a job in the Loop.

He was not

married at the time and the Wrigley area was exactly what he
was looking for.

He told me:

Wrigleyville was exactly what I was looking for.
I had
just finished college and I was able to take public
transportation to work.
I got an apartment a few
blocks away from the ballpark which was owned by an
older couple.
It was a great place because there are
many people there like me.
I went to Wrigley, but most
of the fans are not there for the games.
It is the
atmosphere, its an event, the history and tradition of
the park ... there is a lot of things to do there
[Wrigley area] . There are a lot of bars and that type
of an environment.
Bob married a few years later to someone whom he met in the
area and moved to a suburban home.
suburban train to the Loop.

Now he takes the

He indicated to me his

reasoning:
After you marry, it is difficult to stay in that
environment.
I don't know how people do it.
For us
who are planning a family, moving to the suburbs seemed
to be the right choice.
Nora Weston provided a similar logic to the fact that
she currently resides in that area.

She indicated to me:

I came here after I completed college. This is the
place to be. There are many people who live here and
are of similar age.
I work in human resources for a
large accounting firm downtown. Transportation is
great and in the evenings there are so many places to
visit and things to do, nearby.
It is great . . . . After
I get married though, a suburban lifestyle is going to
be much better for me since it is more slow paced.
Residential lending has also increased dramatically in
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Lake View between 1988 and 1992.

The overall number of

loans (including conventional, home improvement, FHA/VA, and
multifamily types) was 1,600 in 1988.
skyrocketed to near 3,300.
conventional.

In 1992 that number

Of those loans, most were

Specifically the number of conventional loans

increased from approximately 1,400 in 1988 to 3,000 in 1992.
Their amount also increased from $150 million in 1988 to
$400 million (Woodstock Institute, 1994) .
Mark Abbey, moved to the area, hoping to share the
economic growth which Wrigleyville has experienced in recent
years.

He noted:

I wanted to be in a trend-setting group, to get here
before the pack ... Now that the Cubs are staying in the
neighborhood it's a positive sign and an indicator that
more Yuppies will move in. There is a tide that has
come into Wrigleyville in terms of money and growth
potential ... My feeling is that if the Cubs didn't win
[in 1984 and 1989] and they didn't have lights at the
park, I'm doubtful that you would have had the growth
or rise in real estate values we've seen (Buursma,
1990a) .
The proximity to the lake, the numerous cultural and
social amenities, have drawn young upscale professionals.
Housing costs in the area has increased dramatically.

On

Wayne and Addison one has to pay over $250,000 to purchase a
newly renovated unit in a three flat building with a two car
garage and a fireplace.

At 1118 West Addison, fifty feet

from the ballpark, a two bedroom, one bathroom apartment
rents for $1,000 a month.

Ann Ralston, a real estate agent

in Wrigleyville indicated how many are priced out of the
housing market in Wrigleyville:
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Right now, houses are going for $175,000
and the 175,000 home would need a lot of
the people who are looking for a home in
to $175,000 range are now buying condos"
1990b) .

to $400,000,
work.
So all
the $150,000
(Buursma,

Along Southport Avenue, two blocks west of Wrigley Field one
can observe home rehabilitation as well as the emergence of
shops and stores that serve a population which might be
characterized as "trendy."
Redevelopment has also taken place around the ballpark
in recent years.

Many old apartment buildings and small

industrial plants have been converted to upscale residential
condominium and single home properties.

These developments

have taken advantage of the cafes, bars, restaurants and
taverns, transforming Wrigleyville into an entertainment
center for those with high, disposable incomes.

During one

of my walks through the residential area around the
ballpark, I identified 14 homes being rehabbed by
construction crews.
Some residential redevelopment, directly associated
with the opportunity to view a game from the rooftop of
buildings surrounding Wrigley Field, has recently taken
place.

In 1990, for example, real estate investors

purchased a victorian overlooking the ballpark.

With an

excellent viewing opportunity from the roof top, one stands
460 feet from home plate along the right side line.
purchasing price was $425,000 in cash, a few thousand
dollars more from the asking price of $419,000.

The

The
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investors described the deal as an "idiot-proof" investment.
After rehabbing the building and adding a roof top deck for
allowing up to 50 people to view the game, the expected sale
of the newly created four unit building is $240,000 for the
basement condo and $300,000 for each of the three units
above.

A total resale value of $1.14 million (Buursma,

1990c) .

Changes Around the Ballpark
An investigation of census track data from 1980 and

1990 supports the claims made above.

Specifically, after

identifying the tracks which surround Wrigley Field within
half a mile from the ballpark, selected data was compared.
The boundaries utilized for this analysis are Ashland
(West), Irving Park (North), Belmont (South) and Halsted
(East) .

The census tracks which fell within these

boundaries are: #604, #605, #606, #607, #610, #611, #612,
#614, #615, #616, #617, #621, #622, #623, #624.

The total

population of these tracks in 1980 was 27,896 and dropped to
24,853 in 1990.
The data (APPENDIX A) shows that the population around
that area of the city changed significantly between 1980 and
1990.

Specifically, there was a decrease in the older

population (3.1%) and a considerable increase in residents
aged between 25 and 34 (11.3%).

Those residing in this area

of the city are also more likely to live alone (6.6%) or
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live with non-relatives (8.0%), when compared to the
population which resided in the area during 1980.

Another

observation relates to the increased transiency as shown by
the "Lived in same house 5 years ago" category.

The

decrease by 8.3 percent from 1980, shows that this area of
the Lake View community is less stable now than it was 10
years before.

Other considerable changes can be viewed in

marital status, occupation, level of education, income and
housing value (See APPENDIX A) .
These characteristics support the fact that a younger,
single, better educated with higher disposable incomes
population has occupied the area in recent years.

The

lights at Wrigley Field and the introduction of night games
contributed to the creation of a nightlife atmosphere,
making their co-existence possible.

The development of this

type of environment attracts individuals who would depict
the characteristics exemplified by the data above.
In examining the census tract data (APPENDIX B) within
the half mile radius around Wrigley Field it becomes evident
that the tracts which are closer to Wrigley, specifically
#610, #611, #616, #617, #621 and #622, bounded by Grace,
Racine, Belmont and Halsted Avenue, support the above
assertions even more than the expanded census tract data.
Specifically, this second group of tract data (closer
to Wrigley Field) shows that the educational level of its
residents, in 1990, was higher (56.3% had a Bachelor's
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degree or higher) than the overall average of the tracts
within half a mile radius around Wrigley Field (49.7% had a
Bachelor's degree or higher).

In addition, the percent

change between 1980 and 1990, regarding the 20-24 year olds,
is higher in this second, closer zone (+ 3.6%) than in the
first more expanded zone (+ 1.2%).

Similarly, the 25-34

year olds percentage change is also higher in this closer
zone (14.4% versus 11.3%).

Also, the percentage change of

males who never married in this closer zone, between 1980
and 1990, is 16.5% compared to the 13.7% change in the more
expanded zone.

Finally, in this closer zone, the percent

change between 1980 and 1990 of females that have never been
married is 23.3% compared to the expanded zone which is
17.7% (See APPENDIX B).
Though the lights were installed in 1988, the extensive
six year coverage of the issue generated considerable
attention to the mystique and historical tradition of
Wrigley Field.

Such overwhelming coverage made Wrigley

Field an even greater landmark for Chicago, spotlighting the
community area surrounding the ballpark.

The Long Term Effect of Lights on the Community
The long term implications of the lights installation
on the community of Lake View might be more difficult to
assess.

As indicated above, night games have generated a

culture which has transformed the surrounding area into an
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entertainment hub, attractive to young professionals.

But

is it possible to hypothesize on the status of the community
twenty to thirty years from now?
Night games in stadiums always began in limited
numbers, yet, in later years, the number of night games
increased to eventually become the norm.

If night games at

Wrigley Field become the norm, then, the effect which
transportation might have on the surrounding community
should be considered.
With the increase of night games, the automobile will
become the primary source of transportation.

If that is the

case, street or surface parking will not be adequate to
support the demand.

The question then would be whether

buildings in the area remain more profitable than surface
parking.

In responding to this question Bess and Decker

(1988:71) wrote:
A typical six-flat in Wrigleyville has a current market
value of $400,000-500,000, and generates a minimum
gross income of approximately $36,000 a year. A
typical Chicago six-flat lot is 50 by 125 feet.
Adjacent to Wrigley Field, and cleared for surfaced
parking, such a lot might now generate about $25,000
per year in gross income (assuming 200 square feet per
car, valet parking, $10 per car in parking fees, and 81
games per year), but with fewer maintenance costs and
much lower taxes assessed to the "unimproved" real
estate ... Assuming that night baseball does generate
more automobile traffic, how much of this traffic can a
neighborhood tolerate before prices escalate to $20-25
per space making surf ace parking too economically
attractive to resist (pp. 70).
If this assessment is accurate, then it is possible
that in the pursuit of profit, residential properties will
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give way to potential revenue generated by parking.

That

would mean the end of a coexistence between Wrigley Field
and the surrounding community. 49
When examining current parking practices in the area
around Wrigley Field, one can arrive at the development
scenario discussed above by Bess.

Specifically, on game

days, businesses along Clark and Addison streets become
transformed into parking garages for the automobile traffic.
'Krystals Hand Car Wash' on Clark Street, stops washing cars
on game days and charges $10 for parking, promising a quick
and easy exit out of the area after the game.

One of the

attendants who was flagging cars in the car wash/garage told
me:
On game days there is demand for parking around here.
We have a business that can be a garage. Why not use
it. You can make some good bucks from that ... The
competition [for parking] is rough around here but we
do well. See from here you get on Clark and then you
go south and you are out of the congestion. That is
why this is a good place to park when you come to the
game.
Local gas stations and even the parking lots of adjacent
49

An example which could be considered to support
this hypothesis is the case of Crosley Field in Cincinnati.
It was there that the first night baseball game was played
in 1935. Crosley Field just like Wrigley Field was an urban
ballpark.
It rested within a residential community and was
well connected to the surrounding neighborhoods. A
comparison of aerial pictures depicting Crosley Field in the
early 1930's, during the 1953 All-Star game and in the
1960's, prior to its demolition, revel some interesting
findings.
In the early 1950's, many of the residential
properties began to deteriorate and by the 1960's, there was
nothing left around the ballpark but large parking lots,
similar to those found in the recently constructed suburban
style ballparks.
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fast food restaurants also become transformed into game day
parking garages.
Clearly, the future stability of Wrigleyville depends
on the ability of the local community organizations to
consider the long term implications which an increased night
game schedule could have on Lake View.

Though noise,

drunkenness, rowdiness are all concerns that affect the
daily life of the immediate residents, the reorganization of
space due to economic rationales could have wider
implications and threaten the stability of this community.

Conclusion
The installation of lights at Wrigley Field by the Cubs
in 1988 is an example of how professional franchises through
stadium development plans attempt to generate increased
revenues.

The sale of the Cubs to a corporation in 1981

adds to the dynamics of the lights issue.

The derived

income from expected, nationally broadcasted night games
makes the installation of lights a "necessity" for the new
ownership.
Wrigley Field is also positioned in a predominantly
white residential community and its strong, sustainable
response to the lights issue made the installation of lights
a difficult task for the franchise.

Concerns about

increased community problems and decreased property values,
allowed the residents to enlist the support of the local
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political leadership in the "battle."
Yet, the fear of losing the historic franchise becomes
an unthinkable possibility to most including the local
government.

The perceived economic implications take center

stage and are utilized as a rationale to apply pressure on
the anti-lights organizers.

The city becomes involved in

supporting the needs of the franchise by passing an
ordinance which allows night games at the ballpark.
In response to citizen concerns, a permit parking
program for the surrounding neighborhoods, during nights
games is approved.

Yet, that decision has helped some

businesses over others and in the process impacted the
existing economic balance within the community.

The area

around Wrigley Field becomes an entertainment center,
providing a great opportunity for restaurants, bars, clubs
and related businesses to succeed.

On the other hand, other

small businesses found that the parking permit program
discouraged many customers from visiting their shops due to
fear of parking tickets and towing.
This general culture which the lights fostered,
contributed to attracting many young professionals to the

area, since the presence of a night life atmosphere
complements their lifestyle.

The introduction of night

baseball has assisted in reorganizing this area and has
transformed life in this community.

As economic rationales

have driven the current status of this urban community, it
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is going to be the evolution of these same economies, which,
in the long term, will shape its future.

As Bess (1988:74)

indicates: " ... the character of Wrigley Field depends on the
health and well being of Wrigleyville."
The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley
Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor
Washington's death.

Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw

the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or
test their political power.

Though most Chicago aldermen

supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced
by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed later by
Mayor Sawyer, many became populists and supported the
neighborhood anti-lights campaign.

In reality, with mayoral

elections in the near future, the lights issue became an
opportunity for these politicians to place forth an early
challenge to Mayor Sawyer.

In the end, not even a

referendum proved capable of changing the will of the city
in passing a lights ordinance.

CHAPTER 9
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO SPORTS-DRIVEN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
IN THE NEAR WEST SIDE
Introduction
This chapter examines two recent attempts to construct
professional sports stadiums in Chicago's disadvantaged Near
West Side during the 1980's and into the 1990's.

The first

attempt was initiated by the Chicago Bears who proposed to
build a 75,000 seated, open-air, spectator facility.

The

second effort led to the construction of the United Center
which was completed in 1994 to host the Chicago Bulls of the
NBA and the Chicago Blackhawks of the NHL.

The United

Center is also the site of the upcoming, 1996 National
Democratic Convention.
This chapter investigates these stadium development
projects within the context of urban redevelopment.
Specifically, proponents of these stadiums perceive the
construction of these facilities as leading to the
improvement of a low-income community.

As a result, the

stadium becomes viewed as a vehicle of urban regeneration.
In this regard, this analysis outlines the political economy
of these stadium development plans while concentrating on
the response of the local community.

Specifically,

(1)

driven by increased profit possibilities, the ownership of
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these franchises identifies numerous stadium construction
proposals,

(2) community activists show themselves to be

surprisingly effective in extracting substantial, short-term
benefits in negotiations with sports team owners,

(3) the

only long term beneficiaries of these negotiations, however,
are the team owners, whose voices predominate in the
financial, political and media arenas wherein negotiation
outcomes are determined, and (4) the advancement of these
corporate interests, as expressed through sports and stadium
construction, also result in the reorganization of city
space at the physical, economic and cultural level.

The Community of the Near West Side
Like many other urban communities, the Near West Side
in Chicago has experienced the great white flight to the
suburbs.

The U.S. Census reports a decrease in local area

population since the 30's.

In addition, the sharp increase

of the African-American population, combined with the sharp
decrease of the white population, has made this area
predominately African-American.

Housing vacancies,

exacerbated by the urban renewal projects of the 1960's and
1970's, have also increased over the years.
Prior to the 1960's, land had become available for the
construction of the Henry Horner Homes, a high-rise public
housing development.

Later, major developments such as the

University of Illinois at Chicago, Malcolm X College and the
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expansion of the nearby Medical Center also proved to impact
the Near West Side.

The construction of the University of

Illinois at Chicago in the 1960's displaced many residents,
and more recently, the elimination of historic Maxwell
Street transformed part of this community area.
In describing its own community, a publication by The
Interfaith Organizing Project (IOP)

(1992:1), a local

community organization, notes:
Like many inner-city neighborhoods, [the Near West
Side] is short on resources, but long on talent and
potential ... Chicago's West side experienced a massive
flight of capital and resources in the late 1960s and
1970s; the main shopping district had been tortured in
the 1968 uprisings following the death of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., and high-paying factory jobs soon
relocated to the suburbs or Sun Belt.
The same publication addresses the economic impact of
these changes on the community: "Much of the surrounding
areas suffered from chronic dis-investment--banks refused to
lend money, insurers stopped underwriting properties and
"slumlords" were more common than not"

(pp. 20) .

Often, a socially, politically, economically and
physically disorganized community will be viewed by
developers as an easy place to assert their agenda.

Thus, a

community like the Near West Side which experiences these
problems becomes an open target of urban development
programs driven by corporate interests.

Though, in this

case, government officials, stadium developers and local
community representatives all agree that some form of
revitalization is needed, the implementation method of any
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proposed stadium development plans, as well as the economic
and social outcomes of these plans, are topics of contention
among these groups.
Though it was in 1989 that the ownership of the Chicago
Stadium, Bulls and Blackhawks officially expressed their
interest in the construction of a new arena in the area,
this was not the first time that this community had been
exposed to such plans.

A few years earlier, the Chicago

Bears viewed the Near West Side as the "natural choice" for
a large football stadium.

The Near West Side and the Chicago Bears
After winning the Superbowl in 1986, the Chicago Bears
of the NFL expressed interest in moving to a new sports
facility.

This interest in a new stadium was tied to the

lack of an "appropriate number" of skyboxes at Soldier Field
and to the fact that 20 percent of the revenues raised by
the 60 skyboxes in that facility went to its owner and
operator, the Chicago Park District.

The Bears estimated

that 240 skyboxes at a new stadium would generate
substantial income for the team.

These economic rationales

served as the driving force behind the search for a new
site.

The First Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side
The University of Illinois at Chicago and Rush-
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Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, both major
landowners on the Near West Side, responding to the Bears'
quest for a stadium site, began to investigate the
possibility of bringing the team to the area.

In January of

1987, then Governor James Thompson, announced his support
for the west side site over a lakefront site (the lakefront
site had received wide opposition from environmental groups)
(Bayard, 1987) .

Other sites under consideration by the

stadium committee of the Metropolitan Planning Council
included the West Loop area, the railroad yard area south of
Roosevelt Road, suburban Arlington Heights, McCormick West
and the Illinois Central Railyards west of Soldier Field.
Mayor Washington also appointed a Stadium Review Committee
to make site recommendations.

William Wirtz, owner of the

Chicago Stadium on the Near West Side and of the Chicago
Blackhawks, expressed an interest in the proposed site.

In

the end, the plan called for the hospital, the university,
the Bears and Wirtz to develop a larger complex which would
include linking an "Olympic-class" sports medicine and
education facility to a new football field and a refurbished
Chicago Stadium.

The Chicago Bears also required the plan

include the construction of 15,000 parking spaces, 72,00078,000 stadium seats and 240 skyboxes.
Promoters of the Near West Side site contended it would
"yield far more benefits to the city in terms of jobs and
urban redevelopment than would any of the others under
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consideration for the new football stadium"

(Mccarron,

1987a) and "it would be hard to find a neighborhood more in
need of such help"

(Reardon, 1987) .

The promoters also

predicted that the plan would receive the support of local
political representatives.
Other observers were not so optimistic.

A report by

The Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and
Community Development (Steinhoff, 1988), identified four
types of economic benefits as a result of a new Near West
Side stadium: construction, operating, real estate and
taxes.

Though this report concluded that over the first ten

years the new stadium would attract $364.9 million to the
city of Chicago, a net increase of $217.8 million from the
economic benefits generated by Soldier Field, it also noted
that:
.. for the stadium to act as a catalyst, the money that
it generates must be made available for neighborhood
development (Steinhoff, 1988:24).
and
... unfortunately, very little of the net increases in
benefits are easily accessible for the purpose of
neighborhood development. Less than a tenth of the
benefits would flow to the public sector, the
traditional agents for revitalizing depressed
neighborhoods ... furthermore, Chicago taxpayers could
loose up to $23 million if the Chicago Park District
lets the Bears out of their lease at Soldier Field
(Steinhoff, 1988:24-25).
Speaking more favorably for this plan, The Metropolitan
Planning Council, a civic group, noted in its preliminary
report that a Near West Side sports complex has "the
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potential for numerous neighborhood and citywide benefits"
(Mccarron, 1987b) .

Even though 300 housing units would be

demolished, the possibility for replacements made it an
attractive option amongst sponsors of the proposal.

The

Near West Side site became more and more attractive because
of the limited infrastructural costs (less than $10 million)
and was the final recommendation of the Stadium Site
Selection Committee (Goff, 1987).

Community Response to the First Football Stadium Plans
As local newspapers began to print front page articles
supporting the appropriateness of this plan, Mayor
Washington became increasingly concerned about the eventual
fate of the local community.

Would the proposed plans serve

as a way to expand the downtown area, thus pushing the local
community further west?

Would the residents have a voice in

the negotiations?
The local community, led by the Interfaith Organizing
Project (!OP), a coalition of clergy and lay-persons founded
in November of 1985, questioned this form of urban
redevelopment.

They viewed the stadium proposal as a "land

grab" by white developers, and as a case where the poor
would lose out to the wealthy downtown interests.
The goal of this community organization was to
redevelop these neighborhoods on the west side of the city
independent of a sports stadium construction.

Specifically,
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the IOP plan included the construction of 2,000 housing
units over a 10 year period.

These units would fill in the

void created by vacant lots.

They could be apartment

buildings, townhouse developments and/or single family
structures.

Redevelopment of the commercial establishments

along Madison Street was also included in the plan, as was
the introduction of community parks.

These parks ranged

from small parks aimed at eliminating current vacancies, to
larger, centrally located developments (Mccarron and
Thornton, 1987) .
The IOP also claimed that the proposed stadium plans
would displace 328 families and approximately 1,000-1,500
low income and elderly residents.

Rev. Arthur Griffin, a

leader of the group, called the stadium a "playground for
the wealthy in the suburbs"

(Wilson, 1987) .

Pastors of

numerous churches in the area attempted, in Sunday sermons,
to engage the local residents in the proposed developments,
outlining their potential effect on the local community.
Some even claimed that these plans would include the
destruction of the local churches which have been there for
years.

Since a large portion of the membership of these

churches resided outside this community, game traffic on
Sundays could pose a direct threat on the viability of these
congregations.

At the same time, local pastors saw no

"real" economic development arising from these plans.

Rev.

Griffin noted: "· .. we want this neighborhood developed in a
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way that it is in conjunction with the aspirations and the
dreams and hopes of the people of this community" and "we
want some jobs that will have some significance, some jobs
that will allow someone to feed a family"

(Wilson, 1987)

Others echoed these concerns, and according to Trimina
O'Connor, a member of the IOP: "We don't want members of the
neighborhood's churches and schools displaced so we can
become a service heaven for the rich"

(Wilson, 1987) .

The media responded to the position of the local
community as short sighted.

Front page headlines appeared

in the Chicago Tribune during early September of 1988
entitled: "Chicago on Hold: The New Politics of Poverty."
The articles criticized Mayor Washington's "open door"
policy to neighborhoods which resulted in the emergence of
community leaders like the IOP's Gates and Griffin.

The

series viewed these developments as "part of a growing
political movement ... maintaining political and social
control not by improving the lot of the poor, but by
posturing against development"

(IOP, 1992).

The Chicago

Tribune also reported in those same articles that the
stadium would help revitalize the community.
Mike Royko (1987), a newspaper columnist wrote about
the community response in the Near West Side:
At most, about 330 families would be moved [as a result
of the stadium plans in the Near West Side]
And the
homes they'd be leaving are, for the most part, a bunch
of dumps. Under the new plan, new housing in the same
general area would be built, and they'd move into it.
There would be new parks, playlots and shopping
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clusters.
It appears, then, that they're angry because
they will be asked to leave beat-out old buildings and
move into superior modern housing in an upgraded
community. The solution to that problem appears
obvious ... just build some new dumps and maybe they'll
be happy.
The Midwest Community Council, the oldest community
organization on the Near West Side was more positive about
the proposal than the IOP.

Directed by its longtime leader

Nancy Jefferson, a strong supporter of Mayor Washington
during his election, this organization advocated for a
stadium development plan only if the local community were to
be involved in its planning.

According to Jefferson (Thomas

and Johnson, 1987) :
I am excited about this prospect.
It could mean a
redevelopment of the area that has not happened in 40
years.
It means the creation of an economic base for
jobs. The spillout from the stadium could create a
safe, attractive and good community.
And (Wilson and Mccarron, 1987) :
It [stadium] has to be carefully planned so that it
does not impose on the community and so that it does
not replace the community.
The community found itself divided on the issue and
newly elected alderman Seneather Butler of the 27th Ward
summed up community opinion on the proposed stadium as
follows:
One group says they don't want the stadium.
group is saying 'tear the projects down-it's
way we will get out of poverty,' and another
saying that it wants the stadium, but not on
West Side (Wilson and Mccarron, 1987) .

Another
the only
group is
the Near

A report investigating the potential link between
economic benefits and the residents of the Near West Side
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supported the position taken by the !OP (Steinhoff, 1987).
This report concluded that (1) only 2 percent of the
temporary jobs created by the construction of the facility
(30 jobs) would go to the residents and those hired from
within the community would be likely to earn less due to
discrimination in the construction industry,

(2) one-third

of the permanent jobs created (330 jobs), would go to local
residents but they would also be low paying,

(3) no evidence

supports the notion that a sports center would increase the
pace or scope of community development,

(4)

increased

spending on the Near West Side will not benefit the local
residents since, due to the fact that 84 percent of the
property and 86 percent of the privately owned rental units
are owned by individuals residing outside the local zip
code, new money will leave the area,

(5) displacement is a

serious threat since it is often likely to follow large
capital investments and physical improvements, especially
when the majority of local residents are for the most part
unable to finance a home and cannot afford to rent an
apartment.

Specifically, according to a report prepared by

the Architectural Firm of Perkins and Will (1987),
commissioned by Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center,
only 1.5 percent of the existing households on the Near West
Side could afford to finance a home and only 11.2 percent of
existing rental households could afford to rent an
apartment,

(6) since the strength of the local economy is in
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manufacturing, marketing local strengths and tying them to
job training programs could prove far more beneficial than
investment into a sports center, and (7) efforts to
revitalize the community should be made at the micro level
(Steinhoff, 1987).
The proposed sports complex never materialized.
Community dissatisfaction and difficulties with the finance
of this large project, redirected the Bears' attention to a
new stadium development proposal.

The Second Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side
In the Fall of 1987, the City and Mccaskey agreed to
work together in building the stadium for the Chicago Bears,
independent of any association with the previously proposed
"complex plan."

The agreement came after the city allowed

new skyboxes at Soldier Field, a plan which, according to
Robert Mier, assistant to the mayor for development and
planning,

"decompresses the intense time pressure of the

construction schedule ... And it helps the Bears develop their
skybox market"

(Mccarron, 1987c).

Eventually, two possible stadium plans were introduced
within the same site area on the Near West Side.

The first

alternative would displace 475 families and provide 6,200
parking spaces, while the second would displace 400 families
and yield 5,400 spaces for parking (Mccarron, 1988c).
The Bears sought $90 million in city and state funds to
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help finance their privately held stadium.

It was during

this time that the Chicago White Sox threatened to leave
Chicago unless the city and the state provided the franchise
with a new stadium.

Congressman Dan Rostenkowski introduced

a bill in Washington that would grant the City of Chicago
$250 million in bonding authority on behalf of stadium
development for the Bears and the White Sox on the Near West
Side.

The city also sought to generate additional funding

for these projects and requested approximately $30 million
from the state.
In May of 1988, Governor Thompson proposed the
construction of a new ballpark for the White Sox on the Near
West Side to take advantage of the infrastructural
development offered to the Chicago Bears.

This plan was

supported by State Senator William Marovitz (D-Chicago)
whose proposal claimed to save $50 million in infrastructure
costs and it would account for no additional displacement.
However, according to the IOP, this twin-stadium plan would
displace half the area community.

Though this plan received

the support of the local papers, the IOP continued to
challenge its assumptions.

The residents participated in

numerous marches and protests.

They attended community

meetings with city officials and held mock-funerals of their
community.

Their goal was to communicate to the city that

these stadium development proposals would only displace the
poor so that the wealthy could increase their profits.
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Aaron Freeman (1988), a political satirist in Chicago,
suggested in a commentary that locals should be allowed to
stay in the skyboxes during the week and make them available
for the wealthy on Sundays.

He wrote:

The city and the stadium developers should let the poor
people who will be made homeless by the stadium live in
its skyboxes six days a week. Of course on Sunday
afternoons they'd have to get the hell out so that the
bankers and commodities traders and such can have the
boxes to drink, cheer and vomit in.
. .. If you've ever
been in one of these skyboxes you know there are far
worse places to live. Skyboxes have color TV's,
refrigerators, wet bars, even balconies so that fans
can tan in nice weather. With a Murphy bed thrown in,
a lot of them could rent as studio apartments or at
least luxury housing projects.
In the end, the construction of a Bears' stadium in the
Near West Side did not occur.
cited:

The following reasons can be

(1) the city was unable to silence the IOP and the

concerns of the local community.

Convincing the local

constituency of the positive economic outcomes which the
stadium development could provide would have made the
approval of the site quicker and easier,

(2) higher interest

rates threatened the Bears financing agreement,

(3) Chicago

Stadium owner Wirtz, tried to sabotage the proposal.

Even

though an editorial by the Crain's Chicago Business (October
17, 1988c, p. 10) urged Wirtz to cooperate with Mccaskey
since a collaboration "would help stabilize West Side
residential neighborhoods and prime the pump of economic
development", the two failed to reach an agreement over
parking revenues on Wirtz-owned land, and (4) the lack of
community-wide support for the stadium development plan and
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the uncertainty of the Rostenkowski efforts in Washington to
raise money, made the state legislators indifferent to
advancing the proposal and approving the $30 million funding
requested by the city.

The Near West Side and the United Center
As part of an intense, profit-oriented era by
professional teams, many sport organizations have attempted
to reconstruct their facilities in order to maximize
profits.

Many owners recognize that the old facilities are

not adequate in a new era of increased player salaries and
potential income which can be generated from luxury seating,
restaurants, concessions, increased ticket prices, etc.
Moving the team into a new facility would increase general
revenue, thus, increasing profit (Quirk and Fort, 1992).
Because it lacked skyboxes, the Chicago Stadium, which
opened in 1929, had a limited capability to generate
additional revenue.

As early as 1988, Bill Wirtz described

that facility as "economically obsolete" and according to a
source close to the owner: "There comes a point when you
realize that you could hurt the health of the franchise by
not making a move.

The numbers right now don't favor

keeping things the way they are"

(Kass, 1988h).

Steve

Scanwald, marketing head for the Chicago Bulls explains the
reasons that courtside seats at the Chicago Stadium, though
originally priced at $35 were going for $300: "It's supply
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and demand, the most simple and basic law of economics.
It's the primary economic principle upon which this country
was founded.

And, of course, there are increased costs."

The escalating player salaries, according to Scanwald, have
been critical to the building of the new stadium:
It's one of the things [paying the high salaries to
compete for a championship] that motivated us to build
the United Center, to be sure we can compete
economically with the other 26 teams ... The first
objective is to win the championship. The second
objective is if we can at the same time break even or
even make some money. No bones about it that we want
to operate at a profit" (Markus, 1994).
Unmistakably, it was the search for new profit sources that
prompted the owners of the Bulls and Blackhawks to build a
new stadium (Klein, 1994).
In August of 1988, a few months after the second
proposal for a Bears' stadium had fallen through, Wirtz
investigated the possibility of a new basketball and hockey
arena across the street from the Chicago Stadium.

This

facility would be privately financed from revenue generated
by the luxury skyboxes and advertising sources.

The

proposed 180 skyboxes in that facility would range in price
from $50,000 to $120,000 a year.

Though financing for the

facility would come from private sources, city and state
assistance for public works improvements would be needed.

Community and stadium developers relations
After observing the conflict between the local
community and Mccaskey on the proposed construction of a
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football stadium for the Chicago Bears, Jerry Reinsdorf,
owner of the Bulls, said regarding his approach to the
building of the indoor arena (!OP, 1992:3):
... we were determined not to do battle with the
community. That is what Mike Mccaskey did, and he
lost. One person can never win these battles-everyone
has to get something. Years ago, it was common for
developers to come into a neighborhood with plans and
blueprints, but times have changed. We wanted to get
this project moving and be a good neighbor; it's just
good business.
The community also took a different approach to the proposed
basketball and hockey facility.

According to a community

organizer: "This second time around we wanted to use the
opportunity to get something out of it"

(Schmich, 1992).

This new approach by the developers, however, did not
mean that they would be willing to readily provide community
development funds and off er fair compensation to those
displaced by this project.

The Stadium Joint Venture,

organized by Wirtz and Reinsdorf, repeatedly attempted in
January and May of 1990, to buy the homes standing in the
way of their development at low cost ($35,000 - considerably
lower than the value of redevelopment) .
Mayor Daley's position also proved to be different from
the stance which politicians had previously taken.

His

approach gave more leverage to the local community since
according to Daley: "What this community needs most is jobs
and economic development, but not at the expense of homes
and neighborhoods"

(Reardon, 199lb).

In the end, 40 homes

were torn down to make room for the new sports facility
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(Frank, 1992).
For the stadium developers this project allowed for
local economic and social growth.

As Gates noted to me:

In one of our meetings, a representative from the
Stadium Joint Venture organization said: If you want to
make money (referring to the community) you stand in
the way of progress. I was outraged. This is
ridiculous. They were undermining our intelligence.
Like we do not know what is best for our community.
See, there comes an outsider to tell you what to do.
These were some of the things we had to deal with.
Ignorance and being viewed as inferior ... You see that
is the problem. Others want to tell you what is best
for you. Our approach was that we wanted, the
community that is, to define our own destiny. We want
to make the decisions as to what is best for us. Why?
Because we live here, we are the ones to be impacted by
the new construction, the traffic and all that.
That's
why.
Though the Stadium Joint Venture and the community
representatives had different perspectives on the way "real"
development should occur on the Near West Side, the two
groups attempted to work out their differences.

As part of

these negotiations, the community residents proved capable
of asserting their commitment to the well-being of those
directly affected by displacement, while extracting from the
developers short-term community benefits.

Community Response to the United Center Development Plans
Members of the !OP involved in representing the local
community, identified the case of the New Comiskey Park
development as one where the developers did not consider the
well-being of the South Armour Square community.

For them,

the Comiskey Park case served as an example of a situation
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to be avoided.

It was noted to me by an IOP member:

We looked at what had happened on the south side. When
they wanted to build that stadium they told the
residents who were to be dislocated that they would
place them into temporary housing, and then move them
into their newly constructed homes.
In the meantime,
the developers began the demolition of their homes, and
went along with the development of the ballpark. This
temporary replacement housing proved to be more than
temporary, since the people stayed there for .. hm .. , I
think over a year (thinking) ... well it was actually
more than a year, about a year and a half. And, after
all that, their so called "new housing" was not what
you would have expected. The reason why is because
they (the residents) were taken over by the developers.
This is not what we wanted to happen here.
Jill, a member of the !OP also remarked:
Those being moved from their homes wanted to stay
together in their new neighborhood. They had lived
next to each other for years. They raised their
children together, they had developed close ties, which
did not want to break because of the stadium
construction. Some of the people to be moved had lived
there for 30 and 40 years.
Reinsdorf was also surprised by the strong commitment
of the local residents to stay in their neighborhood.

In a

newspaper account, he responded about those who asked for
new homes in the neighborhood:
I was suspicious at first that they were trying to line
their pockets.
. .. I learned that people there are
proud of their community and want to stay there.
I
thought most of the people whose houses would be taken
would want cash.
I was surprised how many just wanted
new homes in their neighborhoods (Schmich, 1992) .
During the negotiations with the Stadium Joint Venture,
the press continued to depict the efforts of the community
and those in leadership positions as counter-productive to
the well-being of the general area.
were criticized by the media.

Both Gates and Griffin

Yet, for the community
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leaders negotiations with the developers could prove an
opportunity from which the Near West Side could benefit.
Gates noted to me:
One of the important issues was for us to understand
their tactics. They said to us during the negotiations
for the United Center: Well, you know this area is
devastated, the land is worth nothing, so you should
let it go. You cannot tell me that the land is
worthless, that there is no value to the land, when you
are doing everything in your power to acquire it. You
see what I mean, a piece of land which you want is not
valueless, it is worth something; that is why you want
it ... We also knew that they were going to get their
stadium, because they got the resources. That
eventually they were going to succeed. And let me tell
you, we were not against the stadium. We wanted to
make sure that the community would benefit from it and
that the people displaced would not get screwed in the
process. That's all.
How did they (the Stadium Joint Venture) respond?
They were surprised. They did not expect such a
response. They thought: here is an area which is
devastated, we should have no problem getting what we
want through.
The community presented its concerns to stadium owners in
specific terms.

Gates, who played a key role in the

negotiations, told me about the strategy:
You do not want to make it a social issue.
Frame it in
the context of a business deal, keep the social out of
it. These people do not care about the community.
They want to get something from us. Well let's deal,
we'll give you what you want, if you give us A., B.,
C., etc ...
This approach afforded the community an opportunity to carry
forward their plan as they negotiated with the stadium
developers.
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The Actual Product: The United Center
In the end, 12 national and international lending
institutions came together to provide the funding for the
United Center.

Those included Fuji Bank Ltd., which lead

seven Japanese institutions, Westpac Banking Corp., of
Australia, Banque Paribas of France and three local-black
owned banks: Seaway National Bank, Drexel National Bank and
Independence Bank of Chicago made up the syndicate (Reardon,
1992).

The City also agreed to cooperate on land

acquisition, provide $3.2 million for infrastructure
improvements, offer a 40 percent break on amusements taxes
and apply a 4 percent tax to 60 percent of the 216 skybox
income (Kass, 1991).
This $175 million facility would assist the ownership
and management of these two Chicago professional teams
(Bulls and Blackhawks) in achieving their goals.

To place

the size of this new structure into perspective, the United
Center surrounds 1 million square feet of space compared to
the 275,000 square feet which were available in the Chicago
Stadium.

Its large structure provided ample flexibility in

building facilities
etc) .

(i.e. luxury skyboxes, restaurants,

There are 216 luxury boxes in three levels which are

priced from $55,000 to $175,000 a year.

All of these luxury

boxes were rented well before the opening of the facility.
They contribute over $25 million to the Bulls and Blackhawks
annually.
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The Community Agreement with the Stadium Developers
The Stadium Joint Venture and the community of the Near
West Side eventually came to an agreement about the
construction of a new sports arena in the area.

The IOP

served as the negotiating arm of the community and the
various terms of this agreement are outlined below (IOP,
1992 :33-34):
(1)

The Stadium Joint Venture will build replacement

housing for all resident homeowners.

All the houses must be

built before the homeowners will vacate their present homes.
Construction of the new stadium will begin after the
replacement housing is built and residents are resettled.
(2)

The replacement homes will be constructed in the

community-designated "Better Alternative Area"- this area
extends from Darnen to Western Avenue, and from Washington
Boulevard to the Eisenhower Expressway.
(3)

Substantial cash values were set for the residents'

homes.

Those wishing to receive cash will secure fair

market value of their property, plus $30,000; or $75,000 for
a single-family home; 100,000 for a duplex; or $130,000 for
a triplex.
(4)

Rental tenants will be compensated according to the

national standard as outlined by HUD.

This is $6,000 per

unit.
(5)

The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a $600,000, no

interest loan to IOP to develop 75 "for sale" homes.
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(6)

The !OP could, if necessary, enjoin construction of the

stadium if the Stadium Joint Venture fails to live up to its
agreement.

The Stadium Joint Venture also agreed to

compensate !OP for attorney's fees and associated costs if
litigation is pursued.
(7)

The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a subsidy to

each resettled resident homeowner for real estate taxes that
were attributed to increased property tax assessments.
(8)

Near the site of the new housing, a park will be built

linking Touhy, Herbert Park and land adjoining Creiger High
School.
(9)

The Stadium Joint Venture agrees not to acquire any

land west of Darnen, in the Better Alternative Area.
However, the Stadium Joint Venture could exercise an option
to acquire one block in this area, only if the end result
was a mutually-agreeable, commercial development.
(10) A new public library will be built on Madison Street in
the Better Alternative Area.
(11) On stadium-owned land, free parking will be provided
for affected churches.
(12) The city will be lobbied by both sides to fund a
construction trade program at Malcolm X College.
(13) The Stadium Joint Venture agrees that there will be no
simultaneous events in the new and old stadiums.
(14) !OP recognizes the Stadium Joint Venture's help in reopening Mile Square Health Center [in 1991, the Stadium
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Joint Venture gave the clinic a $75,000 grant to meet its
payroll] .
It becomes clear from the above terms that the
community of the Near West Side was successful in receiving
various community benefits.

Yet, these contributions by the

stadium developers will prove limited, since in the longterm, this community will experience additional private and
public investment with the potential of transforming the
racial and economic composition of the area.

The Impact on the Community
As previously agreed between the !OP and the Stadium
Joint Venture, the construction of replacement homes was
completed prior to the development of the United Center.
Assistance was also provided by the Reinsdorf-Wirtz group to
finance 75 two-flats and single family homes for other low
and moderate income community residents.

In addition, a

contribution of $80,000 was made to Malcolm X College as
part of a four year scholarship fund.

The Bulls' charity,

Charitabulls, donated $50,000 to the computer center of the
nearby Mabel Manning Library.

The library was named after

Mabel Manning, who lived in the community for many years and
was involved with the "stadium wars."

Through these and

other programs, the ownership of the United Center responded
to many of its financial commitments toward the local
community.
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In recent months the ownership of the facility has
looked beyond the walls of the United Center, interested in
expanding local economic growth.

In September of 1994, the

Bulls donated $4 million to build a recreation and
educational facility.

More recently, the Bulls announced

that a $375,000 contribution would be utilized to support
the Chicago Park District's Midnight Basketball League.
Finally, in February of 1995, officials of the United Center
announced an economic development program aimed at providing
$1 million for new business and job growth initiatives to
the local area.

The program would be available to

entrepreneurs to start or expand services in the area,
within the perimeters of Ashland Avenue, the Eisenhower
Expressway, Western Avenue and Lake Street (Barron, 1995)
Overall, it is estimated that approximately $10 million has
been invested in the Near West Side by the stadium
developers.
Recent plans in the area have also included the
rehabilitation of 403 middle income units at the Henry
Horner Homes, the public housing projects in the area.
Under the five phase plan (to be completed by the year
2001) , a number of new units would replace the 50 percent
current vacancy.

According to this project, the height of

these structures will decrease and the potential for the
complete demolition of eight of those buildings is currently
under review (Ihejirika, 1995) .
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These developments have been welcomed by the IOP and
local community leaders.

Ernest Gates told me that in the

case of the United Center, because of the overwhelming
response and mobilization of the residents, the local
community got the most out of the final arrangements.
According to Gates: "The community was so successful in
getting much of what it wanted that inquiries are coming in
from people in cities in the U.S. and abroad who want to
know the West Siders' technique"

(Frank, 1992) .

And,

according The Interfaith Organizing Project (1992:26): "The
agreement reached between the Near West Side community and
the Stadium Joint Venture was historic.

A largely black and

low-income community was able to turn the tide of "urban
renewal" into a useful catalyst for neighborhood based,
redevelopment"

(pp. 26).

At the same time some important questions persist when
considering the future of those residing on the Near West
Side.

Are these recent developments signs of the local

community's success?

Will the benefits of these economic

investments belong to its current residents?

Is this the

beginning of a massive displacement and gentrification
process which will attract residents of different
racial/ethnic and socioeconomic status to the area?

Or,

will the Near West Side in Chicago become an expansion of
the downtown area, providing numerous support services to
those who work and live there?

In this regard, poverty
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becomes functional within the urban environment since it
provides the population needed to be displaced for new
development (Gans, 1971).
The efforts of the local community were aimed at
enhancing economic development through community organizing.
Specifically, the focus was to solve the immediate community
concerns in exchange for providing support to the prof it
oriented agenda of the stadium developers.

Organizers were

successful in mobilizing the residents by directing their
energies to the adversarial relationship between the
developers and the community.

Yet, the nature of the

economic development as advocated by the local leadership
has been short term and incapable of becoming
institutionalized.
The area east of the United Center has been the one to
experienced considerable redevelopment.

The government has

invested over $13 million in streets improvements for the
new stadium (Reardon, 1991b) and additional spending in
beautification programs have recently occurred.

These

public investments will ensure that the upcoming 1996
national Democratic convention becomes an opportunity for
the city to showcase itself to the rest of the nation.
Under this scenario, the United Center development serves as
a "buffer", a physical boundary, intended to keep the
"unwanted" to the west.

If that is the case, the

construction of this stadium becomes more than a business
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venture and a place for fans to cheer and jeer.

The stadium

becomes a tool for urban redevelopment, capable of fueling
the expansion of downtown Chicago westwards, reshaping in
its way the existing urban terrain.
This "redevelopment" supports the notion that as
central cities, partly due to the suburbanization movement
after WWII, lost jobs to the emerging structures of the
periphery, and must refocus and develop a new economic
function for themselves.

Judd (1995) notes that the efforts

on the part of cities across America to redefine themselves
and invest in the creation of the central city center as a
place of tourism, conventions and sports are a part of this
reorganization.

Connecting the revitalization of the Near

West Side to large-scale capital investment projects such as
the stadium projects discussed in this chapter can have
broader implications.

These forms of investment, due to

their proximity to the downtown area, could not only alter
the local community but also shape the cultural character of
the city itself.

Conclusion
The case of the Near West Side in Chicago is a case of
an urban, economically devastated community which has become
exposed to various urban renewal programs orchestrated
during the last few decades.

In addition, the community has

been exposed to the corporatization and capitalism of
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professional sports.

An

investigation of the recent

political economy of sports shows that place has
increasingly become an integral part in the operations of a
professional franchise.

For the owners of professional

teams such as the Chicago Bears, Bulls and the Blackhawks,
place has become a critical means of production.

It is

space (the stadium), which provides the capitalist with an
opportunity to expand capital and enlarge profit.

Thus,

selling entertainment through the use of space becomes
vital.

The construction of luxury boxes provides privacy,

good viewing of the game and an array of personal benefits
(i.e., cocktails, dinner, etc.,), all aimed at a better
entertainment experience.

These are the forces which make

the construction of the United Center a "necessity."
We can also see that the existing socioeconomic and
political conditions are supportive of this endeavor.
Specifically,

(1) the local and state governments support

the idea of stadium development by providing infrastructural
development funds and various tax-benefits and,

(2) the

economically depressed area makes the construct of the
facility easier, since such community is perceived to be
weak and more willing to embrace economic development
opportunities (Rubin and Rubin, 1987) .
The response of the community to this project is
critical.

Many of the members of the IOP proudly discussed

their success in their battle with "Goliath."

The ongoing
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services which the United Center provides to the community
are very different when compared to other past urban
development projects in that area.

This sports facility,

provides very little to the community after its
construction.

According to an informant: "· .. it is [United

Center] a free standing, money making structure which will
be there for many years and after its construction, has
nothing to offer to this community."
The stadium development plans lasted for over six
years.

The exchanges between the developers and the local

organizers, during those years, can be divided into two
distinct historical eras:

(1) the Chicago Bears' stadium

proposal and its eventual defeat (mid to late 1980's), and
(2) the United Center proposal and the eventual construction
of this facility (late 1980's and early 1990's).
and who lost?

Who won

It is clear that during the Mccaskey era, the

community succeeded, partly because of its actions and
partly because of the inability of the developers to
generate adequate funding.

The outcomes of the "second

battle" with Wirtz and Reinsdorf have yet to be determined
but could include the expansion of the city core.
The corporate drive of sports for profits resulted in
the construction of the United Center on the Near West Side
of Chicago.

A poor, African-American community was capable

of responding to these urban projects with courage and
strength.

Yet, the stadium developers' investments are the
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beginning of additional investment which will reorganize
this part of the city.

In the end, stadium development

becomes not only a vehicle for the physical reorganization
of urban space but also a means of reshaping the social,
economic and cultural fabric of this community.

CHAPTER 10
THREE STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THREE URBAN COMMUNITIES:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the three
case studies presented above at two different levels.
First, the chapter examines the communities' responses to
the proposed stadium plans.

How did each community attempt

to resist the proposed plans?
and/or differences?

What were the similarities

What factors were critical as these

communities attempted to negotiate with the stadium
developers?

In this regard, the chapter concludes that race

and class, local political influence, internal divisions,
occupancy status, the media, political circumstances, and
the imposition of state government, proved to have an
influence on these community responses.
Second, this chapter investigates the community effects
of these stadium development plans.

What are the

similarities and/or differences in the outcomes following
the completion of the new Comiskey Park, the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field and the construction of the United
Center?

What might be the short and/or long term effect of

the urban development projects on these three areas?
The chapter concludes with a comparison of the role
313
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which the government played in these developments.
Conclusions then are drawn regarding the relationship
between government and private enterprise within the urban
environment, as exemplified through stadiums.

Finally, the

role of these urban social movements is addressed.

Community Response to the Stadium Development Plans
The responses of South Armour Square, Lake View and
Near West Side communities to the proposed stadium
development plans differed.

For example, the Lake View

residents sought to altogether halt the installation of
lights at Wrigley Field, whereas the Near West Side
residents viewed the construction of an indoor sports arena
as an opportunity for urban redevelopment.
In order to compare the community effects of these
stadium development plans on the urban environment, a
consideration of the social, political and economic
organization of these communities is essential.

The

composition of these communities will determine:

(1) the way

the government and the stadium developers perceived the
community concerns,

(2) the extent of community inclusion in

the negotiations, and (3) the duration and effectiveness of
the community opposition to the proposed plans.
Since community response and effects are interrelated,
an understanding of these variations proves fundamental.
For example, race played an important role in the
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communities responses and consequently in the community
effect.

The success of the Lake View community in

developing a viable and comprehensive program to address the
effects of night games at Wrigley Field, and the inability
of the South Armour Square residents to enlist on-going
government support for their community, is partly due to the
racial composition of these communities.

Yet, what proves

consistent when examining the resident reaction to these
stadium plans, is that all three of these communities viewed
these projects as cases where the corporate interests of the
wealthy came in conflict with the well-being of the
powerless residents.

Power proves central to these

community-based, urban resistance movements.
Following, I identify some of the critical factors
which were integral as these communities responded to the
stadium development plans.

However, it is important to note

that all these factors operate together, they are
interconnected, influencing the community organization, and
thus, the community response.
Race and Class
Race and class proved critically important when
comparing these community-based, urban, stadium resistance
movements.

Both the South Armour Square and Near West Side

community residents involved in the "stadium battles" were
African-American, whereas the residents in Lake View were
ethnic European.

Similarly, the incomes of these groups
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varied.

The south and west side residents were less

affluent than their north side counterparts.
The government and the stadium developers perceived
these communities differently in the negotiation processes.
Because of their race and class position, the community
residents from South Armour Square and the Near West Side
were viewed as groups standing in the way of urban
development and progress.

On the other hand, the concerns

of the Lake View residents were identified to be very
legitimate, and worthy of serious consideration.

As a

result of these perceptions, the ability of the AfricanAmerican community in South Armour Square to effectively
oppose the construction of the new Comiskey Park and more
importantly, ensure that the relocation plans were
responsive to all of its residents failed.
O'Connell, involved in the new Comiskey Park
development communicated to me how the local residents
perceived the developments on the south side, and how race
played an important role.

She noted:

I was very mad when I talked to people about stadium
issues in Chicago. Automatically, everyone assumed
that I was talking about the Cubs. People in Chicago
were mostly aware of the lights situation at Wrigley
Field. Here we have a community on the verge of
displacement, and people in Chicago were not talking
about it. Yet, the lights issue at Wrigley Field
received all the media coverage. Everybody knew about
the Cubs.
I am sure that race played an important role
here. We were more aware of the events affecting a
white community than we were about the events affecting
a black community.
People also viewed the new Comiskey
development as something good for South Armour Square.
I don't think that this is a fair assessment.
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Because of these differences, the concerns of the
predominantly African American residents of the South Armour
Square, following the construction of the new Comiskey Park,
did not receive the extensive attention which the Lake View
residents generated.

Specifically, the Neighborhood

Protection Plan in Lake View has proven effective, however,
such plan has been instituted in neither the South Armour,
nor the Near West Side case.
Race continued to play a role when the residents of the
South Armour Square community were unable to enlist the
support of their neighboring white communities.

The sharp

racial divisions did not provide these residents with an
opportunity to build a coalition which would have proven
extremely helpful in the negotiations with the government
and the developers.
Finally, it was also proven in this case that it was
much easier for the government to directly remove, poor
minority residents, than it would have been to remove
middle-class or wealthy individuals who are white.

The

various social, political and economic power which these
groups exemplify contributes to these variations.
Local political influence
Though these communities employed many similar tactics
to influence the stadium development plans, in the end,
involvement in the political process proved critical.

A

comparison of the three communities' organizing efforts,
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shows that the advocacy of their aldermen to City Hall
varied.

Specifically, the Lake View alderman was actively

involved as the community attempted to stop the installation
of lights at Wrigley Field.

According to Mccarron (1987e)

Meetings about lights at Wrigley Field are typically
heralded by printed agendas and press releases; emceed
by a professional mediator hired by the city; attended
by Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th), two state
representatives, two state senators, the city's
commissioner of planning; covered by reporters from The
Tribune, the Sun-Times, the Lake View Booster and
Channels 2, 5, 7 and 9.
Although the Near West Side's local alderman engaged in
the stadium issues, she did not take a convincing stance in
favor of the opposition leaders.

Instead, the newly elected

alderman attempted to determine the community "feelings" on
the issue.

As a result, community residents emerged as the

leaders who would direct and organize the community response
to the stadium development plans.
Finally, in South Armour Square the local aldermans'
role in the negotiations was less than minimal.

He proved

incapable of advocating for the interests of the residents
in City Hall.

According to Mccarron (1987e):

They [some residents in the South Armour Square]
learned about the bill-signing ceremony only because
somebody heard about it on radio. So they gathered
over the weekend in the kitchen of neighbor Lillian
Brown, tore up a bunch of cardboard soda-pop cartons
and hand-lettered some protest signs with Magic
Markers . . . . They have been told nothing [about the new
stadium], not by the mayor, not by his department
heads, not by their alderman, Patrick Huels (11th), not
even by the precinct captain even though the precinct
with all the endangered homes delivered 345 of its 359
votes to Harold Washington in April's election.
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After considering these variations in local political
representation, it is obvious to see why the Lake View
residents proved to be the most successful of the three
communities.

They attempted to organize and influence

decisions through the existing political structure.

Forming

a partnership with the local alderman, city government and
community representatives, resulted in effective
negotiations with stadium developers.

This type of

conventional participation, which uses the institutional
channels of representative government (Conway, 1990; Janda,
Berry and Goldman, 1996), was clearly a central aspect of
the strategy employed by the north side community.
Internal Divisions
A comparison of the three communities' responses to the
stadium development plans shows the Lake View community to
be the most unified.

Although the Near West Side did

experience some internal divisions, as various community
organizations viewed the proposed plans differently, it was
the South Armour Square response which proved to be the most
divided.
Contributing to this internal division were the
residents' feeling of powerlessness.

Because of the

influence of the state, they believed that the construction
of a stadium in their community was inevitable.
result, they began to act individually.

As a

Their goal became

to arrange the best deal possible for themselves, since they
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feared the that the state would take over their homes
without even providing replacement housing.

Likewise,

community leaders on the Near West Side also realized that
in the end the United Center would be built.

Yet, they

remained more focused to extract the best possible benefits
for the local community.

The extent of displacement in

South Armour Square and the power of the state, proved much
more overwhelming in dividing the community response than in
the more limited displacement and state imposition
experienced by the Near West Side.
On the other hand, the Lake View residents did not
experience the threat of direct reorganization of physical
space due to displacement.

Thus, their personal interests

did not become an issue, and, as a result, the Lake View
residents viewed the introduction of lights to be a
community problem rather than an individual concern.

They

remained united.
Imposition of Local and State Government
The magnitude of power exercised by the state and local
governments also played an important role in influencing the
communities' responses to the stadium development plans.

In

the case of the South Armour Square, the influence of the
state government in realizing the construction of a publicly
funded stadium for the White Sox proved overwhelming.

The

state and the city, through the ISFA, had access to many
resources - political, legal, financial - in their efforts
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to remove the residents.

In the face of all this, the

community's attempts to challenge these plans proved
ineffective.
The role of the state and local government on the Near
West Side was not imposed in the same manner that it was in
the South Armour Square case.

Though the government in this

community supported the private interests of the developers,
the community leaders did not directly conflict with
government representatives.

Part of the strategy of the

Near West Side community leaders was to exclude the
government from the negotiations.

As Gates told me:

I knew that if we could keep the government out of the
negotiations we would have a chance to get something
out of the agreement. You see, that was our goal. You
can never beat the government. That's why we were
successful.
Finally, in the Lake View case, the government did not
directly impose its will on the community.
contributed to the resident's effectiveness.

This greatly
Though, in the

end, the ordinance passed by the city allowed for the
installation of lights at Wrigley Field, through the active
involvement of the local alderman, and a strong voter
turnout in a non-binding referendum, the residents had the
opportunity to effectively communicate their concerns.
Political circumstances
It was during the Washington administration that the
South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side stadium
development plans first emerged.

With the death of Mayor
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Washington, these stadium issues in Chicago became even more
politicized.

The Mayor employed an approach which had

attempted to balance the community requests with the
interests of the developers.

Because of this strategy,

Washington proved capable of advancing his agenda by
building appropriate political coalitions in City Hall.
Following his death, political direction on the stadium
issues diminished, subsequently having a different effect on
the three communities.
In the case of South Armour Square, this politicization
contributed to further dividing the community and weakening
its response.
neutral.

On the Near West Side, the effect was

Even though plans to develop a stadium on the Near

West Side had the support of Washington, the Mayor was also
sensitive to the community's needs.

The shift in

administrations provided community leaders with an
opportunity to assert their agenda.

Yet, the lack of local

political support, did not provide the residents leverage to
halt the stadium development plans.
On the other hand, the death of Mayor Washington
provided an already politically engaged Lake View community
with an opportunity to further oppose the lights proposal.
This community attempted to enlist wider City Hall support
since the political agenda on this stadium issue now lacked
direction.
The community which had the greatest political means to
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resist the stadium development plans (Lake View), proved to
potentially benefit the most from these circumstances.

On

the other hand, the community with the least effective local
representation (South Armour Square) proved unable to take
advantage of these circumstances and resist the stadium
development plans.
Occupancy Status
The type of occupancy also proved to play an important
role in these community responses, especially in the case of
South Armour Square.

The presence of both renters and

owners divided this community when the relocation package
was proposed.

For the renters, the ISFA offer recognized

the needs of the owners to a much greater extent than it
recognized those of their own.

Because of the relocation

proposal, the community became further divided due to their
occupancy status.

The owners, without regard for the

renters, concentrated on extracting the best replacement
housing possible.
The role of the media
Another factor which proved influential in the way
these communities responded to the stadium development plans
was the media.

The media in all of these cases sided with

the developers, often isolating the community leaders
describing them as radical, self-serving and insensitive to
the well-being of their communities.

The media also

consistently promoted the proposed social and economic
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benefits of these professional sports franchises.

Acting in

support of urban redevelopment, they urged the construction
of a stadium on the Near West Side since it would save this
socially and economically devastated community.

Though

Lake View was more successful in utilizing the media to
advance its discontent with the lights proposal at Wrigley
Field, none of these communities found the media as an ally
in their efforts.
Role of these factors in community response
Because of the above mentioned factors

(the types of

organizational strategies), the effectiveness of the tactics
utilized by the residents proved different.

The community

of Lake View was most capable in its response to the
installation of lights, as exemplified by the neighborhood
protection plan.

This plan shows that the community ensured

continued attention to the effects of this stadium
development plan.

The community of the Near West Side

proved capable of sustaining numerous short term benefits.
Yet, this community has been unable to guarantee continued
partnerships with the government and the developers on
issues facing the Near West Side.

Finally, the community of

the South Armour Square proved incapable of resisting these
stadium development plans, resulting in considerable
displacement.
In considering the communities' responses, it becomes
clear that structural forces played a very critical role.
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The inability of the South Armour Square to effectively
address the community concerns can be attributed to factors
such as race, class, and the role of the state.

These

factors proved to impact each community differently,
producing social inequalities, while also communicating
their effect on urban change within a larger context.
The communities of South Armour Square and the Near
West Side did not rely on the political system to advance
their goals.

The community leaders instead attempted to

take it upon themselves to best respond to the stadium
development plans.

On the other hand, in Lake View, the

community proved most capable of employing the political
system to represent its goals.

This variation can be

attributed to the different ways blacks and whites perceive
the effectiveness and inner-workings of the government.
Research shows that for blacks, the political system is
viewed to be ineffective, untrustworthy and incapable of
responding without bias to their needs (Shingles, 1981; Bobo
and Gilliam, 1990) .
In addition to these structural factors, the residents
of the South Armour Square and the Near West Side accepted
the fact that eventually these stadiums would be built in
their communities.

As a result, their goal became to search

for the best possible arrangement, thus, contributing to the
success of the stadium developers.

The community responses

then are part of a dynamic experience of both structure and
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agency.

The Effects of the Stadium Plans on the Three Communities
The stadium development plans discussed in this study
contributed to the physical and cultural reorganization of
these communities.

The effectiveness of the community

response and the degree of impact proved interconnected.
Following, I summarize these effects:
South Armour Square and the New Comiskey Park
The new Comiskey Park in South Armour Square was
completed in 1991.

This stadium was meant to provide the

White Sox with increased prof its since they threatened to
leave the city and the state.

As a result, the construction

of this sports facility required the displacement of an
African-American community including numerous businesses.
This development has had a direct physical effect on this
area, since, over 15 acres of land were taken from the
community to develop the new structure.
In addition to this physical reorganization, the
culture of this community has also been transformed with the
removal of this neighborhood and the demolition of
McCuddy's, a local baseball bar which had become a south
side landmark.

In addition, the lease agreement between the

state and the franchise prohibited locals from selling their
products outside the new sports facility, since the
franchise was given complete control over all game related
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sales.
Efforts by the community to address these effects have
been slow.

The public housing residents left behind,

without the support of the local government, have recently
attempted to redevelop their community.

Their goal has been

to reintroduce the community businesses destroyed during the
stadium development process.
Lake View and Wrigley Field
In 1988, the community of Lake View experienced the
addition of lights at Wrigley Field, a stadium development
plan.

Though, there was no displacement or direct physical

reorganization of space resulting from the lights
installation, this stadium development plan has contributed
to transforming this part of Lake View into an entertainment
area.

Night games assisted the various entertainment

businesses by supplying the "after the game" crowds.

A

parking program intended to assist the community, affected
businesses which did not rely on night games for business.
Thus, a different type of co-existence between Wrigley Field
and the community of Lake View, driven by this stadium
development plan, emerged.
At the same time, the long term implications of the
lights at Wrigley Field on the community of Lake View are
yet to be determined.

Driven by economic rationales and

transportation demands, the community could be transformed
as efforts to accommodate a larger number of night games are
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undertaken.

Specifically, under this scenario, surface or

multi-level parking structures would yield more profits than
the current operation of these structures as rental units.
If that becomes the case, Wrigley Field will not be a
ballpark integrated with the local community, but rather
another suburban-style facility.

The future stability of

this north side community largely depends on the stability
of Wrigley Field.
Near West Side and the United Center
In the 80's and the early 90's the community of the
Near West Side was presented with proposals for the
construction of two sports facilities.

These proposed

stadium development plans resulted in the construction of
the United Center in 1994.
Though the magnitude of this project is not comparable
to the new Comiskey Park, displacement of residents proved
inescapable.

Beyond this direct, physical effect, the

construction of the United Center on the Near West Side has
sparked additional physical reorganization, and has served
as a catalyst of culture change.
Specifically, driven by the 1996 National Democratic
Convention to be held at the United Center, the city has
invested considerably into area beautification and other
related projects, including the demolition of the nearby
Henry Horner Public Housing.

This form of public investment

occurred along side additional private spending on the area
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surrounding the United Center.

To that extent, the actions

of the private and public sector work to alter the cultural
and physical environment of this community.
Though some form of urban redevelopment on the Near
West Side was clearly needed, the community advocated
different types of spatial reorganization than those
advanced by the stadium developers, the local government and
the media.

The most recent developments on the Near West

Side, precipitated by the construction and presence of the
United Center, point toward the creation of a space and a
culture not inclusive of its current residents.
Gentrification, increased cost of redevelopment and higher
taxes will likely force many of the current residents to
move elsewhere, thus reshaping this part of the city.

Government and Corporate Partnership in Stadium Development
This study also outlines the role of the government in
these stadium projects.

Though the degree of involvement

and financial contribution to the plans varied, a clear
partnership between government and private interests can be
observed.
The government played a critical role in each of these
three situations.

The most intense government support of

private interests can be observed in the case of South
Armour Square and of the new Comiskey Park.

The local and

state governments not only financed the construction of a
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new facility for the White Sox, but also agreed to be
responsible for its management and operation.

In addition

to this extraordinary, direct, financial assistance, the
government, at public cost, assumed the responsibility for
the removal and relocation of community residents.
In the case of the installation of lights at Wrigley
Field in Lake View, the local government again played a key
role.

It was the mayoral support of these stadium

development plans which resulted in the approval of a City
Council resolution, making night games at Wrigley Field
possible.
Finally, the government proved to be in support of the
stadium development proposals on the Near West Side.

The

city government promoted these proposals as a means of
redevelopment, while playing a key role in the production of
a publicly financed package which would make the
construction of a stadium for the Bears in that community
possible.

Though this plan eventually failed, the

government later assisted with the infrastructural
development of the United Center, while providing sales and
luxury skybox tax incentives.
The professional franchises utilized four methods to
ensure that the government would support their goals.
Specifically, they (1) threatened to leave Chicago, coercing
the city and the state into distributing 'necessary' public
funds to support their goals,

(2) employed economic impact
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studies to show their economic contribution to the city,
county and state,

(3) argued that the franchises' presence

assisted in the advancement of civic pride while noting the
special relationship between the public and the teams, and
(4) argued that their proposed plans would result into
positive urban redevelopment.
The utilization of these methods can be seen in all
three of these cases.

For example, both the White Sox and

the Cubs threatened to leave Chicago unless their demands
were met.

The same two franchises also published economic

impact studies to showcase their contribution to Chicago's
and Illinois' economies.

The Tribune Co., through various

surveys also attempted to bring to the attention of the
public and the politicians that Wrigley Field was a special
ballpark and that the Cubs were an integral part of
Chicago's history.

The Tribune Co., advocated that

Chicagoans strongly identified with the Cubs and Wrigley
Field, thus a move of the Cubs out of Chicago would mean the
possible demolition of the historic ballpark.
The Bears, the Bulls and the Blackhawks promoted the
concept of urban redevelopment on the Near West Side,
claiming a new sports stadium or arena would provide
economic opportunities and help revitalize the area.
Though the community responses and community effects of the
stadium development plans were different in each of the
three case studies presented earlier, the driving force
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behind these stadium proposals by these professional
franchises remained the same; a search toward profits and
increased capital.

Thus, government support of free

enterprise, expressed through stadium development becomes a
central finding of this analysis.

The Role of these Urban Social Movements
But what role do these urban community movements play
in society and more specifically, can the community
responses discussed in this study inform us of the dynamics
of social change in the urban environment?

What is the

social significance of these localized urban movements?
Answering these questions will allow both a connection and
an interpretation of the events which occurred in South
Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side in Chicago
during the 1980's and 1990's into a larger social and urban
context.
Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) examines urban social
movements within capitalism.

Since the city is a social

product, class conflict and production relations contribute
to the emergence of social movements.

The capitalist class

reorganizes social forms, and according to Castells results
in "changes [in] the existing meaning .... A social movement
develops its own meaning over a given space in contradiction
to the structurally dominant meaning"
305) .

(Castells, 1983: 304-
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In this regard, the stadium development plans, an
expression of the dominant political and economic interests,
perpetuate urban change as indicated by the effect that
these stadium development plans have on these communities
and the city in general.

The conflict between the stadium

developers and the communities provides the contested
meaning of space within these communities.
This notion of contested meaning of urban development
is best exemplified in the cases of the Near West Side and
the South Armour Square.

Specifically, the city, the

developers and the media viewed a new stadium differently
than did the residents of these communities.

The plans of a

new, open-air sports stadium on the Near West Side, for
example, would develop into an urban redevelopment project,
capable of rescuing that community from its current
condition.

On the other hand, the community leadership

attributed a different meaning to redevelopment, or at least
how redevelopment ought to take place.

As Gates noted to

me:
They [stadium developers] were undermining our
intelligence. Like we do not know what is best for our
community . . . . Others want to tell you what is best for
you. Our approach was that we wanted, the community
that is, to define our own destiny. We want to make
the decisions as to what is best for us. Why? Because
we live here, we are the ones to be affected by the new
construction, the traffic and all that. That's why.
Similarly, in the case of the new Comiskey Park development
in South Armour Square, Radford-Hill noted:
The case of a sports stadium is not a public benefit.
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It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing
back to the community affected.
As a result of these conflicting perceptions of urban
meaning, and through the struggles that ensue, an
understanding of the process of urban change emerges.
At the same time, these urban movements proved quite
limited.

Although a variation in the level of success can

be observed, in the end, the interests of the developers
proved overwhelming.

In all three cases the communities

proved incapable of suspending the construction of new
stadiums in South Armour Square and Near West Side, and the
installation of lights at Wrigley Field.

What then becomes

the significance of these community movements?

Is there a

long term social significance?
Castells (1983:319) views these movements within the
larger context of social change by noting that these
movements alone are incapable of producing social change.
While reflecting on the role of the urban movements of this
study, one can conclude that all three of these movements
lost the possibility of a radical focus.

A focus which

would have attempted to challenge the institutionalization
of the dominant interests at the structural level.

Rather,

all three of the urban movements evolved into interests
groups, concentrating on advancing single objectives (i.e,
resident relocation, neighborhood protection, etc) .
Yet, on the macro level of analysis, these urban social
movements can be viewed as assisting in the production of
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social change since they" ... are the organizational forms,
the live schools, where the new social movements of our
emerging society are taking place, growing up, learning to
breath, out of reach of the state apparatuses ... " (Castells,
1983: 331).

In this regard, the urban social movements of

discussed here, while disjointed, sporadic, and powerless,
have the ability to contribute to the creation of a culture
structure capable of producing social change.

Specifically,

the language employed by the community organizers, the
community tactics, the exposure of the dominant interests,
etc., can have an influence on other urban social movements.

Conclusion
The responses of these three communities to the plans
of the stadium developers varied.

Structural factors such

as race, class and the political support of private
interests played a critical role in the outcomes.

In

addition, South Armour Square and the Near West Side,
accepted the fact that the developers would eventually
succeed, thus, contributing to the construction of the two
sports facilities.
It also becomes clear that stadiums and stadium
development plans, can have both direct and indirect effects
on the urban environment.

In this regard, both the physical

and the cultural organization of community living is
transformed.

Finally, the role of the government in this
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process becomes crucial.

In all three case studies

presented, the government worked in accord with the
developers to realize their capitalist interests.
In the end, a combination of government, economic and
social factors are transcended through the stadium
developments of this study.

In the process, an opportunity

to better understand urban change and urban life is
revealed.

CHAPTER 11
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has investigated the relationship between
urban communities and stadium development within the larger
scope of capitalist relations.

Urban centers across America

have departed from being identified as centers of
manufacturing and industry and have increasingly become
involved in promoting themselves as cities of culture.

This

shift in direction is consistent with the emergence of a
post-industrial society, elements of which have included
decentralization and globalization.

The economies which

have emerged from these structural changes can be identified
as culture industries.

Such industries have included the

arts, urban tourism and sports.
Professional sports teams have come to be viewed by
local governments, civic boosters, the media and the teams
themselves as significant economic and social/cultural
contributors.

In this regard, these sports franchises

differ from other local businesses since they can draw from
their symbolic and cultural value to become intensely
connected with the cities themselves.

The investigation of

the urban environment, including urban change, requires a
theoretical framework which integrates cultural factors into
337
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an analysis of political and economic aspects.
The stadium becomes the link between the professional
team and the city.

A new or refurbished stadium provides

the sports franchise with an opportunity to substantially
increase its profit through advertizing and luxury seating.
The city on the other hand, since its cultural image and
perceived progress relies on the presence of the team, will
have to invest in the construction of sports facilities.
Spending on these projects by local and/or state
government proves to be another example of how public
support of private interests within the urban environment
occurs.

Rationalizing these governmental expenditures

becomes of primary concern to public officials, the media
and the franchise owners.

In order for the public to accept

this spending, an environment supporting its approval must
be produced.
Within this context sports and the stadium become first
represented in economic terms.

Through the use of

multiplier effects and economic impact studies, spending
advocates argue that the presence of the team and of the
stadium will result in regional economic growth and urban
redevelopment.

Secondly, this line of thinking is followed

by social and cultural arguments which outline community
building and social cohesion as the outcome of the
activities of the professional team.

These arguments are

advanced by the media which is often positioned to play a
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public policy role.
Yet, research shows that the multiplier effects as a
well as the publicized economic impact studies are seriously
exaggerated.

Problems with definitions, estimations,

assumptions, and vested interests produce findings which
prove unfounded.

Though one can accept the proposed social

functions of professional sports, the extremes to which
these arguments extend seriously undermine the reported
benefits.

Thus, construction of a stadium and the presence

of a professional sports franchise for the city, in the
majority of the cases, does not provide a return equivalent
to the reported benefits.
At the same time, the drive amongst urban centers
toward urban redevelopment through the use of culture
industries also becomes apparent.

Sports, like the arts,

museums, conventions, theme parks and other related
entertainment industries stimulate public investment and
generate government support for stadium construction and
development.

Cities compete to attract professional

franchises by offering huge subsidies and state-of-the-art
facilities.

In the process, the city develops an identity

which often becomes connected to the team and its players.
For example, a recent NIKE ad on a Chicago expressway
highlights a Bears football jersey with pads and the slogan:
"City of Big Shoulders."

Similarly, Michael Jordan has

become a role model serving as an ambassador for the
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Chicago.

The success of the Bulls of the NBA has produced a

world-wide following and the name of the city which the team
represents, becomes depicted in sportswear worn by fans all
around the world.

These sports-based, culturally driven

representations, do not powerfully communicate a city as a
place of industry and a hub of economic activity.

Rather,

Chicago now becomes portrayed as a sporting city, a city of
entertainment and culture.

The use and role of these images

then become part of a strategy toward urban growth.

As a

result, sports is a culture industry which takes center
stage, able to communicate and construct a new urban
identity.
This study further analyzes three stadium development
plans in Chicago; the New Comiskey Park in South Armour
Square, the installation of lights at Wrigley Field in Lake
View, and the construction of the United Center on the Near
West Side.

These investigations cover the political economy

of these projects, the community responses, and the
potential effects of these plans on the communities.

These

case studies allow for the following conclusions to emerge:
(1) Stadium development substantially increases the profits
of professional franchises.
(2) There is strong relationship between the interests of
the stadium developers and the actions of the public
officials (local and/or state governments), who work to
support private enterprise.
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(3) Multiplier figures and social/cultural rationales are
employed to advance the interests of the professional sports
teams.
(4) The community response to these stadium development
plans varies since the social and economic organization of
these communities differs.
(5) Race matters since minority communities prove to be more
directly affected by these projects.

At the same time,

because of the racial make-up of these communities, the
developers and the government find it easier to assert their
agenda.
(6) Social inequality proves to be the outcome of these
projects within the urban environment.
(7) Effective community organizing proves critical in
maintaining continuous government support.
(8) The media plays an important role as it works to support
the interests of the developers.
(9) The stadium as an urban development tool is capable of
not only reorganizing the physical space but also of
transforming local culture.

Thus, the stadium can effect

urban change.
(10) A coalition of government, the media, and capitalists
works to advance private interests.
(11) Culture becomes a driving force behind urban
development and urban change.
This study also communicates the need for additional
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research regarding the relationship between urban
communities and stadium development.

Specifically, the

following areas are identified where further analysis can be
conducted:
(1)

Investigation of the political and economic processes

through which the agenda of the stadium developers is
advanced.
(2) Examination of the ways through which cultural factors
are employed to conceal the implications of these projects.
(3) Assessment of the proposed benefits resulting from these
projects.
(4) Analysis of community effects and urban change.
(5) Exploration of the changing nature of urban centers as
culture cities and the role which sports play within this
framework.
The use of an analytic framework which combines cultural
factors to political and economic forces expands our
understanding of the urban environment and informs us that
even sports contribute to shaping the nature of urban
centers across America as we move toward the 21st century.

APPENDIX A
CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN ONE MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO BETWEEN
1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
1980 - 1990
20-24
25-34
35-44
over 60
Living alone
Living with
non-relatives
Never Married (men)
Never Married (worn)
Bachelor's or higher
Lived in same house
five years ago
Use public trans
for work
Managerial and
Professional
Technical, Sales
and administrative
support
Median Income in
thousand dollars
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
in thousands

+ 1. 2
+ 11. 3
+ 4.3
+

3.1
6.6

+ 8.0
+ 13.7
+ 17.7

49.7 (1990)*
8.3
+

3.3

+ 15.6
+

1. 5

+ 17.2
+ 144

* Due to changes in categories regarding educational
attainment between the 1980 and 1990 census, the figure
reflects the percentage of those with Bachelor's degree or
higher within the tracks surrounding Wrigley Field (U.S.
Census 1980, 1990).
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APPENDIX B
CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990)
YEAR
I

80

I

90

'80

#604
10.7
20-24
23.7
25-34
35-44
12.3
14.7
over 60
Living alone
16.0
Living with
non relatives
5.7
Never Married (men) 40.0
Never Married (worn) 30.6
B.A. or higher
N/A
Lived in same house
45.4
five years ago
Use public trans
35.3
for work
Managerial and
23.2
Professional
Technical, Sales
and administrative
support
29.8
Median Income in
thousand dollars 16.1
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
42
in thousands

'90

#605

I

80

I

90

#606

11. 2
33.6
16.5
10.3
19.6

9.0
19.1
7.0
34.0
31. 0

5.8
22.8
12.7
37.5
36.1

10.2
36.6
11. 9
13.7
29.7

9.7
33.3
19.8
10.4
32.5

13.0
53.3
47.3
49.6

4.3 8.5
37.6 38.9
21. 9 31. 0
N/A 21. 3

12.8
56.4
41. 9
N/A

13.9
56.3
51.2
48.5

39.3

60.2 47.8

47.3 33.8

37.7

49.9 41.4

47.2 56.5

44.3

20.6 31.5

47.4 44.0

25.2

25.1 29.6

38.3 36.6

31.9

5.2 17.0

16.3 31.9

172

42

344

148

119

275
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990)

YEAR
'80

'90

'80

#607
20-24
10.4
25-34
25.9
35-44
11.4
Over 60
13.6
Living alone
21. 5
Living with
non relatives
6.0
Never Married (men) 43.3
Never Married (worn) 29.2
B.A. or higher
N/A
Lived in same house
46.0
five years ago
Use public trans
63.0
for work
Managerial and
29.7
Professional
Technical, Sales
and administrative
26.7
support
Median Income in
thousand dollars 13.7
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
40
in thousands

'90

'80

'90
#611

#610

14.7
32.4
13.5
6.6
19.3

12.8
28.6
11. 5
9.6
18.1

17.4
46.3
15.8
5.6
25.1

10.7
28.7
11.4
10.2
15.6

15.3
46.2
13.0
7.1
23.0

14.1
60.9
45.7
37.8

9.8
52.5
39.7
N/A

23.5
69.9
64.9
61. 2

8.5
47.7
35.0
N/A

20.8
65.2
58.7
57.0

37.0

29.4 18.9

39.5 26.6

51. 0

65.0 54.2

34.4 57.4

32.1

27.6 49.0

35.9 42.4

27.2

26.4 29.7

28.2 38.9

23.4

14.7 34.7

13.6 32.0

200

72

41

212

190
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990)

YEAR
'80

'90

'80

#612
20-24
11. 8
25-34
27.9
35-44
10.8
over 60
13.0
Living alone
12.3
Living with
non relatives
8.5
Never married (men) 44.4
Never married (worn) 37.1
B.A. or higher
N/A
Lived in same house
five years ago
37.3
Use public trans
for work
44.0
Managerial and
Professional
26.2
Technical, Sales
and administrative
26.0
support
Median Income in
thousand dollars 17.2
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
53
in thousands

'90

'80

#614

'90

#615

11. 8
41.4
17.2
10.2
23.2

12.2
26.1
12.2
15.9
18.5

7.5
36.0
19.4
12.1
25.9

10.4
25.4
11. 9
16.7
15.2

13.9
39.0
17.8
10.4
21. 2

16.6
59.5
52.8
60.2

6.9
39.7
36.5
N/A

10.9
53.4
47.5
48.7

5.9
38.4
31. 9
N/A

17.9
58.0
51. 7
58.4

41. 7

32.3 40.6

47.5 38.5

47.6

37.9 42.8

41. 8 45.9

51.4

36.7 44.1

26.6 48.9

29.1

31. 2 33.1

29.6 32.9

38.3

15.8 34.4

18.8 36.9

95

62

51

250

262
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990)

YEAR
'80

'90

'80

#616
20-24
13.4
25-34
28.3
35-44
14.5
over 60
11. 5
Living alone
20.3
Living with
non relatives
10.2
Never married (men) 50.0
Never married (worn) 40 .3
B.A. or higher
N/A
Lived in same house
five years ago
23.6
Use public trans
for work
34.8
Managerial and
Professional
52.7
Technical, Sales
and administrative
support
40.2
Median Income in
thousand dollars 16.6
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
in thousands
46

'90

'80

#617

'90

#621

10.8
45.5
16.9
7.5
41. 5

13.2
29.4
10.5
10.3
19.0

21. 9
38.1
13.5
8.5
16.5

13.6
29.5
10.8
10.9
20.7

20.2
39.6
13.1
11.8
27.0

14.0
71. 6
59.1
59.6

11. 6
55.3
36.0
N/A

24.8
72.2
67.7
55.0

10.0
57.4
38.7
N/A

22.1
72.7
60.9
52.6

20.8

51. 5 26.1

31. 7 23.3

50.8

49.9 50.5

49.3 56.4

53.8

22.3 44.0

31.4 44.7

32.8

30.0 31. 0

31. 6 36.1

31.4

17.7 38.2

11.4 27.8

167

62

57

262

206
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990)

YEAR
'80

'90

'80

#622
20-24
13.5
25-34
24.7
35-44
10.4
over 60
10.3
Living alone
12.8
Living with
non relatives
7.9
Never Married (men) 47.7
Never Married (worn) 34.9
B.A. or higher
N/A
Lived in same house
five years ago
25.3
Use public trans
for work
39.8
Managerial and
Professional
23.4
Technical, Sales
and administrative
28.1
support
Median Income in
thousand dollars 14.4
Rounded Mean value of
housing units
47
in thousands

'90

'80

#623

'90

#624

13.3
39.9
17.5
6.9
22.3

11. 0
21. 7
12.1
15.2
14.7

9.1
37.2
16.2
10.8
22.4

11. 2
17.8
12.0
16.4
11. 6

10.2
32.1
12.8
13.7
16.7

16.4
58.0
53.0
52.4

6.4
40.7
29.1
N/A

11. 8
54.9
45.3
44.2

5.7
39.3
27.7
N/A

11. 7
50.7
38.7
38.9

32.3

60.8 41. 6

53.2 46.5

43.6

34.2 47.4

38.3 30.9

47.6

14.4 47.3

20.0 47.5

29.5

24.0 31. 8

32.8 28.1

34.5

11. 5 32.2

16.2 33.2

197

32

37

158

177
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